Editor’s Note
Is the NATO alliance under stress? The North Atlantic Treaty lays down the modus operandi to be adopted by member states, with a fair degree of clarity, regarding any of its parties facing conventional aggression. However, the treaty does not reasonably state the methodology for a nuclear threat or attack on any member. In Europe, as of date, except for France, no other state has a comprehensive nuclear capability. Even the UK’s submarine fleet with nuclear weapons is on lease from the US.
In the fast-moving geopolitical whirlwind unleashed by the Trump administration over the Russia-Ukraine conflict, European nations are questioning whether American guarantees under Article 5, complimented by Article 6 of the NATO agreement, which they had taken for granted, would still stand.
In a flurry of statements in consonance with his consistent stance over the years, President Trump said, “It’s common sense, right?” Trump told reporters in the Oval Office, “If they don’t pay, I’m not going to defend them. No, I’m not going to protect them”.
French President Emmanuel Macron starkly stated that “The United States, our ally, has changed its position on this war, is less supportive of Ukraine and is casting doubt on what will happen next,” Macron said, adding: “I want to believe that the United States will remain by our side, but we need to be ready if that were not the case.”
He further added, “Our nuclear deterrence protects us, it is complete, sovereign, French from end to end,” Macron said of France’s nuclear arsenal. “This protects us much more than many of our neighbours”.
Responding to the French President’s statements, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov bluntly stated that “If he considers us a threat, he calls a meeting of the chiefs of general staff of European countries and Britain, says that it is necessary to use nuclear weapons, prepares to use nuclear weapons against Russia, this is, of course, a threat”.
Rhetoric aside, it is important to examine the facts in the above statements, which originate from both sides of the Atlantic.
First, look at Article 5 and Article 6 of the NATO Agreement.
Article 5 states that “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area”.
“Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.”
The wording of Article 5 is as woolly as it gets. There is no mention of any ‘Nuclear Umbrella’ and as such is not legally binding.
Article 6 states, “For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”
Again, the ‘complimentary’ Article does not mention any Nuclear Umbrella. Very simply, European states believe in ‘good faith’ of the Americans retaliating with nuclear weapons in case of a nuclear attack!
The British and French had no such illusions and persevered to develop their own nuclear deterrence. However, along the way, the British blundered into thinking that their US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement, 1958, was iron cast, written in stone, and accepted incorporating American nuclear weapons and delivery systems into their nuclear forces.
Possessing nuclear weapons is one thing, having the capability to use them is quite another. Nuclear weapons come in various forms. They can be delivered by aircraft as bombs, by land-based missile systems, by submarine-based missile systems, by ships or submarines (manned or unmanned) nuclear depth charges or nuclear torpedoes, and as also by hand delivery – the supposed ‘suitcase bombs’.
The British Nuclear deterrence is sea-based, centred around their four Vanguard-class Ballistic missile submarines armed with 16 Trident II missiles on lease from America! Yes, on lease! The missiles are completely serviced and maintained by the U.S. at King’s Bay, Georgia, USA.
The British nuclear warheads are supposedly designed by the British but “is reported to be closely related to the American W76 warhead.”
Even if the warhead is indigenous, the missile guidance system, Mk6 MOD1, is American and manufactured by Draper Laboratories, USA. No open-source literature suggests that the British have made their own missile guidance system for their missiles.
A nuclear deterrent is only reliable if ALL the components of the deterrent are indigenous. Even a small component, if imported, can become a single point of vulnerability, rendering the deterrent completely useless. Whether the UK would be able to launch a nuclear weapon and have the warhead hit a designated target without American approval is highly doubtful.
That brings us to the French nuclear deterrent capability. France has both air-launched and submarine-launched systems that are wholly indigenous. The French nuclear deterrence capability is truly organic and self-sustaining. Nothing in open-source data suggests even an iota of dependency for any component on the U.S. or anybody else. President Macron’s statement is, therefore, credible.
Deterrence experts may argue about the size of the arsenal, the doctrinal and policy shifts needed, and so on, but those are side issues. Europe may well be on a course to charting an independent defence strategy against all external threats. Now, it remains to be seen whether the disparate and competing visions of component states allow a united front to confront the emerging geopolitical challenges.
Rear Admiral Ajay Vinay Bhave (Retd)
