Editor’s Pick
The central government has announced unambiguously that it will scrap the Free Movement Regime (FMR) along the India-Myanmar border. However, the stakeholders in this case are both numerous and varied in their stance on the issue. The FMR catered to the peculiar conditions in the area and provided a measure of flexibility on a sensitive issue that also impinges on national security. A polarised debate is already on, with the move garnering great support at one end while others dig in their heels to resist the transition.
The management of the India-Myanmar border (IMB) has, most deservedly, hit national headlines and assumed enormous strategic significance for three main factors: One, the ongoing internal conflict in Myanmar triggering large-scale infiltration (or read migration) into Manipur and Mizoram; two and relatedly, internal strife in Manipur has precipitated sporadic and targeted attacks in the border areas of the state and Three, Chinese attempts to perpetuate unrest in India’s North East as a policy of indirect approach parallel with the disturbed situation along the Line of Actual Control.
During his visit to Delhi on 4 January 2024 and meeting with the Prime Minister, the Union Home Minister and the Minister of External Affairs, the newly elected Chief Minister of Mizoram, Lalduhoma, mentioned that any move to fence the 510 km long porous border the State shares with Myanmar is unacceptable as it is a border enforced by the British to divide ethnic Mizos. It was shortly after the union government decided to scrap the Free Movement Regime (FMR), which had been in vogue since 2018 as part of Act East Policy. The move was triggered due to security concerns and disturbing the delicate demographic composition of the Border States.
The border movement regime has existed since colonial times due to the close cultural, ethnic and traditional relationship among the border population. The border was delimited in 1967, largely following the alignment along Patkai hills (12,552 feet). The FMR was only a formalisation of this practice. The Home Minister, Amit Shah, reiterated the government’s resolve to fence the Inda-Myanmar border on the lines of the Indo-Bangladesh border and scrap the FMR during his visit to Assam on 20 Jan 24, drawing a strong objection from the apex students’ body of Mizoram, Mizo Zirlai Pawl (MZP).
Meanwhile, the NSCM(IM), an insurgent group observing a ceasefire with the Government since 1997, has said that it would never allow the Centre to fence the border with Myanmar as it would further divide the Naga family as a nation.
Following the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, over 40,000 refugees have taken shelter in Mizoram. The recent spike in the clashes between the three brotherhood alliances (comprising of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the T’ang National Liberation Army) and the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) has only intensified the movement of refugees, including soldiers of Tatmadaw into India. The increasing number of attacks on Manipur State security forces of late and the personnel belonging to the Meitei community has instigated the radical and armed Meitei Group, Arambai Tenggol, to summon all MLAs and MPs belonging to the community to sign a set of 10 demands to the Central government, including delisting of Kukis from Scheduled Tribes and replacement of Assam Rifles from the State.
It has been termed anarchy by the rival Manipur Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum (ITLF), a Kuki group. The student and youth organisations in the North Eastern States wield considerable power and influence over ethnically aligned people and governance. While Mizoram and Nagaland have vehemently opposed the Central Government’s plan to scrap FMR and fence the border, Manipur supports it and has intensified its demand to fence the border. The central government ought to harmonise the sentiments of all ethnic communities, given the sensitivity of the region.
The dynamics of the India-Myanmar border vary from state to state and have long-term security and foreign policy ramifications for India. The 1643 kilometre-long border involves the states of Arunachal Pradesh (520km), Nagaland (215km), Manipur (398km) and Mizoram (510km). The border is manned by Assam Rifles, who are responsible for counter-insurgency operations in the hinterland. Unlike other border guarding forces operating in Border Out Posts (BOPs) all along the border, Assam Rifles operate in Company Operating Bases (COBs) with some interchangeability of border guarding and CI operations.
Assam Rifles is the only operational border guarding force under the Indian Army. Still, it is funded and equipped by the Ministry of Home Affairs in line with other border guarding forces (BSF, SSB, and ITBP). Of about 46 battalions of Assam Rifles, around 20 are deployed for border guarding while the balance is on counter-insurgency operations. FMR has thus far governed the border to facilitate border trade and ethnic similarities of population on either side of the border. It allows the population residing close to the border to move up to a distance of 16 km on either side with head loads. It is permitted to stay up to two weeks with border passes only, valid for a period of one year without the requirement of a visa. The move is controlled at three border crossings: Pangsau in Arunachal Pradesh, Moreh in Manipur and Zokhawthar in Mizoram.
