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Editor’s Note
While India has been reiterating that it does not believe that Pakistan’s nuclear posture limits its conventional military options, Operation Sindoor demonstrated emphatically the ‘redrawing of thresholds’ in retaliation for a Pakistan-sponsored terrorist strike. India has conveyed to Pakistan and the global community that nuclear threats will not inhibit its conventional military responses. The country has expressed its readiness to test the military and kinetic escalatory ladder. In this two-part article, Part I, the author discusses India’s nuclear doctrine, its current and future nuclear capabilities development, and the significant strategic shift in deterrence signalling across the conventional and nuclear domains post-Operation Sindoor.
India, by its actions, did emphasise that targeting would be focused on hitting the centres, hubs, supporters of terror, including Pakistan’s military bases, airfields, command, communication and control centres, even in the face of nuclear threats and blackmail. To keen observers, defence analysts, India’s multi-domain offensive actions also signalled that Indian nuclear doctrine, while remaining constant, can be adjusted flexibly to address emerging geopolitical, strategic developments, ensuring that deterrence remains effective, especially against Pakistan. It would be correct to state that there has been a perceptible shift in practice and action in response to any acts of state-sponsored terror from Pakistan. Post Operation Sindoor, India did not shy away from naming China (and Turkey) as the leading supporter of Pakistan in all military manoeuvres, which also signals a significant shift in our political, diplomatic and military stance.
India’s Nuclear Doctrine
India publicly adopted a nuclear doctrine in 2003. Key features include ‘No First Use’ (NFU) – ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ implying India’s nuclear arsenal would be sufficient to deter adversaries and avoid any arms race; ‘Massive Retaliation’ if attacked with nuclear weapons (or weapons of mass destruction to include biological or chemical weapons), even if employed against Indian forces anywhere (recent modification); Operational control lies with the ‘Nuclear Command Authority’ the political executive headed by the Prime Minister. It is notable that India has bilateral agreements with Pakistan on “Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities”, and annual exchanges of nuclear asset lists.
Deterrence Options Post Operation Sindoor
Strategic Signalling based on Actions Taken on Ground
- Rejecting Nuclear Blackmail: Pakistan, in the past and even during Op Sindoor, has constantly used the nuclear escalation card and danger of global nuclear ‘Armageddon’ to ensure a limited kinetic response from India. India’s call out by the political and military hierarchy that “no nuclear blackmail will be tolerated” was validated by Op Sindoor, and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence was challenged.
- The confluence of State and Non-state actors and actions: A significant signal to the world and to Pakistan during Op Sindoor was to treat actions by non-state actors (sponsored by the state) as Pakistan’s direct responsibility. That façade maintained by Pakistan of rogue terrorist acts by non-state actors and indigenous actions within India has thus been broken, closing the gap between non-state actor and state action. That clarifies deterrence – India will now hold the state accountable more directly.
- Raise costs: India has signalled that future responses, including cross-border strikes, may even pre-emptive conventional operations, will not be constrained by Pakistan’s threats. Thus, it raises the costs of terrorism or state complicity in terror. But this also increases the risk of escalation.
- Cumulative deterrence: Experts argue that India is moving from a posture of strategic restraint toward one in which successive responses build pressure, including punitive strikes, diplomatic isolation, and economic restrictions, as part of a multi-domain strategy rather than waiting for a single large provocation. Lowering or shifting thresholds for retaliation while deterring escalation also risks miscalculation.
Escalatory Ladder including Nuclear Option
The escalatory ladder, which need not necessarily be linearly applied, could be:
- Pre-Kinetic Multi-Domain Operations: Non-kinetic operations in the PDIME (political, diplomatic, Informational, military, economic) domains. In the military sphere, show of force, deployment, localised or general mobilisation, concentration of artillery, air power, paratroopers, et, to compel behaviour.
- Conventional military strikes: Operation Sindoor validated the space for conventional operations. The emphasis is that even under the threat of nuclear escalation, conventional responses are possible. India is reinforcing its capability to carry out precise conventional actions that impose high costs.
- Signalling Escalation Dominance: Demonstrating the ability to escalate more severely, signalling to the adversary that we are prepared to face nuclear threats while remaining willing to escalate. It does come with added risks.
- Nuclear Response: Under formal doctrine, only if India is first struck with nuclear weapons (or possibly biological/chemical breach). Our policy dictates that we must maintain a credible second-strike capability, which requires survivable delivery systems like Submersible/Sub-Surface Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) submarines, redundancies, secure command & control, and missile and warhead reliability.
Concurrently, India has made it clear that it is not abandoning its ‘No First Use’ (NFU) policy. Some observers suggest that a degree of ambiguity regarding nuclear policy can enhance its deterrent effectiveness. They argue that varying interpretations circulating in international forums are not necessarily detrimental.
India’s Nuclear Capabilities: Modernisation, Infrastructure, and Force Structuring
China has been carrying out a surge of its nuclear ecosystem, seeking parity with the USA, and has spurned any offer of talks with the USA and Russia, stating that they are in a different league. Apart from modernising and enlarging its delivery arsenal, upgrading strategic and satellite communications and ISR capabilities, China’s nuclear warhead stockpile also significantly grew, increasing from an estimated 300 weapons in 2020 to at least 600 in 2025, and is projected to surpass 1,000 by 2030, with reports indicating a rate of addition of about 100 warheads per year since 2023. It is pertinent to mention that since the last decade, the USA has been carrying out nuclear modernisation (one trillion dollars) of its entire nuclear ecosystem, leading to a corresponding response from Russia and China. The abrogation of nuclear agreements, with more nations keen to join the exclusive NWS club, has upended the delicately maintained nuclear stability. The adversarial conflict in South Asia and the Middle East, coupled with collusive strategic relations between China and Pakistan, has further exacerbated security in Asia. To ensure parity, support our deterrent posture, and maintain a credible second-strike capability and deterrence, India too is pushing modernisation across nuclear weapons delivery and supporting systems (survivability, sea legs, strategic communications, satellite coverage, etc.).
