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After decades of air dominance and an almost unchallenged hold over precision-strike capabilities, the United States now faces an era in which the balance has shifted.
According to a new report from the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “Countering the Swarm: Protecting the Joint Force in the Drone Age,” the proliferation of cheap, precise drones has “democratised mass precision fires” and exposed the U.S. military to a new level of vulnerability.
Authored by Dr Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Senior Fellow and Director of the CNAS Defence Program, and research assistant Molly Campbell, the study concludes that drones have become an unavoidable and escalating threat to American forces worldwide. The Department of Defence (DoD), it warns, “must act swiftly” or risk seeing its distributed warfighting strategies overwhelmed by massed Chinese or Iranian-style drone attacks.
From Air Dominance to Drone Defence
The report traces how the U.S. military—long equipped to intercept fast, high-flying aircraft and missiles—has struggled to adapt to the threat of small, slow, and inexpensive drones. These systems, particularly the Group 1 through 3 categories of uncrewed aerial systems (UAS), are difficult to detect with traditional radar and can be launched in swarms designed to saturate defences.
Pettyjohn and Campbell note that while the Pentagon has invested in counter-drone technologies for nearly a decade, “these efforts have been hindered by insufficient scale and urgency.” Their analysis of U.S. defence spending shows that procurement of purpose-built counter-UAS capabilities has lagged far behind operational needs.
“The stakes are not theoretical,” the report warns. “Without adequate defences, even the most advanced systems and tactics will be rendered irrelevant in the face of overwhelming drone attacks.”
Iran, Ukraine and China
The report opens with case studies from recent conflicts. In October 2023, Iranian-backed militias launched a wave of kamikaze drones at U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria. Though American forces managed to intercept most of them, the attacks injured U.S. troops and depleted interceptor stockpiles. These events, Pettyjohn and Campbell write, marked “the beginning of a new type of guerrilla warfare.”
In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have employed drones extensively for reconnaissance, targeting, and strike missions. The authors note that “drones have become essential weapons on the front lines and an important tool for deep strikes.” The Pentagon, they argue, must absorb these lessons quickly to prepare for potential large-scale confrontations, particularly with China’s rapidly advancing People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
The PLA is “developing more autonomous systems and acquiring them at scale.” In any conflict over Taiwan, the CNAS report warns, Chinese forces could unleash “large, heterogeneous salvos of drones and missiles,” overwhelming U.S. defences unless counter-drone systems are fielded in depth.
A Layered Kill Chain
At the heart of the CNAS analysis is the concept of a layered defence built around a complete counter-drone “kill chain.” This sequence—find, fix, identify, track, engage, and assess—relies on multiple types of sensors and effectors operating in concert.
“Each defensive technology has strengths and weaknesses,” the report notes. “They are therefore most effective when deployed in an integrated, layered fashion.” The study identifies radar as the most important active sensor, complemented by passive systems such as acoustic microphones, optical cameras, and radio-frequency analysers. A combination of both types, it says, offers the best chance to detect, identify, and engage hostile drones in time.
Once detected, drones can be destroyed or neutralised using kinetic or non-kinetic means. Guns, rockets, and missiles form the traditional kinetic layer, while newer options include directed-energy weapons such as high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-power microwaves (HPM). The latter, Pettyjohn and Campbell observe, is “the only counter-drone technology that can neutralise large swarms simultaneously,” though its range remains limited.
Passive defences—such as camouflage, armour, nets, bunkers, and decoys—also play a vital role. The authors emphasise that “resilient forces can weather an attack, adjust their operations, and complete their core missions,” even if they cannot intercept every drone.
Gaps and Imbalance
Analysing DoD spending from 2015 to 2025, CNAS finds that counter-drone investments have doubled—from $4.8 billion to $7.4 billion—but remain “reactive rather than strategic.” Spikes in 2018 and 2023 coincided with operational crises: ISIS’s use of drones during Operation Inherent Resolve and the Ukraine war.
