Kailash Range Operations Reshaped Ladakh Standoff Narrative

Three years ago, around this time, the then Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen YK Joshi, ordered what is now famously referred to as the “Kailash Range Operation” to turn the tables on the Chinese PLA determined to change the status quo on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh.

The following paragraphs delve into the factors that triggered the Indian response, the subsequent Chinese reactions, and how this counterstroke paved the way for more substantial military and diplomatic negotiations.

Before delving into the details, it is worth recalling Lt Gen Joshi’s statements from an interview with me in Leh back in February 2021, which took place as the initial disengagement efforts were underway. During that interview, I asked Lt Gen Joshi whether the actions taken on August 29-30 had placed India on an equal footing in the negotiation process. 

In response, he affirmed, ” Absolutely. That action finally turned the tables on the PLA and got them back to the negotiating table.  Before August 29-30, we had already conducted five rounds of discussions at the level of Corps Commanders. At that time, we found ourselves in a relatively defensive position. While we had established control over specific areas on the north bank, the Chinese held advantageous positions in certain key locations. However, a significant shift occurred following the events of August 29-30. With our occupation of the Rezang La and Rechin La complex, which are notable commanding positions overlooking China’s Moldo garrison across the border, the dynamics changed. We extended our presence to the south bank and secured higher elevations, including Finger-4, thus gaining dominance over the regions previously held by the PLA. This strategic move played a pivotal role in compelling China to re-engage in negotiations. The meticulous planning and execution of our operations took the PLA by complete surprise. Their lack of anticipation for such actions stands as a testament to the dedication of our ground troops and the adept leadership that masterminded and rehearsed these manoeuvres. Our preparation, ongoing since the Galwan incident on June 15, culminated in this decisive action that caught our adversary off guard, thus restoring the element of surprise on our side”

The operation, which started late in the evening of 29 August 2020, was necessitated by intelligence reports and ground observation by troops located in forward positions of the Chushul Bowl that alerted Indian military commanders about Chinese troops moving up the hills from their side to a couple of dominating features called Black Top and Helmet top. The Chinese were clearly trying to pre-empt any possible Indian occupation of the heights along the Pangong and Kailash range of mountains. Sensing the Chinese intentions, Lt Gen Joshi ordered troops from the nearest brigade stationed in the Chushul bowl to climb the heights, but the Chinese beat the Indians to the top of the Helmet top and Blacktop features (see map). This was on the intervening night between 29 and 30th August.

So even as Indian troops faced off the Chinese on the slopes of these two features, Lt Gen Joshi realised it could develop into another stalemate. He needed to break the deadlock and put the Chinese under pressure somewhere. As Northern Army Commander, he had, in consultation with his top commanders—which included his own HQ Staff, 14 and 17 Corps Commanders, Lt Gen Harinder Singh and Lt Gen Savneet Singh, respectively—chalked up several options or, as they say in military parlance QPQ or quid pro quo (counterstrike) action.

As the morning of 30th August dawned, Lt Gen Joshi realised that he had very little time as the Chinese, he suspected, may try to occupy the other heights in the vicinity, putting the Indian positions at a severe disadvantage.

It was a Sunday morning, and the Northern Army Commander thought he would quickly get through to Army Chief Gen MM Naravane in Delhi and get his permission to go ahead with his planned action, but to his surprise the Chief of Army Staff was attending a high-level meeting.

However, using his earlier experience of working in the Army HQ, Gen Joshi found a way to reach the Army Chief. As Gen Joshi’s request reached the Army Chief, he gave immediate clearance. The Army Chief apparently concurred with Gen Joshi’s plan and gave him the go-ahead.

The Kailash Range QPQ was thus greenlighted.

In broad daylight, troops from brigades positioned near the Rezang La War memorial and throughout the Kailash Range rushed onto the Mukhpari, Rezang La and Richen La peaks. This was the first time in 58 years (after the 1962 war) that troops had stationed themselves along the Kailash range of mountains. The Indian Army now could look directly into the Moldo Garrison at the bottom of the Kailash range on the other side. The Chinese were shocked. They never expected the Indian side to go beyond the standard drill. Gradually, India built up the strength and logistics support for the troops who had taken control of the ridgeline as Lt Gen Savneet Singh (Retd), then the Commander of the 17 Mountain Strike Corps, told me in this interview (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVGfHtF_WF4).  On the night of 30 October, there was more tension, excitement and anticipation about a possible armed confrontation with the Chinese as the PLA too, started moving troops up the hills backed by substantial armour strength.

Lt Gen Joshi had also meanwhile moved elements of an independent armoured brigade onto the ridgeline. By the afternoon of 31 August, both sides had consolidated their presence, resulting in an unprecedented situation where tank turrets were face to face, just 50 meters apart at some places. Another stalemate appeared to be in the offing.

However, the Northern Command had another surprise in store for the Chinese on the north bank of the Pangong Tso. On 31st October, troops under 39 Division (14 Corps elements) undertook a daring manoeuvre to go up the higher reaches of the Finger 4 ridgeline and managed to reach behind the PLA troops who had ensconced themselves on the slopes of Finger 4 since mid-May. Now, the Chinese were well and truly checkmated. They were outsmarted on the Kailash range and had lost the advantage of sitting on the slopes of Finger 4 since the Indian troops had gone above and behind them by undertaking an unthinkable operation.

Looking back, those three days can be considered as a major turning point in the current round of India-China tension along the LAC. The Indian Army had turned the tables on the Chinese. The PLA commanders started taking the Corps Commanders level talks more seriously. Yet, it took nearly six more months to achieve the first set of disengagement on the North and South banks of Pangong Tso.

Questions have been raised on why the Indian side did not use the advantage that the Kailash range operations had given to get full disengagement, including the friction points at Depsang and Demchock, Lt Gen Joshi had a clear reasoning in that February 2021 interview. He said: “Rezang La is a dominating feature on the Kailash ranges which we had occupied. But it has been done purposely to push the negotiations to

disengagement, and that is what happened. It is not that the advantage is in perpetuity. We can’t equate the occupation of Rezang La, Richen La and try to resolve the boundary issue with this.” What he essentially meant was the limited objective of the Kailash range operation was to get the eyeball-to-eyeball situation on the north and south banks of the Pangong Tso resolved. The rest of the friction points, in his view, could be discussed and solutions found subsequently.

Regardless of the eventual resolution, the ongoing standoffs in Ladakh over the following months will forever engrave the Kailash Range operation as a pivotal landmark in the contemporary chronicles of India-China tensions. This operation stands out as a defining moment, leaving an indelible mark on the trajectory of events and shaping the narrative of this period of heightened geopolitical dynamics between the two nations.

Nitin A Gokhale