It has been four years since the bloody clash in the frigid Galwan Valley in Eastern Ladakh that led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and between 35-41 Chinese casualties as India drew a line against Chinese expansionism along the 3,488 km long Line of Actual Control (LAC), but especially in Eastern Ladakh. The events of the summer of 2020 were not isolated events but were part of tensions and undercurrents between the two Asian giants that belied the bonhomie between the Xi-Modi ‘dosti’ exemplified by Wuhan (2018) and Mahabalipuram (2019).
Experts believe that the action was caused by China’s interest in asserting its dominance as it felt challenged by India’s rapid rise. Jaidev Ranade, President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy (CCAS), says the Chinese wanted to teach India a lesson over what they perceive was the South Asian nation’s bid to rival China. ‘The Chinese said the real issue is not the border. I’m virtually paraphrasing him it is not the border, but it is the contention for dominance in the region and among its their neighbours’ says Ranade. The CCAS President went on to add that the Chinese have since independence believed that a military conflict is inevitable.
China’s post-pandemic recovery has missed the mark, not just according to outsiders but as per the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as well. China’s economy is export-oriented and India is still one of the largest untapped markets for China. ‘The economy is crashing now. China’s power has been built on its economic rise. Unless it can stabilise that and unless it can get back to, you know, that sort of a growth rate as it had earlier, it’s a bit difficult’ says Associate Professor Suparna Pathak of the OP Jindal Global University.
Professor Srikanth Kondapalli, Dean of School of International Studies and a Professor of China studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) says ‘The whole bilateral relations have been changed from strategic and cooperative partnership to developmental partnership. So which included elements of economy, you know, manufacturing centers, trade, investment and, things like these. So Galwan basically disrupts that, equation in terms of the projection towards a more Chinese, you know, forward momentum, in terms of economic developmental focus.’
Kondapalli asserts that the Chinese are punishing India for closer ties to the West but goes on to add that India too has failed to garner appropriate support from western and other nations to counter China, especially when many other nations allied to the west such as Japan, Taiwan and Philippines, besides other regional nations are also facing similar territorial issues with China. Although he does say that India has learnt lessons from the Galwan crisis.
A sentiment echoed by Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma, former commander of the army’s 14 Corps which keeps a check on China in Eastern Ladakh. Sharma says that the Chinese now know that post Galwan they now have to fight for each and every inch of land unlike the past when they would salami slice our territory.
Post Galwan, the Chinese have gone from having a benign border to an active border where both nations have deployed a considerable amount of manpower and equipment. The Chinese already in what appears to be a losing staring contest with the United States, is also stretched out fighting for territorial claims with almost all its neighbours. As the dragon acts tough it knows that its economy, the source of its strength, is faltering. Having better economic ties with India is a good way to move forward in that direction, but skirmishes on the high Himalayas have made the open door slightly ajar.
