Editor’s Note
The world is witnessing new forms of conflict. These occur in otherwise stable areas where traditional rivals were seemingly headed towards a historic rapprochement. Conflicts have acquired non-kinetic dimensions, like the coercive stand-off in Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). They are proliferating to newer domains – cyber, information, cognitive, energy and economic. It appears that between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the India-Middle-East-Economic-Corridor (IMEC), the world is moving towards a clash of connectivity and corridors. While drawing lessons may be risky and premature, trends need to be deciphered and analysed as these will drive future geo-strategic exchanges. The major emerging trends are discussed by the author in this analysis. The article is in two parts; part II will follow.
Every year, strategic experts and reputed think tanks publish projected ‘conflict-risk’ indices, with likely global conflict hot spots for the year. Maps and graphics invariably accompany these listings. Following is one such representative graphic:
Map Credit – Statista – https://www.statista.com
An analysis of these lists reveals that they naturally draw inferences from the established and well-known geo-strategic theories like Halford Mackinder’s ‘Heartland theory’, Nicholas Spykman’s ‘Rimland theory’ and Alfred Mahan’s ‘Sea Power’ theories. These are contextualised with contemporary geo-political realities. These analyses reveal that most projections conform to Greek analyst Dimitri Kitsikis’s postulates. He opined that besides Mackinder’s – Eurasian heartland, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) intermediate region will also remain the crucible of conflicts. In effect, Kitsikis added a geo-civilizational dimension to an otherwise geo-political construct. MENA is the arena of competing civilisations, exemplifying Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’.
The major ongoing conflicts include- Azerbaijan-Nagrano Karbakh (since 2020), Ukraine (since 2020), and Gaza (since Oct 2023). All these conflicts have been festering for decades, and the timelines indicated are only for the current round of hostilities. The world concurrently continues to be bedevilled with low levels of brewing conflicts/insurgencies unleashed by Houthis, Kurds, Islamic State in Syria/Levant (ISIS), Hezbollah, Hamas and other militants and even private militias like Wagner Army. This arc of instability currently extends from Mali-Sudan-Syria-Lebanon to Yemen. It may be early to add Venezuelan-Guyana skirmishes to this mix, as the situation is getting defused. In addition, more importantly, grey zone coercive posturing by China on the Sino-Indian border since 2020 and aggressive deployment and aerial/maritime manoeuvres of Chinese in the South China Sea targeting Taiwan need to be very carefully monitored.
Template for Analysis
Drawing lessons from unresolved wars and conflicts is risky and premature, yet some critical trends and pointers must be deciphered. In these unending, prolonged, drawn-out conflicts, new paradigms of warfighting are emerging along with possible countermeasures. These may solidify into principles and define postulates in the future.
The most obvious case in point is the pre-mature sounding of the death knell for tanks, consequent to disruptive top-attack effects unleashed by Turkish Bayraktar-TB2 drones and Switchblade ‘Kamikaze’ loitering munitions. Russian-origin tanks in Armenia and Ukraine bore the brunt of reverses, which was magnified by the Western media. Notwithstanding the hasty obituaries, Russian tanks duly fortified are back in Ukraine and modified Israeli Merkavas are fielded in Gaza.
Emerging inferences in an uncertain, dynamic flux of ongoing conflicts need to be validated and customised to the local environment. In our context, in Ladakh, drones are likely to have minimal efficacy due to high altitude and environmental factors. Fortified Merkava-4 is leading Israeli attacks into Gaza. However, India never uses tanks in urban warfare. In contrast, India prefers to secure populated areas with combined arms teams. India is not really in the conflict crucible of MENA, yet we have existing challenges from aggressive China and Pakistan-fostered proxy wars.
More importantly, our adversaries are increasingly in a collusive mode. The conflicts seem ever present, though latent and lurking in the shadows. They get triggered by surprise and isolated events like the Hamas raid in Gaza on 7th October, even when the region was headed for an impending rapprochement between Israel and Saudi Arabia. In a recent interaction, two former Indian Chiefs flagged internal challenges as our main threats. Hence, we need to keep our guard up and be vigilant against external threats and internal fault lines. The subject is analysed in the context of the relevance of mapped attributes in our environment.
