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Editor’s Note
Building on Part I, which analysed India’s nuclear doctrine and the deterrence shifts signalled by Operation Sindoor, Part II turns the lens to India’s evolving role and responsibilities as a nuclear weapon state amid a volatile geopolitical churn. As global power equations shift and technology blurs traditional deterrence lines, India faces the dual challenge of maintaining credible deterrence while upholding its record of nuclear restraint and responsibility. The author examines how India is navigating these crosscurrents – balancing deterrence credibility, strategic stability, and global expectations in an era of renewed great-power rivalry and regional nuclear brinkmanship.
India’s Responsibilities and Challenges as Nuclear-Power State
Confrontations and Wars have always brought death and destruction, with nuclear exchange forming the top end of the escalatory ladder. India has always supported a nuclear weapons free world, but recent nuclear brinkmanship manoeuvres exchanged by adversaries be it USA-China, Russia-Ukraine (supported by West), India-Pakistan coupled with rapid modernisation and scaling up of nuclear warheads and delivery systems (not to forget hypersonic, MIRVs, AI, satellites); has highlighted the challenges and risks involved in the nuclear domain. It goes without saying that unchecked confrontation can easily lead to Armageddon. Similarly, for India, while we strengthen our nuclear deterrent posture and make signalling more robust, they come with risks and trade-offs, especially when it comes to our immediate neighbour Pakistan. India must have strong regulatory oversight, transparency (where possible), and a safety track record.
Risk of Escalation and Crisis Instability
- The assessment and proclamation by India that nuclear threats will not be effective shields, increases the risk of retaliation to any cross-border strike or any conventional response, in the nuclear domain.
- Pakistan’s doctrine of “full spectrum deterrence,” and deliberate policy of irrational nuclear response, places fewer constraints on first use of tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan military leaders have often talked of the employment of tactical nukes within the operational sphere of conventional wars. There is also an ever-present danger that conventional strikes near nuclear facilities might provoke an overreaction. Reports from SIPRI warn that proximity of strikes to nuclear or nuclear-related infrastructure heightens nuclear escalation risk.
- Crisis instability could be worsened by misperceptions, false alarms, mis-communication or disinformation. In a contested border or tense situation, this is a real possibility.
- Lowering thresholds may increase frequency of cross-border operations or retaliatory actions, increasing opportunities for miscalculation.
Credibility with Restraint: India must Showcase Maturity
- India must maintain credible second-strike capability under its doctrine. Building SSBNs, SLBMs, and upgrading nuclear eco-system is capital intensive and technically difficult. Delays, reliability issues (reactors, missiles) can erode deterrence credibility.
- Concurrently, aggressive posturing (retaliatory threats, punitive strikes) coupled with military grandstanding can reduce India’s room for diplomatic manoeuvring, attract international scrutiny, possibly invite sanctions or diplomatic backlash.
- India has to play a delicate balancing act: strong enough to deter, yet restrained enough to avoid being seen as a provocateur or escalator.
NPT, Diplomacy, and India’s Status
- India is not a signatory to the NPT and has chosen to remain outside some international non-proliferation norm frameworks. This brings her nuclear weapon modernisation under greater scrutiny, especially when we develop longer ranged, more powerful SLBMs or MIRVs.
- Moves perceived as lowering nuclear thresholds or blurring lines between conventional and nuclear conflict may reduce the comfort level of other states, potentially increasing diplomatic pressure.
- By her actions, India is historically considered a mature and responsible NWS with a credible record.
The Way Forward
Recent global confrontation and conflicts some of them between unequal nations has signalled the decreasing relevance of deterrence (even nuclear). One has always felt that some degree of ambiguity makes a nuclear policy more potent. While India has a mature, stated policy of NFU, she has indicated some flexibility in policy application. Nothing in the policy stops India from following a proportionate response if strategically felt appropriate. Just as a golfer carries numerous drivers and clubs in his bag, possessing a range of delivery and launcher systems operating across land, sea, undersea, and space, India too has created options. It is worth reviewing the necessity of having tactical nuclear weapons in our armoury, now that India’s linking acts of terror with state linkages (Pakistan), has acquired a new connotation post Sindoor. India has several strategic options, and some could be mutually contradictory, which is the nature of the beast.
| Policy | Description | Pros | Cons / Risks |
| Reinterpret NFU doctrine | Keep “No First Use” formally, but clarify that certain provocations (terrorism backed by state, chemical/biological attacks) might cause earlier responses. | Keeps international legitimacy, avoids appearing revisionist; retains differentiation from adversaries. | Ambiguity might provoke adversary miscalculation; seriousness of threat to first-use triggers may be contested. |
| Indicate flexible response
below nuclear threshold |
Increase conventional strike capabilities, hybrid warfare, cyber, economic coercion, diplomatic isolation so that nuclear threats lose strategic utility to adversaries. | Deterrence enhanced; adversary cannot rely on nuclear threats; limited risk of full nuclear exchange. | Needs strong conventional forces; risk of misinterpretation; escalatory spiral. |
| Expedite sea-based deterrent capability | More SSBNs with longer-range SLBMs (K-5, K-6), ensure continuous at-sea deterrence, improve communication, survivability. | Strong second-strike; reduces vulnerability; increases deterrence credibility. | Cost, technical complexity; maintenance, security of submarines; political risk of accidents; possibly provoking regional submarine arms competition. |
| Upgrade
Nuclear eco- system |
More mobile missile launchers (rail/road), quicker reaction time, MIRVed warheads, deception, hardening, redundancy. | Harder for adversary to pre-empt; more credible deterrent. | Technical, safety issues; cost; political perception. |
| Revise
Doctrine |
Possibly update the doctrine to redefine or contextualize NFU, declare thresholds more clearly; perhaps include state responsibility for non-state actor actions. | Clarity; reduces ambiguity in crisis; sends strong message. | Risks of global negative reaction; possible legitimizing of nuclear first-use arguments; risk of an arms race. |
| Global
Posturing |
Use international architecture (bilateral, multilateral) to signal restraint (nuclear asset lists, communication channels), possibly even transparency about numbers. | Helps reduce mistrust; lowers risk of accidental escalation; improves international legitimacy. | May be of limited tactical value; transparency may expose vulnerabilities; adversaries may not reciprocate. |
India is already pursuing most of these options, and modernisation plans align closely with what is needed to make deterrence credible under the new expectations post-Op Sindoor.