An overview is provided below:
Sea-Based Deterrence & SSBNs/SLBMs
- India has developed and commissioned SSBNs
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- INS Arihant (first SSBN) – operational.
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- INS Arighat, the second SSBN, was commissioned in August 2024.
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- S4 and S4* (third and fourth Arihant-class SSBNs) have been launched or are in the final stages; S4* in particular was launched in October 2024, with 75% indigenous content, equipped with K-4 missiles (3,500 km SLBMs).
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- Two S5 SSBN under design will be armed with 12 SLBM Launch Tubes, K5 Missile, and 190 MW Reactor (CCS October 2024 under Project 77)
- K-4 SLBM by DRDO, a solid-fuel two-stage missile with a range of 3,500 km, enhances India’s second-strike capability at sea.
- Development underway of K-5 and possibly K-6 SLBMs to further increase range and payload. These will allow later SSBN platforms (S5-class) to carry longer-range SLBMs, possibly even MIRVed warheads.
- Six conventional diesel-electric submarines under Project 75I (CCS October 2024).
- Very Low Frequency (VLF) communication stations to maintain communication with submerged assets, ensuring SSBNs remain in the loop even under crisis. For example, a new VLF facility, the Very Low Frequency Naval Station at Damagundam, Telangana, was inaugurated.
Correctly, the sea leg of the triad is being strengthened significantly, which is essential for survivable deterrence (second-strike), a prerequisite in the face of nuclear threats or first strikes.
Land including Rail & Air Leg Upgrades
- Agni-series ballistic missiles.
- Warheads, missile readiness, and deployment posture are being improved (undisclosed but inferred from government statements raising the costs of aggression).
- Air-based nuclear weapons: Maintenance or upgrade of bomber or aircraft delivery system readiness, though exact public details are sparse. India continues to keep aircraft platforms capable of nuclear special payloads (bombers or dual-use aircraft).
- India successfully tested the new-generation nuclear-capable Agni-Prime ballistic missile, which has a strike range of 2000 km, from a rail-based launcher system for the first time on 26 Sepember 2025. It provides operational flexibility, survivability and cross-country mobility. It is a canister-launch missile system like the Agni V, the country’s most formidable missile with a strike range of 5000 km. In such systems, the nuclear warheads are already mated to missiles in hermetically sealed canisters, allowing long-term storage and quick launch. This successful flight test from a rail-based Mobile launcher system has put India among the select nations capable of developing a canisterised launch system from a mobile rail network.
- Procurement of 31 Predator drones from the US (CCS October 2024).
Command, Control and Communications Systems
- Survivability of command and control is critical: VLF stations ensure communication links between submarines and the nuclear command authority, which functions under political leadership. A Very Low Frequency facility at Damagundam for communication with SSBNs has been reported.
- Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) and Early Warning (EW): In keeping with NFU policy, it is imperative that India receive advanced notice of attacks and be able to manage escalations. Hence, the importance of dual-use technologies (such as satellite and maritime domain awareness) warrants the utmost urgency and emphasis.
- Safety and Supply of Fissile Material: India has significant stockpiles of plutonium and uranium, along with its indigenous fuel cycle. The fast-breeder stage and the thorium program are long-term bets. The more reliable and assured the material supply, the more credible the threat of retaliation.
Budgeting and Creation of Energy & Civil Nuclear Infrastructure
It is essential to achieve complete synergy between public and private partners across all defence and security endeavours, given the multi-domain nature of confrontations and conflicts, especially in the niche field of nuclear technology. To sustain both civilian energy and support nuclear weapons infrastructure, India is expanding its civilian nuclear power capacity and R&D. Though the civilian sector is distinct, improvements in nuclear material management, indigenous reactor design, and the thorium program enhance the technical base. Some notable steps in this direction are:
- Union Budget 2025-26 allocated Rs 20,000 crore for a Nuclear Energy Mission focused on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) and Bharat Small Reactors (BSRs). The aim is to operationalise at least five SMRs by 2033
- India aims to reach 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 as part of its energy strategy.
- Several new reactors approved: 10 new PHWRs (Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors), including Kaiga 5-6, GHAVP 3-4, Chutka 1-2, and Mahi Banswara 1-4. These add 7,000 MW to capacity by 2031-32.
- Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam is nearing first criticality (expected by ~2026). It is the second stage of India’s three-stage nuclear program.
- Indigenous reactor designs (PHWR-700, etc.) are being deployed, and a separate vertical under the Department of Atomic Energy is being created to bring in the private sector.
Resource and Fiscal Allocation and Challenges
- For the fiscal year 2025–26, India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was allocated Rs 37,482.93 crore in the Union Budget. The budget for military modernisation remains opaque, naturally.
- Modernisation of the nuclear ecosystem; delivery systems across domains—sea, undersea, land, air, space; strategic communications, ISR systems are expensive. Civil nuclear expansion (SMRs, PFBR, reactors, etc.) also requires significant public investment.
- Talent, original research, industrial base, safety regulation, nuclear liability frameworks, supply chains: all need to be developed. Failures in these could lead to technological mishaps, delays, and cost overruns.
Note: Part II will explore India’s responsibilities and challenges as a nuclear weapon state (NWS) in the current geopolitical landscape.
Lt Gen PR Kumar
