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In response to the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on 22 Apr 25, India on 07 May 2025,
launched Operation Sindoor with precision strikes. Pakistan retaliated on expected lines
– perpetual state of denial and being a cry-baby. India, responding with alacrity, delivered
telling damage to several critical Pakistani military assets. Indian airstrikes achieved their
objective of crippling major Pakistani airbases without provoking an all-out war.
In any campaign, for any self-respecting commander (Political or Military) shaping the
narrative (Strategic or Otherwise) is a Key Result Area. Unfortunately, in Op Sindoor,
India like before conceded that narrative space. The military success for India was clear,
the narrative control internationally was less effective.
Post 07 May Indian strikes, there was 10–12-hour information void from India. Pakistan
exploited this ‘void’. It pumped the global media with its version of events. Western media
outlets such as the BBC, the New York Times, the Guardian, and the Reuters and some
Pak-sympathetic international outlets used this flood of unverified information and went
into overdrive to propagate unsubstantiated Pakistani claims, framing India as the
aggressor. The role played by Indian-origin journalists and commentators who, from their
international perches, reinforced the Pakistan-favouring narrative under the guise of
neutral critique. In strategic communication, perception forms early—and are hard to
dislodge once set. Pakistan positioned itself, predictably as a victim.
Another question that needs answering is whether India has a dedicated information
warfare vertical to give out in real time the required story and counter the false claims.
India had to first counter the disinformation and then give the correct information. Hence,
India was basically playing ‘Catch-up’. Also, why wef 23 Apr, a day after the Pahalgam
massacre did India not go into an aggressive narrative building up. Did the absence of
proactive engagement by Indian think tanks and veteran influencers weaken the narrative
response. Also, in this intervening phase why could India not put in place a
mechanism/procedure to release near live information. Can these be called ‘Strategic
Communication Delays’, maybe.
The Indian government invariably faces criticism for its delayed public communications.
One may wonder if this is ‘internal procedural caution’. Hierarchical decision-making,
inter-agency coordination bottlenecks, and an inherent risk-averse approach allowed
Pakistan and third parties like the US to shape the initial global narrative. In this military
conflagration, it is not being said that India should have been trigger happy in releasing
sensitive military information, but an incomplete picture sets tongues wagging iro ‘is there
something to hide’. Strategic messaging cannot be ‘at your own time and pace’.
There is a need to acknowledge here that reality of the false narratives vis-à-vis Op
Sindoor eventually got corrected—when Western think tanks and prominent bloggers/contributors on defence matters accredited Indian dominance. The entire event
however underscored ‘weaknesses’ in India’s preparedness apropos warfare narrative.
One is left pondering if these ‘weaknesses’ are Op Sindoor specific or systemic.
Social media, the Aorta of the present-day information highway was choked by fabricated
Pakistani videos and images. This distortion was further reinforced by cognitive
prejudices, where audiences abroad had started to believe the false Pakistani narrative.
Using social media, Pakistan fed the audiences in the West aggressively by falsely
alleging civilian casualties during Indian strikes- a raw nerve in the western mindset. The
Indian silence on specifics allowing the evidence to ‘surface with time’ only gave the
much-required fodder to the Indian nay-sayers while Indian audiences were confused as
to whom to believe. The Indian narrative highlighted that Indian objective was to target
terror infrastructure but it did not bring forth what were civilians doing in the middle of the
night (time of strike) in those terrorist camps / sites. The intensity with which this and other such aspects should have been played up by India was lacking which points to lack of a coordinated mechanism to push back against the misinformation and disinformation.
The Indian media was and is invariably in ‘fastest finger first -Breaking news’ mode.
It damaged its own credibility by circulating some ridiculous news like that of Indian
attacks on Karachi port. Matter of fact news was lost to ‘Jingoism and lack of verifiable
evidence’. Overridden by Nationalistic fervour Media outlets spread claims, such as
reports of a coup in Pakistan, Indian forces entering Pakistani territory, and the surrender
of Pakistan’s prime minister—all of which were false. These claims, amplified by major
networks like Times Now, Zee News, and ABP News, damaged India’s credibility and
provided adversaries with material to discredit Indian narratives.
