![](https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/LT-BSI-Defence.gif")
Editor’s Note
In the first part of this two-part commentary, we discussed different models available in other countries. Today, we attempt to figure out what India could do to achieve the objectives of better jointness and integration among the three services.
Analysis of the two command structures discussed in the first part brings out that both are structured for the joint application of force, generally for Out-of-Area Contingencies (OOACs), in addition to sovereign territorial (homeland) defence. While the US model is focused on maintaining global military dominance and the capability to intervene in conflict-prone regions, the ADF is employed as a part of multinational forces (including peacekeeping missions of the United Nations) where Australia has political obligations.
Although the appointments and staff for planning and conducting operations are permanent in the Australian model, the forces are allotted by the individual service headquarters (HQ) based on a joint appreciation of the emerging threat.
In both cases, the meaning of ‘theatres’ relates to large contiguous geographical areas of continental proportion. In the Indian context, our most immediate security concerns relate more to ‘homeland defence’, and in the conventional sense, defending territorial integrity in a ‘two-front’ scenario. However, with a growing regional and global profile, India also needs to develop and maintain the ability to project power beyond its territory in support of its foreign policy and other national security objectives.
In effect, such operations would constitute OOAC. In addition, there also needs to be developed the joint capability to respond to large-scale HADR contingencies like the Asian Tsunami (2004) and the conflict-driven displacement in Yemen (2015), which called for the evacuation of Indian expatriates by India using military assets.
Hence, we need to adopt a model that addresses the spectrum of conflicts the Indian military may need to address, ranging from asymmetric to nuclear threats, while also permitting it to retain the flexibility to project power in the geographical area of interest. The Australian model of “centralised yet diffused control” comes closest as an example for us to evolve a broad consensus.
Jointness in the Indian armed forces have been steadily enhanced following lessons learnt during wars and war-like situations. Examples include the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan Wars, the Sri Lanka Operations of 1987-90 (Operation Pawan), the Maldives Coup Intervention of 1988 (Operation Cactus), and the Kargil Conflict of 1999 (Op Vijay). In operational terms, mechanisms for planning and operating jointly have matured over the years. The Armed Forces have evolved organisational cooperative models to meet specific operational and training requirements, such as maritime air operations, battlefield air support, air maintenance of forward posts, and amphibious operations.
Given the conventional challenge of the ‘two-front’ threat and the asymmetric challenge of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism, the need for cooperation and operational synergy is well acknowledged and appreciated by the three Services.
It is reflected in the Joint Doctrines published by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). The geographical areas and possible contingencies in which the Armed Forces would work together are also well delineated following years of experience. However, structurally, the progress from ‘jointness’ to ‘integration’ has been largely confined to the realm of ideas and discussions.
The first CDS, late General Bipin Rawat, had embarked on the process of defining the broad contours of Theatre Commands, which were based on the geographical principle and focused on addressing the conventional challenges of two adversarial neighbouring states (Pakistan and China), as well as the maritime frontier. The debates spurred by General Rawat’s publicised interventions were intensive and, at times, even controversial. However, he did make people sit up and take note of the need for change. Unfortunately, with his untimely passing away on December 8, 2021, the process suffered a setback.
Given the complexity of the Indian military’s geographical spread and supply chain dynamics, the chosen model should be such that it requires bringing about minimal changes to the existing deep-rooted operational organisations and yet achieves the desired integration to actualise joint strategic thinking and operational planning.
Thus far, the thinking regarding Theatre Commands in India seems to be inspired by the US (as also partly by the Chinese or Russian) models, which predicate the division of the nation’s strategic geography into multiple military theatres. Going by the unremitting reservation of the Indian Air Force to the idea of “dividing its precious air assets” between multiple theatres and the imperative to retain centralised control, it is perhaps time to take a closer look at the Australian model, to draw cues.
How might a viable Indian model be outlined?
As per the assessment made by Team Bharatshakti, a broad Five-Point Terms of Reference that could govern the formulation of such a model is elucidated as follows:
- It should result in the institution of an operationally empowered CDS without majorly prejudicing the current operational and administrative powers of the Chiefs of Staff of the Services, enshrined in respective laws of the land (Army Act, Navy Act and Air Force Act).
- It should not result in reorganisation of existing commands or destabilisation of well-entrenched administrative/operational structures, which have acquired a ‘critical mass’ over a period, with legal, hierarchical, and inter-agency dimensions. For example, Naval Cs-in-C are also concurrently designated as Cs-in-C Coastal Defence and exercise functionally superior relationships over numerous supporting agencies, viz. Coast Guard, Marine Police, Port Security, etc., in their Area of Responsibility. Likewise, the Air Force Cs-in-C are responsible for Air Defence Identification Zones in respective AsOR, thereby contributing to a national level responsibility, entailing inter-agency coordination.
- It should permit adequate autonomy to extant Commands in terms of airspace management, maritime domain awareness (including surveillance), coastal security and geographical/territorial jurisdiction, without any alterations in the areas of responsibility (AoR) of various Commanders-in-Chief.
- It should accord adequate authority/legislative backing at the apex hierarchy of the integrated structure (CDS) to demand human and material resources from Service Headquarters for OOAC and other joint operations, including the nomination of a Sub-Theatre Joint Commander (from amongst the combatant C-in-Cs) and Supporting Commanders, for executing such operations.