Strategic Assessment: SWOT Analysis
An in-depth analysis is needed to determine whether India’s current trajectory provides a credible deterrent and adequately safeguards it from potential risks. Additionally, it is essential to identify the current challenges facing the country.
Credible second-strike Capability is an Imperative
The SSBN force is nascent, and although INS Arihant, Arighat, and S4/S4* are at various stages, continuous patrols, reliable SLBMs, reactor reliability, crew training, and stealth manoeuvres must all reach high standards. Any failures will reduce deterrent credibility.
- Policy Ambiguity vs Clarity: While some ambiguity is beneficial in deterrence, too much leaves room for miscalculation. India has to balance signalling red lines with preserving flexibility.
- Escalation Dominance: Once conventional responses are more aggressive and thresholds lowered (terrorist safe havens strikes, possibly inside Pakistan territory), there is always a risk that Pakistan may retaliate with tactical nukes. India must have strong early warning and dominate escalation control mechanisms by pre-emption.
- Maintain image of a Mature Power: While India is not bound by NPT obligations, it operates in a world where nuclear (and non-nuclear) states watch the region closely given the history of conflicts; the most recent being Op-Sindoor. India will need to manage the diplomatic fallout.
- Nuclear Modernisation calls for Infrastructure, Technology and Money: Building submarines, reactors, SLBMs, high yield warheads, requires technical excellence and excellent safeguards. Delays or accidents (especially in reactors or submarines) can degrade credibility. Budget and industrial capacity constraints need to be vectored in.
- Watch the Adversary closely: Pakistan is enhancing its conventional and nuclear capabilities, and China remains a formidable nuclear and conventional power. India’s multi-domain modernization must endeavour to deter China and compel Pakistan not to impede our national interests.
- India must lay down crystal-clear red lines: India’s statements must be unambiguous, strong, and mature, laying out our red lines and triggers, which will reduce the probability of miscalculation. We can think of specifying what constitutes ‘nuclear blackmail’ by our adversaries. Our actions correspondingly must match our words, and India must try to avoid manoeuvres which can be used deliberately by our adversaries to react, like strikes very near nuclear facilities.
Additional Steps
- Invest in ballistic missile defence (BMD) in a phased and prioritised manner due to its immense costs.
- Strengthen command, control and strategic communications.
- Improve intelligence and early warning (satellite, radar, maritime surveillance) to detect threats —kinetic and non-kinetic —and reduce the risk of surprise escalation.
- Ensure international standards of safety, security protocols for nuclear weapons and materials, both for accidents/deterrent credibility and for international perception.
- Galvanise diplomatic domain to state our case real time. Maintain the nuclear asset exchange with Pakistan, which safeguards own nuclear assets.
- Expedite strategic partnerships (not recommending a defence or strategic pact) with like-minded countries for technology transfer, joint early warning, defence cooperation, especially in nuclear propulsion or submarines, missile technology.
- Maintain hotlines/channels for crisis communication to alleviate any misinterpretation or misreporting.
- Invest in strategic wargaming, scenario painting, war games, simulations of nuclear escalation, to ensure contingencies (response to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear strike), doctrine and strategy have been thought through.
- Explore nuclear propulsion beyond submarines (naval and exploration surface vessels), if strategic logic demands (comes with technical, environmental and diplomatic challenges).
Conclusion: Make Operation Sindoor a Turning Point for Rising India
Operation Sindoor has heralded a new dawn for India in terms of both conventional and nuclear posturing and execution. India has conveyed unequivocally to the world at large and Pakistan in particular that nuclear status or threats cannot serve as a shield for state-sponsored terrorism or prevent India from responding. Concurrently, India is modernising its nuclear eco-system (especially the sea leg), improving missile capabilities, and upgrading communications and infrastructure to ensure survivability and credibility, thus enhancing second strike capabilities. India’s rising economic and geo-political clout will create more challenges, and she must demonstrate our willingness to go the distance to become a regional player. In the future, India must develop capabilities to credibly deter any misadventure against it, both in conventional and nuclear terms. The world is watching India closely.
Lt Gen PR Kumar
Lt Gen PR Kumar (Retd) served in the Indian Army for 39 years, He was the DG Army Aviation, before superannuating from the appointment of Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) in end 2015.
He continues to write and talk on international and regional geo-political, security and strategic issues. He can be contacted at prkumarsecurity.wordpress.com and kumapa60@gmail.com
