Editor’s Note
The conflict zone in West Asia is expanding to engulf more countries in the region. All eyes remain vigilant, awaiting Israel’s next move. Will it be so powerful as to draw Iran fully into the battle? Meanwhile, solutions to keep the battleground localised, if not stop the genocide, are being sketched out in capital cities. The article grapples with the issues and suggests a few measures.
Map West Asia
A year into the Israel
Hamas war, triggered by the horrific transborder attack by Hamas, resulting in the deaths of over 1,200 civilians and around 250 hostages; the situation in the Middle East is precariously poised. The conflict has since escalated into Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen and has the potential to engulf the entire region. The rhetoric on both sides has put the world on the edge. Already saddled with the Russia – Ukraine war with no signs of ebbing, the world can do without another debilitating conflict. The Israeli counter-offensive has so far left over 42,000 dead in Gaza, over 2,100 dead in Lebanon, and over 3.5 million forcibly displaced. The threat of uncontrolled escalation with unintended consequences is real after the ballistic missile attack by Iran on 1st October.
While Israel had the right to respond to this brutal and despicable attack on its territory, including rape, brutal murder and taking of hostages, its war of resurrection (as termed by Netanyahu) has seriously violated international humanitarian laws by targeting hospitals, schools, UN designated refugee camps, UN aid personnel (including one Indian Colonel) and even firefighters involved in rescue operations. In the bargain, it seems to have squandered the initial sympathy/solidarity and moral high ground, transforming into one of international isolation, hate and condemnation, starting with demonstrations in academic institutions across the US, UK, Australia, Canada and EU capitals.
It reached a crescendo with the International Court of Justice, at the behest of South Africa, calling out Israel to take provisional measures to prevent genocide, permit humanitarian aid and protect Palestinians, stopping short of ordering the suspension of operations.
The ICJ ruling of July 2024 termed Israeli occupation of Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem as illegal. UN resolution of 18 September 2024, supported by 124 nations asking Israel to vacate Palestinian territories in 12 months and the recent call by the French President for an arms embargo only points to increasing discomfort against Israel’s strategy of utterly disproportionate use of force in the Middle East.
Early in the conflict, UN Chief Antonio Guterres opined that the Hamas attack in Israel had not happened in a vacuum, indicating Israel’s persistent violation of the UN resolution to vacate the occupied territories and its ruthless prosecution of innocent Palestinians.
Israel was carved out of Palestinian territory in 1948 as part of Britain’s promise during the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Despite multiple UN resolutions, Israel continues the occupation and expansion of its settlements in occupied territories, and Palestinian people have been denied a homeland for over 75 years, a systemic and perpetual injustice. However, a disorganised, disjointed and factional Palestinian authority is equally to blame for perpetuating a terror approach to the realisation of statehood.
Hamas justified the 7th October attack as a response to continued Israeli occupation, blockade of the Gaza Strip and settler violence against Palestinians. Events leading up to the attack included the Trump Administration’s shifting the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018, the Abraham Accord of 2020, under which UAE, Egypt, Morocco and Bahrain sought to normalise diplomatic relationships with Israel and reproached between the regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran brokered by China in 2023. These geopolitical shifts sought to push the Palestinian aspirations to the backburner.
The Israeli military response has been relentless, clinical and sequential. Starting with the carpet bombing of Gaza, ground offensives in Northern, Southern and Central Gaza were preceded by large-scale evacuations and intense land operations in Khan Younis, Rafah and Al Shifa Hospital.
Having reduced most of Gaza to rubble, the focus shifted to the Northern border with Lebanon. The operations against Hezbollah have been more precise and intelligence-driven. The pager, walkie talkie and solar devices attacks demonstrated Israeli capability in infiltrating into the core of opposing leadership and using vastly superior technological and intelligence backup to decimate most of the top leadership of Hezbollah, including its chief Nasrallah, with minimum collateral damage.
Two decisive phases of operations brought Iran into direct confrontation with Israel. The first was the targeting of the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, resulting in the killing of a number of the senior military leaders of IRGC, which was responded to by the first Iranian direct attack on Israel by rockets and drones on 24th April, which was largely symbolic rather than substantive. The second, more resolute attack was on 24 October, consequent to the killing of Hezbollah chief Nasrallah only weeks after Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Teheran while in the city to attend the swearing-in of the new president. Israel is not known to accept attacks on its territory without severe and disproportionate retribution.
Netanyahu declared at the UN that Israel has been fighting a war on seven fronts. While one out of these is a state actor, the others are nonstate/semi-state actors/Iran-backed militias. At the beginning of the conflict, Israel had declared the complete destruction of Hamas and the securing of the hostages as part of its war aims. One year into the conflict, neither aim seems to have been achieved or is likely in the foreseeable future. Instead, the threat of a regional conflict looms large with the likely possibility of reversing the Arab-Israel reproachment.
The military capability of both Hamas and Hezbollah have been severely degraded (as claimed by Netanyahu himself), including their leadership, infrastructure and hardware. Both after the first strike in April and the second in October, Iran has called the strikes conclusive and does not want to escalate if there is no Israeli response. It is fully aware of its military and economic weakness vis a vis a vastly superior Israel, at least in airpower, as the two don’t share a border. The ball, therefore, lies squarely in the Israeli court to steer the future course of war.
Ironically, Israel may be salivating with the idea of targeting Iran’s nuclear and oil installations, an opportunity it may never get in the future with greater prospects of Iran going nuclear after the conflict. The US, though it has called for a ceasefire multiple times, has continued to supply weapons and ammunition besides vetoing calls for a ceasefire at the UN.
The Arab world has been largely non-committal in its response since it doesn’t want to get embroiled in a regional conflict with devastating economic consequences. It seemed to move away from a Shia–Sunni quagmire into a more transactional relationship both within the region and with the West. While acting as a conduit for communication between Iran and its adversaries to manage escalation, it has not been able to de-escalate the situation.
During the first calibrated strike by Iran, countries like Jordan intercepted drones targeted at Israel. However, no such effort was made during the 1st October missile strike. The situation seems to have changed rapidly now with more vigorous secret and hectic parleys between Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia as any escalation might bring the US bases and oil refineries (including likely closure of the Strait of Hormuz through which nearly 30 per cent of world oil trade passes) in the larger Middle East region into the equation.
Much like the Russia-Ukraine war, India is uniquely positioned to act as a mediator to end the conflict. Its interests in the Middle East have been severely compromised, whether it is in the domain of energy security, renewed focus in Chahabar port, remittances from over nine million diasporas living in the region, I2U2 or the still-born India-Middle Est-Europe economic corridor. Its wider engagement with the Islamic world (including UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar), which had warmed up of late, may suffer a setback.
It has maintained a strong military and economic relationship with Israel and a consistent policy on the Palestinian question. While abstaining from voting in the UN resolution calling for Israel to vacate occupied territories in 12 months, the PM, in his recent interaction with the President of Palestine, Mr Mehmud Abbas, has pledged his unwavering support for the people of Palestine, including the two-state solution. He called for an immediate ceasefire, a return to dialogue and diplomacy and a return of hostages.
The situation calls for an immediate halt to the hostilities. Terrorism can never be used as an instrument to achieve political aims. Hamas, Hezbollah and Houthi must be designated as terrorist organizations with attendant consequences. Palestine must be admitted as a separate state in the UN, recognising its territories as of 4th June 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Time-bound withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories with ironclad security guarantees holds the key. The Arab world must recognise the State of Israel and establish diplomatic relations.
All this is easier said than done, but is there always a way to do it? The Middle East conflagration needs a solution more urgently than ever before.
Maj Gen SC Mohanty (Retd)
