Editor’s Note
In Part I of the article, the author dwelt upon global conflicts. He also deliberated on using templates of past wars to arrive at likely models we could face in the future. The author also analysed the modern trends in warfare, including the concept of short and swift wars that have prevailed, logistics in today’s battlefield and the like. In this concluding part, he continues with his analyses of the trends. He defines the uncertainties ahead and touches upon the approach to it.
The quest for the elusive silver bullet or game-changer weapon is never-ending and unlikely to yield results. With no single weapon like tanks or current favourites, drones can win battle independently. Disruptive effects like drones give an initial advantage, but it is only temporary till mitigating defensive and counter-offensive measures are devised.
Tanks are already retrofitted with cage-like structures as part of Tank Top-Attack Survival Kits. In addition, high-end Active Protection Systems like Trophy and Shtora are being fitted, and tanks are fielded within Air Defence envelopes and umbrellas. In essence, it will be the synergistic application of combined all arms teams duly backed up by smart logistics.
Nations strive for technological asymmetry, yet a determined adversary doesn’t allow it to acquire debilitating character by closing the gap. Human elements and operators (men/ women) behind machines (guns) remain very much relevant. It is especially relevant in high altitudes, where environmental factors degrade equipment performance.
The correct training and application of tactical concepts like dispersion, convoy discipline, and intelligent use of ground would have drastically reduced Russian casualties in Ukraine. In this context, it is relevant to recall Indian crews exploiting their improvisation (jugaad) in antiquated Centurion tanks to defeat much superior and modern Pattons (M-48) in the 1965 war. Another example is the audacious employment of helicopters along with the floatation of tanks in the 1971 war to bounce the formidable Meghna River and effect a siege on Dhacca from the most unexpected direction. In essence, well-trained and motivated human capital can offset technical asymmetry.
The most worrying aspect has been that nuclear installations are getting targeted in combat. In the Ukrainian conflict, the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant was damaged, wherein actions of Russian forces were questionable, notwithstanding it being a nuclear power plant. More recently, the Israeli Sdot Micha base, housing Jericho missiles, was attacked by Hamas rockets, probably accidentally.
It underscores the need to ring-fence such facilities as the danger of radiation fall-out and proliferation is very real. Any attempt to reduce or surrender nuclear stockpile is unlikely to find traction in the light of the Ukranian experience. It had surrendered its stockpile in 1994 in return for a Russian nuclear umbrella and guarantees. If it had retained its weapons, the same would have deterred the Russians. John Mearsheimer predicted that without nuclear weapons, Ukraine would be subjected to war. Consequently, the quest for and retaining atomic weapons is likely to increase. Iran is the next serious contender on the verge of threshold limits in this quest.
Security alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or less formalised ones like QUAD as a hedging strategy cannot ensure requisite deterrence. Ukraine has got caught in such a pincer as its partners are most reluctant to put boots on the ground; in fact, fatigue is creeping in on the issue of material support. In effect, such linkages have severe limitations and at best, support can come in the form of resources, but operating crews need re-orientation.
Fielding of externally supplied armaments like American F-16 and German Leopard tanks has drawbacks regarding training and complexities of integration in the beneficiary’s existing combat architecture, surveillance, communication and command grids. For Ukraine, it’s a transition from Russian to Western mode. We will face similar challenges as we are reducing dependence on Russian equipment. In the power play, China has opted to remain in the background in physical involvement even in United Nations force deployment. The only departure is China taking a pro-Palestine stance in the recent Gaza conflict at the cost of her traditional ties with Israel.
It bears reiteration that the performance of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Sudan and Chinese drones in Syria have been sub-optimal. Whether leading powers like China can avoid responsibility and for how long is a moot question. In our context and larger context, nations must build smart partnerships, integral capabilities and self-reliance (Atamnirbhar).
The basic paradigm of national interests being enduring and long-term is undergoing a radical shift in polarized, binary flip-flops at the apex level of security management, especially in the USA. It is starkly evident in the transition from President Obama’s ‘Pivot to Pacific’ to President Trump’s ‘Fortress America’ and Make America Great Again (MAGA). We are witnessing President Biden’s Quad and Build Back Better World (B3W). Concurrently, the focus on NATO, dealing with Russia and China, has drastically changed between Democratic and Republican dispensations. Even in China, the transition from Deng’s ‘Hide your Shine-Bide your Time’ to Xi’s Wolf-Warrior aggressive China surprised many, like India. The lesson for us is to endeavour to forge bipartisan consensus on key security challenges and promulgate a clearly defined national security strategy.