Due to the open nature of the border, characterised by rugged and deep forests, lack of infrastructure, inaccessibility and limited surveillance capability, it has seldom been possible to exercise full and effective control over illegal border crossings. The transborder move of insurgents, arms and narcotics takes place often in connivance with the population residing close to the border for petty remunerations or fear of reprisal.
In Arunachal Pradesh, the border is shared by the three Southern Districts of Tirap, Changlang and Longing (TCL region) affected by insurgency and have been under AFSPA for long. Though there are no insurgent camps and resident insurgents in Arunachal Pradesh, the festering insurgency is supported from across the border. Of late, even the Naga community (Wancho, Tutsa, and Tangsa) in the TCL region have dissociated themselves from the Nagas of Nagaland and are demanding an autonomous council.
The ceasefire between the Government of India and a plethora of insurgent groups is not applicable in Arunachal Pradesh. There have been intermittent attacks on security forces posts launched from across the border, often in connivance with or in total disdain by the Myanmar Army. Most insurgent camps across the Arunachal Pradesh border belong to NSCN (IM) and its various offshoots, as well as ULFA. ULFA insurgents operating largely in restive Upper Assam (now at its lowest ebb consequent to large-scale surrender and recently signed an accord in December 2023) find the infiltration through Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh to be the shortest and least contested due to the low density of SF deployment and Namdapha reserve forest.
In Nagaland, ever since the ceasefire agreement with NSCN(IM) in 1997, there have been designated insurgent camps within which the insurgent groups are relatively free to operate. The terms of the ceasefire agreement restrict combat operations, including the areas along the borders. The ethnic Naga population with spillover into Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Assam and even Myanmar (the long-standing demand of greater Nagalim) furiously oppose the border fencing that will not only divide the ethnic Nagas on either side of the IMB but will also restrict their area of influence.
The Central government frozen the terms of the Naga Peace Accord on October 31, 2019. However, the agreement continues to be in limbo due to NSCN (IM)’s demand for a separate flag and a constitution. At this stage, Nagas will fiercely oppose any attempt to fence the border.
Manipur, which shares a border of 398 km with Myanmar, has a number of designated insurgent camps consequent to a similar ceasefire agreement based on Suspension of Operations (SOO, which is now being opposed by Maitei group) and Taken Note Of (TNO) camps, belonging to disparate insurgent groups. Commencing with the Manorama Devi episode, a large number of police stations areas in Imphal have been removed from AFSPA, permitting insurgents to operate with impunity in the Imphal valley. There have been a number of attacks on security forces personnel launched from camps across the border, including the attack on Colonel Viplav and his family in November 2021. In the past, in response to an attack on the convoy of 6 Dogra in 2015, which resulted in the death of 18 personnel, a transborder operation against insurgent camps was launched by the Indian army in coordination with the Myanmar Army. It was followed by Sunrise’s series of joint operations in 2019-20, which met with limited success.
The opposition by Mizoram is largely a by-product of ethnic affiliation with a population close to the IMB in Myanmar. The situation has become more intense after the military takeover in Myanmar in February 2021 and the large-scale refugee influx into India. However, Mizoram is not affected by insurgency but serves as a corridor for drugs and narcotics.
Notwithstanding the Central Government’s resolve to fence the IMB, execution will most certainly be a challenge. Not only does the fencing need to be foolproof, but it must also have all-weather access and be kept under observation and fire to be an effective deterrent. This will require a huge investment in construction, lighting, surveillance, and the physical deployment of troops. Smart fencing using technology is a way forward.
Some analysts have suggested a takeover of the border by BSF. IMB is quite unlike the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders. The discernible reduction in insurgency in the North East resulted from the painstaking effort by Assam Rifles over the decades. It continues to have domain knowledge and expertise in a sensitive region, which is the reason why it calls itself the friend of the hill people. Short-sightedness should not lead to undoing this enormous advantage. It does not take much time for the region to transition into alienation and insurgency if we don’t consolidate our hard-earned gains. How the Government of India plans to execute this process remains to be seen.
Maj Gen SC Mohanty (Retd)
