![](https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/LT-BSI-Defence.gif")
In response to the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on 22 April 2025, India, on 6-7 May, launched Operation Sindoor with precision strikes. Pakistan retaliated on expected lines – perpetual state of denial and being a cry-baby. India, responding with alacrity, delivered telling damage to several critical Pakistani military assets. Indian airstrikes achieved their objective of crippling major Pakistani airbases without provoking an all-out war.
In any campaign, for any self-respecting commander (Political or Military), shaping the narrative (Strategic or otherwise) is a Key Result Area (KRA). Unfortunately, in Operation Sindoor, India, like before, conceded that narrative space. India’s military success was clear, but its control over international narratives was less effective.
Post 7 May Indian strikes, there was a 10–12-hour information void from India. Pakistan exploited this ‘void’. It pumped the global media with its version of events. Western media outlets such as the BBC, the New York Times, the Guardian, Reuters and some Pakistan-sympathetic international outlets used this flood of unverified information. They went
into overdrive to propagate unsubstantiated Pakistani claims, framing India as the aggressor.
The role played by Indian-origin journalists and commentators who, from their international perches, reinforced the Pakistan-favouring narrative under the guise of neutral critique. In strategic communication, perceptions form early and are hard to dislodge once set. Pakistan positioned itself, predictably, as a victim.
Another question that needs answering is whether India has a dedicated information warfare vertical to deliver the required story in real time and counter false claims. India had to first counter disinformation before providing the correct information. Hence, India was basically playing ‘Catch-up’. Also, why, on 23 April, a day after the Pahalgam
massacre, did India not go into an aggressive narrative building up? Did the absence of proactive engagement by Indian think tanks and veteran influencers weaken the narrative response?
Also, in this intervening phase, why could India not put in place a mechanism/procedure to release near-live information? Can these be called ‘Strategic Communication Delays, maybe.
The Indian government is invariably criticised for its delayed public communications. One may wonder if this is ‘internal procedural caution’. Hierarchical decision-making, inter-agency coordination bottlenecks, and an inherent risk-averse approach allowed Pakistan and third parties, such as the US, to shape the initial global narrative. In this military conflagration, it is not being said that India should have been trigger-happy in releasing sensitive military information, but an incomplete picture sets tongues wagging: ‘Is there something to hide?’ Strategic messaging cannot be ‘at your own time and pace’.
There is a need to acknowledge here that the reality of the false narratives vis-à-vis Operation Sindoor eventually corrected itself, when Western think tanks and prominent bloggers/contributors on defence matters acknowledged Indian dominance. The entire event, however, underscored ‘weaknesses’ in India’s preparedness apropos warfare narrative. One is left pondering whether these ‘weaknesses’ are Ops Sindoor-specific or systemic.
Fabricated Pakistani videos and images choked social media, the Aorta of the present-day information highway. This distortion was further reinforced by cognitive prejudices, where audiences abroad had started to believe the false Pakistani narrative. Using social media, Pakistan fed the audiences in the West aggressively by falsely alleging civilian casualties during Indian strikes- a raw nerve in the Western mindset.
The Indian silence on specifics, allowing the evidence to ‘surface with time’, only gave the much-needed fodder to the Indian nay-sayers, while Indian audiences were confused as to whom to believe. The Indian narrative highlighted that the Indian objective was to target terror infrastructure, but it did not bring forth what civilians were doing in the middle of the night (time of strike) in those terrorist camps/sites. The intensity with which India should have played up this and other such aspects was lacking, suggesting a lack of a coordinated mechanism to push back against misinformation and disinformation.
The Indian media was and is invariably in ‘fastest finger first -Breaking news’ mode. It damaged its own credibility by circulating some ridiculous news, like that of Indian attacks on Karachi port. As a matter of fact, news was lost to ‘Jingoism and lack of verifiable evidence’. Overridden by Nationalistic fervour, media outlets spread claims, such as reports of a coup in Pakistan, Indian forces entering Pakistani territory, and the surrender of Pakistan’s Prime Minister, all of which were false. These claims, amplified by major networks like Times Now, Zee News, and ABP News, damaged India’s credibility and provided adversaries with material to discredit Indian narratives.