The U.S. Army, which became the executive agent for the counter-drone mission in 2019, has fielded several purpose-built systems, such as the Low, Slow, Small UAS Integrated Defeat System (LIDS) and the Coyote interceptor. Yet procurement numbers remain low, and much of the Army’s budget continues to favour legacy air-defence platforms ill-suited to small drones.
In 2024, the Army announced plans to deploy nine new counter-drone batteries, each equipped with 15–20 Coyote launchers. CNAS calls this “incredibly thin protection,” noting that a single division covers nearly 20 miles of frontage. Moreover, most launchers are for fixed bases rather than mobile or forward-deployed units.
Perhaps most concerning, the report highlights an unfavourable cost-per-shot ratio. A DJI Mavic 3 costs around $2,000, while an Iranian Shahed-136 costs between $20,000 and $50,000. U.S. forces, by contrast, often use missiles costing hundreds of thousands—or even millions—of dollars per intercept. “The cost of the interceptor far outstrips that of the drone,” the authors observe. The $125,000 Coyote missile is cheaper than most alternatives, but even this remains costly for high-volume defence.
Directed Energy: Promise Unfulfilled
The CNAS report devotes particular attention to directed-energy weapons, which have long been hailed as the Pentagon’s future counter-drone solution. Despite more than $3 billion in investment over a decade, “no service has transitioned any of their DE research and development programs into a fully operational capability.” High-energy lasers have struggled in testing, limited by power, cooling, and performance issues in poor weather. Four 50-kilowatt laser vehicles deployed to CENTCOM in 2024 were deemed “cumbersome and ineffective.”
By contrast, high-power microwaves—tested successfully in the Philippines in May 2025—“may hold more near-term promise,” the authors write. If further trials confirm their effectiveness, CNAS recommends shifting resources from laser to microwave programs.
Lessons from the Middle East
Between October 2023 and February 2024, U.S. Army units in Iraq and Syria faced over 170 attacks from Iranian-made drones. The 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division (2/10) achieved an 80 per cent intercept rate, shooting down 93 of 115 incoming drones. Their success, CNAS reports, stemmed from adaptive leadership and rapid on-the-ground experimentation with new tactics and technologies.
Yet even these successful defences exposed systemic weaknesses: slow identification procedures, reliance on visual confirmation, and insufficient training for non-specialists. The report concludes that “every unit will need the ability to defend itself against small UAS,” and that counter-drone defence “cannot be siloed to dedicated air-defence units.”
Key Recommendations
The authors offer a detailed roadmap for the Pentagon:
- Prioritise counter-drone defence across the Joint Force. Every unit must have the tools and training to defend against drones.
- Expand and standardise training. The DoD should develop common tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- Build resilient, layered defences. Combine active interceptors with passive measures to maintain operational continuity.
- Procure large stockpiles of low-cost interceptors. High-volume, short-range weapons—such as gun-based systems and simple rockets—should be prioritised.
- Integrate artificial intelligence. AI-enabled command and control can accelerate detection and engagement.
- Transition promising emerging technologies, especially HPM, to programs of record.
- Invest in high-resolution passive sensors to complement radar and improve survivability.
“Drones are ubiquitous on the modern battlefield,” Pettyjohn and Campbell write. “Not even the U.S. military will be able to shoot down every single one.” What matters most, they argue, is resilience—the ability to fight through drone attacks and complete the mission.
The report’s message is clear: there is no single solution to the drone threat. Only a layered mix of kinetic, electronic, and passive defences—backed by training, realistic testing, and sustained investment—can protect American forces in the drone age.
Ramananda Sengupta
In a career spanning three decades and counting, I’ve been the foreign editor of The Telegraph, Outlook Magazine and the New Indian Express. I helped set up rediff.com’s editorial operations in San Jose and New York, helmed sify.com, and was the founder editor of India.com. My work has featured in national and international publications like the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Global Times and Ashahi Shimbun. My one constant over all these years, however, has been the attempt to understand rising India’s place in the world.
I can rustle up a mean salad, my oil-less pepper chicken is to die for, and it just takes some beer and rhythm and blues to rock my soul.