Mapping-Emerging Trends
The first defining trend is that applying kinetic force has limited effect and utility. It is certainly not adequate for a decisive end-state. Putin’s so-called special operations, designed to capture Kyiv and effect regime change in the garb of de-Nazification, ensure neutrality or keep away Western powers, planned to be achieved in two weeks, have entered the third year. It is even after the annexation of Crimea and areas in the Donbas region by Russia, starting in 2014. Even the planned counter-offensives by both sides are stalemated with negligible progress.
Similarly, Israeli Defence Force (IDF) operations in Gaza are already in the third month and are likely to linger. Resource control, huge technical asymmetry and relentless operations are yet to get IDF, the desired objectives and the end state. The resolute stand adopted by India in Ladakh has certainly derailed the PLA game plan of forcing India into capitulation and scoring an uncontested grey zone victory.
As a complementary inference, it will be pragmatic for nations to avoid hostility and application of kinetic force. Even if forced into it, it will be prudent to stipulate realistic goals with a clearly defined end-state. It is also axiomatic to build interim exit options, which may be required for conflict termination and face-saving.
Putin and Zelinsky seem caught in this account’s never-ending logjam and ego-trap. Even in Gaza, Hamas’s objective of getting the focus back on Palestine and Gaza seems more likely to be achieved rather than the IDF mission of destroying Hamas. Even securing the release of hostages may need more time and even more concessions.
The following major corollary debunks the long-held belief that wars are likely to be short, swift and decisive. In India-Pakistan, the 14-day operational cycle was used as a template. Consequently, stocking and war reserves were planned for 21 days of combat. Long, drawn-out conflicts with indeterminate objectives are more likely to be the norm and the new normal in future. In addition, conflicts are likely to degenerate into extended hybrid wars/insurgencies, especially in Palestine, where Hamas may get temporarily marginalised, albeit only till a more dangerous variant of Hamas sprouts in its place. Wanton destruction of population centres is becoming the new normal, with Aleppo, Grozny, Mariupol, and Gaza razed to the ground. Humanitarian crises with large-scale civilian casualties and displacement of refugees invariably accompany it.
Another major trend is validating the seminal maxim that no defence line is impregnable, especially in the face of determined Fedayeens like Hamas. The famed Gaza Barrier has been added to compromised ones like the French Maginot and German Siegfried Lines (World War II), the Berlin Wall (Cold War) and the Barlev Line (1973 Arab-Israeli war), to list the important ones. While breaching of defence lines is inevitable, the immediate response is the key imperative.
IDF slipped up badly on this account during the audacious Hamas raid. It has been repeatedly seen that information, though available and plentiful, needs to be collated and analysed to convert it into operational and actionable intelligence. Hence, timely analysis of data and surveillance are most important. We need to revamp our surveillance and intelligence structures/ mechanisms analytics, as we have been repeatedly surprised in Kargil (1999) and again in Ladakh (2020).
For prolonged conflicts, nations must build resilience in the logistics chain and spurt capabilities to ramp up inventories rapidly. We are witnessing Russia, famed for its depots and military-industrial complex, now scouting for spares and munitions. Countries like Pakistan have become suppliers to their Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)- Ukraine.
At one time, we were planning to stock only for a 21-day conflict. It is time to adopt a ‘whole-of-nation’ approach with civil-military fusion, enabling dual-use technologies and applications. An apt example is the fielding of Elon Musk’s Commercial of the Shelf (COTS) satellite communications and Starlinks terminals by Ukrainians to circumvent Russian electronics warfare. Another exciting aspect is the use of crowdfunding to field low-end drones, like the employment of ham operators in yesteryears. Fielding such dual-use devices is the obvious way forward. These conflicts have literally become trial and testing grounds for armaments. Large manufacturers are exhausting munitions, nearing the end of their shelf-life. In a no-victor, no-vanquished scenario, the only winner seems to be the military-industrial complex with bulging order books. We also need to boost our defence industry eco-system and infuse dual-use stakes.
Lt Gen KJ Singh (Retd)
