India–China Standoff, August 2020: What Happened, Who Decided, and Limits of Disclosure

A political controversy over former Army Chief General Manoj Mukund Naravane’s unpublished memoir has sparked renewed debate about a critical night during the India–China military standoff in eastern Ladakh in 2020.

At the centre of the discussion is a brief exchange between the political leadership and the Army Chief on whether political leadership hesitated or whether the military was deliberately given operational freedom, revealed through excerpts quoted by Caravan magazine. Excerpts cited in Parliament led to claims of political indecision.

The issue is not only about what was said that night.

To understand this, it is necessary to examine the facts, focusing on the sequence of events and finally explaining who decided what and when.

The Strategic Background

By August 2020, India and China were already facing their most serious military crisis in decades.

The standoff began at the start of May.

It escalated sharply after the violent clash in Galwan Valley on June 15, in which both sides suffered casualties. It was a “watershed moment” that exposed the full scale of the Chinese threat, not just militarily, but economically and politically for the first time.

Trust had broken down completely.

Both sides had forward eye-to-eye-deployed troops, with heavy armour and artillery.

Every move was being watched and assessed for escalation risk.

In this environment, decisions were being taken at multiple levels, often under severe time constraints- the situation was volatile to the hilt during the full-blown COVID pandemic.

Early Warning Before August 31

According to Lt Gen Y K Joshi, then Northern Army Commander, the Indian Army was aware of unusual Chinese activity as early as August 29.

It was not a sudden surprise on the night of August 31.

It meant that the Indian response on the South Bank of Pangong Tso was not improvised.

In interviews with BharatShakti, Gen Joshi has explained that Indian commanders anticipated a PLA move.

Preparations were already underway. It was the result of prior assessment and preparation that Indian troops moved swiftly to occupy key heights along the Kailash Range, including Rezang La and Rechin La.

The move altered the tactical equation.

This context is important.

Occupation of the Kailash Range

On the night of August 29–30, Indian troops moved swiftly, and they occupied key heights along the Kailash Range. These included Rezang La, Rechin La, and other dominating features.

It was a pre-emptive move and denied the PLA tactical advantage. More importantly, it gave India direct observation over Chinese positions at Moldo.

This operation later came to be known as part of ‘Operation Snow Leopard’.

The Rechin La Incident

On the evening of August 31, intelligence inputs indicated that PLA tanks, supported by infantry, were advancing towards Rechin La -the movement was direct and aggressive.

Indian troops fired an illuminating round as a warning; however, the PLA did not halt or deter.

Lt Gen Joshi immediately informed the Army Chief, Gen Naravane.

The situation had reached a decision point!

Rules of Engagement on the China Front

The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is guided by long-standing understandings that distinguish it from other borders, where firing is not a routine occurrence. The authority to open fire rests at the highest levels, reflecting a carefully maintained restraint that has been in place for decades. This approach aims to prevent local incidents from escalating into larger conflicts or wars.

As a result, Gen Naravane sought political clarity before authorising the use of fire.

Civil–Military Consultation

Gen Naravane reached out to high-ranking officials within the political and security echelons including the NSA, the External Affairs Minister, The Defence Minister and the , a process that required considerable time. While such delays may often be misconstrued, they actually underscore the seriousness of the situation. Deciding to open fire against the PLA is not just a tactical decision; it carries significant implications that necessitate careful consideration.

It carries diplomatic, economic, and strategic consequences.

The Prime Minister’s Instruction

At around 10.30PM, the Defence Minister conveyed the Prime Minister’s instruction to the Army Chief.

The message was concise and succinct:

“Jo uchit samjho, woh karo.” (do as you deem fit)

It was not a refusal to decide.

It was an explicit delegation of operational authority.

As BharatShakti’s Editor-in-Chief, Nitin A. Gokhale observes, no Prime Minister issues battlefield orders.

Political leaders provide intent and boundaries.

Military commanders decide how to act on the ground.

“It is uncommon for political leaders to issue specific battlefield orders; instead, they articulate intent and establish boundaries, leaving military commanders to determine the appropriate actions on the ground,” he quipped.

Why This Was Authorisation, Not Abdication

From a civil–military perspective, the message gave the Army Chief full backing.

It allowed him to act without political interference, as military leaders are trained to do in such situations. They assess terrain, force balance, and escalation risk.

Calling this abdication misunderstands how modern militaries function.

The Question of Time

Criticism has focused on the time taken to convey the message.

Some see it as hesitation; they argue that this delay reflects indecision.

Gokhale views it differently, arguing that such decisions cannot be rushed.

Political leaders are tasked with weighing the potential consequences of their decisions, especially in complex situations that involve significant adversaries, challenging environments, and the risk of escalation. The context becomes even more intricate when considering that India was grappling with the COVID-19 crisis and an already strained economy, making the implications of any conflict far-reaching. In this light, taking the time to consult and deliberate should be viewed not as inaction, but as a necessary measure of caution, as time spent consulting is part of responsible leadership.

The Military Response

After receiving authorisation, Gen Naravane assessed the situation carefully.

The Army did not open fire, instead, it consolidated control over the Kailash Range.

It blocked PLA movement and secured tactical dominance.

This decision avoided immediate escalation.

Quid Pro Quo Strategy

Lt Gen Joshi has explained that India adopted a quid pro quo approach.

When China attempted to change the status quo in one area, India responded elsewhere.

The occupation of dominating heights forced the PLA to reassess its position.

It shifted leverage to India as it was a deliberate and calibrated military response.

“Some of the PLA troops were caught napping—literally. We had achieved total surprise,” Lt Gen Joshi recalled and added “After Snow Leopard, the body language of the PLA negotiators changed completely. They realised India now had leverage. That’s when disengagement really began,” Gen Joshi said.

The disengagement process, which began in earnest in early 2021, led to Chinese pullbacks in several key sectors. While some friction points remain unresolved, analysts widely view the Indian response following the Galwan incident as a turning point in how India handles PLA provocations.

Sensitivity of Disclosure

The larger issue raised by the book excerpts is about timing.

Conversations between political leadership and military commanders are inherently confidential.

Such exchanges reflect deliberation, uncertainty, and responsibility.

They are not meant for real-time public scrutiny.

Releasing details while negotiations are ongoing can weaken national positions.

This is why many countries declassify such material only after decades.

Gokhale points out that even historical files in India remain classified when sensitivities persist.

A Question of Judgment, Not Motive

Gen Naravane may have believed he was recording history.

The government may have believed disclosure was premature.

Both positions can coexist.

What matters is that the decisions taken in August 2020 were within established civil–military norms.

The Larger Picture

There is no evidence of political paralysis.

There is no evidence of military abandonment.

There were consultations.

There was authorisation.

There was disciplined military execution.

The Indian response combined caution with tactical boldness.

It avoided war.

It secured leverage.

That balance explains why August 2020 did not become something far worse.

Ravi Shankar