The military leadership rightly prioritized operational secrecy over gratifying
communications. This induced time-lag, however became counterproductive. Chief
of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan acknowledged that 15% of the Armed Forces’ time
during the operation was spent countering fake news. This was bound to have happened
and should have been catered for. Countering Fake news is part of Narrative building;
it cannot be allowed to underscore the narrative management.
There is no denying that Indian kinetic response was swift, highly synchronized and was
a demonstration of India’s new normal in national security—a country willing to punish
terror sponsors at will. The DGMO, DGAO & DGNO came for media briefing later and set
the matters right. One however wonders as to why were these senior military officials
not there for briefings from the beginning.
The digitalization is a reality of life as is the breakneck advance of social media. This has
laid a so-called highway for data recirculation. This supply of information good, bad or
ugly has profoundly affected almost every sphere of our existence. Op Sindoor once
again showed that the public opinion and perceptions are no longer based on factual
truths and lies, but on what appears / made to appear truth. This ‘producing of public opinion’ is further aided by AI-enhanced techniques making disinformation and fake news
a menace. Pakistan exploited this brazenly. One wonders if India tied itself in Niceties.
Among the lesson learnt for us, Narrative Building has to be considered one of the
foremost weapon of modern-day warfare. It was the maliciously built and AI assisted
‘no-holds barred’ Narrative that led to the various coloured revolutions in middle east and
the regime changes in Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. This needs to be tackled with
the ancient Indian principle of ‘Saam, Daam, Dand and Bhed’ / ‘Persuasion, Price,
Punishment and Division’. This philosophy has enduring relevance. The Narrative
building and its spread has to be contemporary, innovative, compelling, structured,
transparent and convincing. This requires an all-government lead and should be a
core component of national security strategy.
There is need to pre-empt the Narrative of the adversary by timely putting out own
Narrative and near live countering misinformation/disinformation/fake news laced
adversarial narrative. This requires a special body/cell comprising of AI mavens, IT,
Communication and Cyber specialists, Social Media savvy Gen Z aficionados,
enterprising media representatives, experts from defence, strategists from think tanks
and academia, professionals from cognitive psychology and behavioural sciences and
representatives from the ministries of external affairs, defence, home, information &
broadcasting or any other ministry deemed fit. The counsel of intelligence agencies to this
body should not be filtered by ‘it is my news/they don’t need it/they will misuse it etc’ type
syndromes. The cell should be mandated to step up engagement and coordinate
messaging across international governments, own government agencies, military,
diplomatic channels, domestic and international audiences, international media, think
tanks.
This civil-military-media interface should have a statutory standing and be guided by
the requirements laid down by the highest government office of the land. It should
lead India to ‘Active Strategizing’. It should mandatorily be part of India’s national security
architecture working 365×24. The work of this body should be ‘active’ rather than be
‘reactive’. It needs to oversee that Indian Narrative (Not necessarily during a military
conflagration) is not Siloed. This body should be an expert ‘story maker and story
teller’.
In conclusion, India’s adversaries—both state and non-state—operate 24/7 in the
information domain. The five domains of modern warfare—land, sea, air, space and
cyber—now have added a sixth: narrative. Control over the story shapes control over
outcomes, alliances and perceptions. As India emerges as a regional and global power,
it must not just win battles; it must also win belief. The next operation as and when it
occurs must also speak louder and shape perception more effectively. To prevent future
Pahalgams, it is imperious that our future stratagem should take into account the fact that
“narrative” is not just a loose word to be tossed around. It is something very precious and
valuable in today’s global, networked, unceasingly active attention economy. Without
control of the narrative, the terrorists will always win, even when they lose
Air Vice Marshal Prashant Mohan, a fighter pilot superannuated from IAF on 31 Mar 25. A Qualified Flying Instructor commanded a frontline fighter squadron and two front line fighter bases. The Air Officer was India’s Defence and Air Attaché to UK from May 19 to Oct 22.
