Editor’s Note
Islamabad is trying to cosy up to the US by playing an old game in a new environment with rules that have no relevance today. Pakistan was a frontline state in the US-led War on Terror when terror was the priority and Afghanistan the focus. However, such an advantage for Pakistan is hardly imaginable now. Pakistan could certainly hand over, even today, some suspects that the US wants, as it has with the suspected Kabul airport bombing planner Mohammed. However, it’s unlikely that the ground it lost when Biden was in the chair can be regained with Trump and his new priorities.
In his memoirs, Line of Fire, Pervez Musharraf, former President and Army Chief, recalled that Pakistan had captured 689 Al Qaida operatives and had handed over 369 of them to the US. It was Pakistan’s contribution to the US ‘War on Terror’ launched in the aftermath of the bombing of the Twin Towers in 2001.
The latest handing over by Islamabad of the suspected Kabul airport bombing planner Mohammed to the US shows that it aims to try and bring the focus back on US-Pakistan ties with counter-terrorism and Afghanistan as the major points of discussion. In the guise of counter-terrorism cooperation, Pakistan is trying to curry favour with the new Donald Trump administration. Sharifullah, a member of the ISIS-affiliated Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP) is accused of planning the Abbey Gate bombing at Kabul airport on 26 August 2021.
President Trump acknowledged Pakistan’s assistance in Sharifullah’s ‘arrest’ despite the fact that it was US intelligence which provided information on his whereabouts. Bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation has been at the root of ties since President Musharraf joined the ‘war on terror’ in 2001, and the primary route has been through covert channels. In the larger context, Pakistan seeks to gain Washington’s attention at a time when its polity and economy continue to be in dire straits. While President Trump has acknowledged Pakistan’s role, a complete reset of US-Pakistan relations is still some time away as the US focus currently is on China and Russia.
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif thanked the US President on X for acknowledging his country’s role in the apprehension of the ISKP mastermind behind the 2021 bombing. According to PM Sharif, Sharifullah was apprehended on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in late February 2025, demonstrating that the ISI-CIA combine is still active in the region. The Kabul bombing occurred a few days before the US was to have completely withdrawn. Over 200 people were killed, including 13 US soldiers. Both the planner and the bomber, Abdul Rahman al-Logari, had been members of the ISKP since 2016.
While it may be claimed that such cooperation is routine and part and parcel of bilateral counterterrorism cooperation, past precedence indicates that both the US and Pakistan view the intelligence channel as the main mechanism. Both sides also have diplomatic discussions on counterterrorism, the last episode taking place in May 2024. However, differences exist in the approach of each side. While the US wants help in tackling the ISKP, Pakistan wants the US to pressure the Afghan Taliban on the activities of the TTP on Afghan soil.
Pakistan’s current efforts to engage with the Trump administration are focused on terrorist groups like the ISKP and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Many individuals belonging to these groups are also affiliated with Al Qaeda (AQ). Simply put, for Pakistan, mechanisms for counter-terrorism cooperation continue to be aimed at gaining US aid and assistance, including training and capacity building. The US will likely play along for the time being, as South Asia is currently not on their radar. To this point, we shall return a little later.
US-Pakistan counter-terrorism cooperation can be traced to the ‘war on terror’ starting in 2001. While the Pakistan military’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was able to collaborate with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), what irritated Islamabad was the US refusal to give them the technology needed to conduct surveillance and gather information about jihadi elements. Searching for ways to get US attention, the then DG, ISI Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, proposed that Pakistan could give Washington known suspects who were linked to AQ or other terrorist entities. Pakistan also decided that, in return, the US could pay it in cash for each individual/entity. Some reports suggest that the US may have initially suggested the price for each exchange, and in 2006, the US paid US$ 5,000 for a single suspect, and most such individuals were sent either to Guantanamo Bay in the US or Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan.
It resulted in the flow of AQ leaders and other suspected terrorists to the US in exchange for cash. Later, US special forces and the CIA were also charged for overflights and leasing of bases for drone operations. Thus, the war on terror became a ‘war of profit’ for Pakistan. One of the first entities from whom Pakistan gained monetarily was Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi in November 2001, a Libyan national who ran a terrorist training camp (Al Khaldan) in Afghanistan, where some of the 9/11 attackers had reportedly trained. Investigations later showed that al-Libi was not an AQ operative, but he became the American poster boy to show that AQ had plotted against the US.
Bilateral relations with the US under President Joe Biden were routine, and generally, the White House chose to ignore Pakistan. The State and Defence Departments continued with engagement when required. This policy was partly driven by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and a renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific. Pakistan’s current difficult economic situation and uncertain politics make it unattractive to the US. With President Trump focused on reducing China and its military power, the relationship with Pakistan will likely remain patchy. One can visualize a continuing focus on Afghanistan in bilateral discussions; in this sense, the counter-terrorism dialogue will continue to be a platform for engagement. Thus, relations between the US and Pakistan will remain purely transactional, with military cooperation being one of the primary pillars.
Recent developments, however, indicate that the US will continue to focus on Pakistan from a transactional perspective, and issues relating to democracy and human rights will remain on the table. The US Congress allowed the introduction of a bipartisan bill (25 March 2025) which seeks to impose sanctions on General Asim Munir, the Pakistan Army Chief, for his alleged role in the persecution of political opponents, including former Prime Minister Imran Khan. Titled “Pakistan Democracy Act”, the bill calls for action under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. It indicates that the US intends to use available pressure points on Pakistan while persisting with counter-terrorism and defence cooperation, keeping Chinese influence on Islamabad in mind. The symbolism associated with the bill signals US interest in not giving the Pakistan Army a free rein in domestic politics.
Counter-terrorism cooperation between the US and Pakistan has provided the latter with much more than just training and capacity building. The geopolitics of such arrangements give Islamabad an edge over others, given its previous and current association with jihadi elements. However, the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban shifted the narrative somewhat, necessitating an American recalibration of ties with Pakistan. With the US, Islamabad knows it has burnt its boats. Every now and then, there is a flicker of hope that ties will be the same as they were in the past. The new world, however, is much more unforgiving, and Pakistan can only find temporary solace in the US under Trump, even as the former slips deeper into the hands of China.
Dr Bhashyam Kasturi