Conflicts are characterised by relentless narrative wars on social media and electronic and print mediums, which were highlighted in the Ukrainian conflict. Now, in Israel, it is a concurrent clash of two narratives- Terrorist Hamas vis-a-vis genocide in Gaza. Cognitive warfare is only going to escalate and proliferate. It’s important to be suitably prepared for it with policy, organisations (like PLA’s Strategic Support Force) and training. Competition and contests, including conflicts, are increasing in emerging domains like Cyber, Space, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Robotics and Autonomous Weapons backed by quantum computing. It will be pragmatic if certain basic global norms and protocols are devised for these domains, like Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) protocols. In our context, concerted research and development (R&D) in AI, autonomous platforms and quantum computing, as well as upgrading organizations in the cyber and space domain, is recommended.
Geo-strategy is yielding ground to geo-economics. Hence, there are conflicts in an economic domain like energy supply through the application of sanctions. In addition, the Nord Stream pipeline sabotaged energy supply from Russia to Europe. However, these have limited utility, as sanctions have affected Russian energy supplies.
Connectivity is another new frontier for power projection, which was flagged by Mike Pompeo, former US Secretary of State, when he dubbed Chinese connectivity corridors like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as more geo-strategic than economics-driven. The American counter strategy is routed through India’s Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC). However, it is currently under a shadow due to the conflict in Gaza. The US establishment has claimed that the Hamas raid was an attempt to disrupt the IMEC initiative. Chinese Maritime Silk Route, including the KRA Canal project, are an attempt to overcome the Malacca dilemma and build energy security. India must remain vigilant about these challenges and stay invested in relevant connectivity corridors like International North-South Transportation (INST), Chabahar, Kaladan, and IMEC to build redundancies.
Summarised Listing of Trends
It is important to reiterate the trends:
- Application of kinetic force has limited utility in objectives and effects.
- Realistic and clearly defined objectives and end state, along with exit options, must be devised when force application is unavoidable.
- The new normal is long, festering conflicts with indeterminate outcomes, often tapering off into hybrid war/insurgencies.
- No defence line is impregnable; quick response and resilience are the key.
- Timely analysis of information and surveillance to convert into opportunities; actionable intelligence is most important.
- Resilience in logistics mandates a ‘whole of nation approach’ and civil-military fusion with dual-use technologies.
- There can be no silver bullet; synergistic application of combined arms, backed by smart logistics, is mandated.
- Technological asymmetry is temporary and contested, and human capital still has relevance, especially in high-altitude warfare.
- Isolation of nuclear installations in battle space requires immediate attention.
- The quest to acquire nuclear weapons is likely to amplify.
- Security alliances have limited hedging value.
- There is a need to evolve a national consensus on key security challenges and promulgate a national security strategy.
- Narrative warfare and cognitive shaping are emerging trends. They require structures and organisation.
- Conflicts are imminent in newer domains like cyber, space and autonomous warfare incorporating AI.
- Sanctions have limited utility, yet they are a growing ingredient of geo-economic contestations.
- Geo-economic contests are evident in energy and connectivity corridors.
Uncertain Future
The power play is acquiring non-kinetic dimensions and grey zone characters like the coercive stand-offs in Ladakh and Taiwan (South China Sea). Even in the kinetic genre, conflicts are festering, and instead of finding a resolution, they are degenerating into insurgencies. Conflict proliferates into newer domains like cyber, space, cognitive and autonomous platforms. Geo-economics is being leveraged through sanctions, especially in energy security. It also appears that the world is moving literally towards a clash of corridors between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and India’s Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC)’
Alliances are unable to ensure deterrence. Hence, nations have to build integral capabilities and intelligent partnerships. The most worrying trend is that the UN and other dispute-resolving bodies have been rendered ineffective. The key challenge is to discern and map emerging trends and stay ahead of disruptive trends. Nations must build survivability, resilience and redundancies in their response mechanisms, infrastructure, manufacturing eco-systems and supply chains.
Lt Gen KJ Singh (Retd)