The military leadership rightly prioritised operational secrecy over gratifying communications. This induced time lag, however, became counterproductive. Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan acknowledged that 15% of the Armed Forces’ time during the operation was spent countering fake news. It was bound to have happened
and should have been catered for. Countering Fake news is part of Narrative building; it cannot be allowed to undermine the narrative management.
There is no denying that India’s kinetic response was swift, highly synchronised, and was a demonstration of India’s new normal in national security, a country willing to punish terror sponsors at will. The DGMO, DGAO, and DGNO later came for a media briefing and set matters right. One, however, wonders as to why these senior military officials
not there for briefings from the beginning.
Digitalisation is a reality of life, as is the breakneck pace of social media. It has laid a so-called data recirculation highway. This supply of information, good, bad or ugly, has profoundly affected almost every sphere of our existence. Ops Sindoor once again showed that the public opinion and perceptions are no longer based on factual truths and lies, but on what appears/made to be the truth. The ‘production of public opinion’ is further aided by AI-enhanced techniques, making disinformation and fake news a menace. Pakistan exploited this brazenly. One wonders if India tied itself in Niceties.
Among the lessons we learnt, Narrative Building has to be considered one of the foremost weapons of modern-day warfare. It was the maliciously built and AI-assisted ‘no-holds-barred’ Narrative that led to the various coloured revolutions in the Middle East and the regime changes in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. It needs to be tackled with the ancient Indian principle of ‘Saam, Daam, Dand and Bhed’ (Persuasion, Price, Punishment and Division). This philosophy has enduring relevance. The Narrative building and its spread must be contemporary, innovative, compelling, structured, transparent, and convincing. It requires an all-government lead and should be a core component of the national security strategy.
There is a need to pre-empt the adversary’s Narrative by timely putting out one’s own Narrative and near-live countering misinformation/disinformation/fake news-laced adversarial narratives. It requires a special body/cell comprising of AI mavens, IT, Communication and Cyber specialists, Social Media savvy Gen Z aficionados, enterprising media representatives, experts from defence, strategists from think tanks and academia, professionals from cognitive psychology and behavioural sciences and representatives from the ministries of external affairs, defence, home, information and broadcasting or any other ministry deemed fit.
The counsel of intelligence agencies to this body should not be filtered by ‘it is my news/they don’t need it/they will misuse it, etc.’ type syndromes. The cell should be mandated to step up engagement and coordinate messaging across international governments, own government agencies, military, diplomatic channels, domestic and international audiences, international media, and think tanks.
This civil-military-media interface should have statutory standing and be guided by the requirements set by the highest government office of the land. It should lead India to ‘Active Strategising’. It should be mandatorily part of India’s national security architecture, working 365×24. The work of this body should be ‘active’ rather than ‘reactive’. It needs to oversee that the Indian Narrative (Not necessarily during a military conflagration) is not Siloed. This body should be an expert ‘story maker and storyteller’.
In conclusion, India’s adversaries, both state and non-state, operate 24/7 in the information domain. The five domains of modern warfare—land, sea, air, space and cyber—now have added a sixth: narrative. Control over the story shapes control over outcomes, alliances and perceptions. As India emerges as a regional and global power, it must not only win battles but also win hearts and minds. The next operation, as and when it occurs, must also speak louder and shape perception more effectively. To prevent future Pahalgams, it is imperative that our future stratagem should take into account the fact that “narrative” is not just a loose word to be tossed around. It is something very precious and valuable in today’s global, networked, unceasingly active attention economy. Without control of the narrative, the terrorists will always win, even when they lose.
Air Vice Marshal Prashant Mohan (Retd)
Air Vice Marshal Prashant Mohan, a fighter pilot superannuated from IAF on 31 Mar 25. A Qualified Flying Instructor commanded a frontline fighter squadron and two front line fighter bases. The Air Officer was India’s Defence and Air Attaché to UK from May 19 to Oct 22.