- It should facilitate qualitative enhancement in jointness by establishing localised arrangements for joint planning and the conduct of operations by inter-service Commands with overlapping operational mandates, including overlapping Areas of Responsibility (AoR).
A National Theatre Command as the First Phase of Theaterisation
Will it be better for the Indian military to adopt a phased approach to the formation of theatre commands, wherein the first phase involves learning to operate together as a pan-India theatre at the national level? To evolve a mechanism wherein the combatant Commander-in-Chiefs of the three Forces report to the Permanent Chairman COSC (CDS) in addition to their Service Chiefs in a dual track paradigm? The empowerment of the CDS to plan, direct, and control operations could be contingency-based, as mandated by the government. It would ensure that there is clarity among the Chiefs of Staff Committee about the scenarios in which the CDS can exercise operational command.
In line with the terms of reference, a viable option for ushering structural integration would be to create a unified command structure at the national level. Let us call it the (Indian) National Theatre Command (NTC). At the apex level of NTC will be the CDS (as the Permanent Chairman COSC), assisted by his Joint staff at HQ NTC. The key cardinals of the proposed approach are as follows:
- Geographical Scope: Like the Australian model, it would consider the entire national territory (including Air Defence Identification Zones and Maritime Areas of Responsibility) as a theatre and could be named as National Theatre Command (NTC). The Headquarters IDS would need to be re-designated as the Joint HQ NTC, and it would have a suitably structured joint planning staff under the CDS (Permanent Chairman COSC). The Chief of the Integrated Defence Staff to the COSC (CISC), who heads the HQ, IDS, could be “double-hatted” as the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) to assist the CDS in implementing his operational mandate.
- Operational Mandate: Operational forces would not be permanently controlled by the CDS but would be allocated by concerned Service Chiefs when so called for by CDS, based on Joint Planning process. Assigned forces will be mobilised for specific campaigns/operations and reverted to the control of parent Service, on termination. The conditions and occasions when such allocation would be necessary will need to be clearly specified.
- Command and Control: The CDS, as Permanent Chairman of COSC, would be empowered to assign a Sub-Theatre Commander from among the tri-service combatant C-in-Cs for a given situation that calls for a joint operation to be launched at the National Theatre level. The issuance of operational directives to the Supporting Commanders (from among the GOC, AOC, and Naval Commanders) would also fall under the prerogative of JHQ NTC, led by the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) and reporting to the CDS. In a full-blown inter-state conflict, more than one Sub-Theatre Commanders may need to be nominated.
- Planning: While detailed planning would be undertaken by JHQ NTC, representatives of Service HQ would be co-opted in the joint appreciation and planning process (Joint Operations Committee). In this model, retaining a strategic focus would be easier, and responses to OOACs and emergent threats, including major acts of cross-border terrorism, could be addressed more effectively. For wider, large-scale operations, sub-theatre-specific planning will have to be undertaken by the respective Sub-Theatre Commanders.
Well Begun is Half Done
The brief yet intense conflict with Pakistan that unfolded in early May 2025 during Operation Sindoor has driven home the criticality of evolving a uniquely Indian structure for integrated military operations under the overall guidance and coordination of the CDS.
The prevailing state of affairs concerning reforms of higher defence organisations in India, stemming from the absence of consensus in the Defence Forces, could be described as ‘cautiously interested in enhancing jointness but reluctant to integration’. The situation could be given a transformative turn by presenting a model that is least destabilising to the existing arrangement yet sufficiently reformative to bring our apex-level military management structure in line with India’s rise as a regional power and achieve the preparedness to meet the spectrum of threats.
Establishment of a National Theatre Command, headed by an empowered CDS (as the Permanent Chairman COSC), to command and coordinate operations entailing inter-service participation, may be the appropriate step to begin the process of ushering in credible integration in India’s higher defence organisation. As the nascent organisation settles and gains more confidence in ushering in a joint ethos, the powers and mandate of the CDS as the Pmt Chairman COSC could be reviewed and strengthened in subsequent phases to enhance integration in substance and scope.
Nitin A Gokhale
Author, thought leader and one of South Asia's leading strategic analysts, Nitin A. Gokhale has forty years of rich and varied experience behind him as a conflict reporter, Editor, author and now a media entrepreneur who owns and curates two important digital platforms, BharatShakti.in and StratNewsGlobal.com focusing on national security, strategic affairs and foreign policy matters.
At the beginning of his long and distinguished career, Gokhale has lived and reported from India’s North-east for 23 years, writing and analysing various insurgencies in the region, been on the ground at Kargil in the summer of 1999 during the India-Pakistan war, and also brought live reports from Sri Lanka’s Eelam War IV between 2006-2009.
Author of over a dozen books on wars, insurgencies and conflicts, Gokhale relocated to Delhi in 2006, was Security and Strategic Affairs Editor at NDTV, a leading Indian broadcaster for nine years, before launching in 2015 his own digital properties.
An alumni of the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Hawaii, Gokhale now writes, lectures and analyses security and strategic matters in Indo-Pacific and travels regularly to US, Europe, South and South-East Asia to speak at various international seminars and conferences.
Gokhale also teaches at India’s Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), the three war colleges, India's National Defence College, College of Defence Management and the intelligence schools of both the R&AW and Intelligence Bureau.
He tweets at @nitingokhale
