Editor’s Note
Dealing with China is often a slow and arduous trek, requiring ample patience. The agreement reached in October 2024 is a prime example of this. However, despite this agreement, the perceptions of the two countries of the LAC on the ground do not yet converge, leaving room for transgressions. To ensure peace and tranquillity at the borders, it’s crucial to bring the issue of boundary settlement to the forefront and arrive at a mutually acceptable solution. While the current situation may seem challenging, there is potential for positive change in China-LAC relations, inspiring hope and optimism.
The 21 October 2024 agreement between India and China on disengagements on two flashpoints in Eastern Ladakh is a telling example of how perseverance and commitment can go a long way in resolving tactical issues with Beijing along the border. The disengagement of Chinese and Indian troops from Depsang and Demchok in Eastern Ladakh thus completes the first stage of conflict resolution since 2020. The resolution is significant as a tactical measure since China had stopped India from patrolling in Depsang by occupying positions patrolled by India prior to 2020.
Three points make the current agreement important from an Indian perspective. First is the integrated politico-military approach to resolving the two flash points led by the MEA. It also was the case with Gogra and Pangong Tso earlier. Second, quiet but firm political leadership by PM Narendra Modi maintains India’s position on the need to restore the status quo as of April 2020 and, finally, military tenacity in operating in all weather and terrain along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This pact, it is expected, will lead to a normalisation of relations, which had been marked by tension and distrust since 2020.
Subsequently, the Special Representatives of India and China met and agreed upon a ‘six-point’ consensus. Actually, China made the consensus points public, while India merely reiterated the desire to reach an agreement on the boundary question based on the 2005 agreement. India kept quiet on the Chinese posturing, suggesting that both sides, while agreeing on the tactical deal, continued to differ on the strategic aspects of the border issue.
While one more pact in the series of disengagement agreements signed since 2020 has been put in place, disengagement is a process that takes time and verification. China has reportedly withdrawn from the Y junction and Raki Nala in the Depsang region. According to the EAM, Dr Jaishankar, the problem in Depsang and Demchok was related to the inability of the Indian Army to patrol these areas due to their being blocked by the Chinese PLA. In Demchok, there was also the question of our nomadic population’s access to traditional grazing grounds. The signpost for the post-2020 diffusion of tensions is a determination by the government that it would do what it took to maintain the status quo.
A closer reading of the briefing EAM Dr S. Jaishankar gave to Lok Sabha MPs on December 3, 2024, makes it clear that the inflexion point was caused by China’s military build-up and aggressive military posture in April/May 2020. The operative part of the statement reads, “There is a Line of Actual Control; it does not have a common understanding in some areas.”
Two issues need flagging here. If both sides don’t have common clarity on where the LAC lies, then the potential for future dissonance always exists. Second, are some areas mentioned by the EAM disputed prior to 2020, or are these where China intruded in 2020? Given the tenor of Jaishankar’s statements, the latter appears to be more likely. It will be important when the two sides decide to engage on the boundary issue in the future.
The numerous agreements between India and China since 1988 have been listed, and these are the ones that China violated in 2020. However, the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) agreed to in 2012 is a mechanism that has continued to be used effectively even post-2020. Additionally, the meeting of the senior-level military commanders, along with representatives of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, to discuss the nitty-gritty of withdrawal and disengagement has provided significant impetus to the current resolution.
The WMCC, for instance, has met 17 times since 2020, with the last meeting held in August 2024. Soon after the agreement on 26 October 2024, the WMCC met once again. The military commanders have met more than 21 times since 2020 to discuss the finer details of disengagement. It shows the high level of diplomatic and military engagement leading to the current agreement.
According to the External Affairs Minister, both sides have completed the task of disengagement at ‘friction points’, which in the current instance refers only to Depsang and Demchok, and will now move towards de-escalation. It will happen in two stages: first, with the moving back of troops amassed on the border and second, with management of the border, in the light of experiences gained. Once this is done, will both sides seek to find a new mechanism for boundary resolution, or will the 2005 Agreement continue to form the basis for a final settlement? It makes sense for India to now push for the former as the basis for a settlement.
Disengagement undertaken by both sides will determine the future opening of relations in a ‘calibrated manner’, says the EAM. It is undoubtedly a complex relationship, but giving primacy to the border issue requires mentioning the post-1988 Joint Working Group (JWG) which was formed to clarify the LAC. The JWG continued to work till 2002 when differences reportedly arose over the interpretation of the LAC in the Western Sector. Post this, both sides signed the 2005 Agreement, Article IX of which proposes that both sides should “strictly respect and observe the Line of Actual Control” and recommended that the JWG and Diplomatic and Military Expert Group continue their work, which inter alia included clarifying the LAC.
As far as the incumbent government is concerned, normal relations with China cannot be conducted until peace and tranquility on the border are restored. This stance demonstrated the government’s commitment to the high priority it attached to maintaining peace on the border. The fact that the government has brought military and diplomatic personnel to the same table while discussing the border issue with China is an important signpost that India may now attempt to take the next step in searching for a final boundary settlement with China.
However, problems arose when both sides started negotiating a framework agreement on each article in the 2005 pact. Given this situation, does it look realistic to expect China to appreciate the need for an understanding on the border?
All indications currently indicate a negative trend. It, however, should not stop India and, more importantly, the Modi government from pushing the envelope to seek a two-stage process for boundary settlement. Given the experience of 2020 and its aftermath, clarifying the LAC may become necessary to determine where the respective forces stand to effectively ‘manage’ the border. Subsequently, India and China can attempt to undertake a full and final settlement of the boundary question based on the 2005 agreement. The EAM and his boss, the Prime Minister of India, know that this issue can only be resolved with PM Modi and President Xi Jinping.
Dr. Bhashyam Kasturi
