‘Do What You Deem Fit’ Was Not Abdication

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A political controversy triggered by opposition leader Rahul Gandhi over India’s handling of the 2020 Galwan crisis has been sharply dismissed by strategic analyst and Editor-in-Chief of BharatShakti Nitin A. Gokhale, who describes the episode as a “storm in a teacup” driven more by selective interpretation than by any substantive lapse in civil-military decision-making.

Gandhi cited a magazine excerpt attributed to the unpublished memoirs of former Army chief Manoj Mukund Naravane, claiming that Prime Minister Narendra Modi and senior members of the political leadership effectively abdicated responsibility at a critical moment.

According to the excerpt, when Chinese light tanks were reportedly moving towards sensitive heights in eastern Ladakh, the Army chief sought political advice on next steps. After a delay, he was allegedly told to “do whatever you deem fit,” a phrase the opposition has portrayed as the political leadership passing the burden of a potentially war-triggering decision to the military.

Gokhale argues that this interpretation misunderstands both the context and the norms of military command. In his assessment, the situation described was not about authorising a war, but about responding to a Chinese tactical move. Reacting to such a move, he says, falls squarely within the professional remit of the Army chief and field commanders.

He acknowledges that China’s status as a major strategic adversary explains why political leaders were consulted. However, he stresses that it would be impractical—and operationally unsound—for every tactical development to require detailed political direction. Once broad political intent is conveyed, professional military judgment must guide how that intent is executed on the ground.

The same excerpt, Gokhale notes, records that Indian troops were instructed not to fire unless fired upon. This, he argues, underscores India’s consistent effort to avoid being seen as the aggressor, while still retaining the option to block or counter Chinese advances. In his reading, this measured posture allowed Indian forces to pre-empt Chinese movement at key locations, denying them advantageous positions and creating leverage for subsequent negotiations.

Far from demonstrating weakness, Gokhale says India’s actions during 2020–2021 were unprecedented in confronting Chinese “salami-slicing” tactics. He credits a combination of firmness and diplomacy with enabling disengagement at several friction points along the Line of Actual Control, even as broader de-escalation remains a work in progress.

The second strand of controversy—the government’s reported decision to stall publication of General Naravane’s memoirs—also draws a robust defence from Gokhale. When the book was reportedly scheduled for release in January 2024, India and China were still in the midst of sensitive negotiations. Publishing operational details, internal political deliberations, and command-level discussions so soon after the events, he argues, could expose how India’s system functions and reveal negotiating positions.

Gokhale points out that India has yet to declassify some major conflict-related reports even after six decades, reflecting a longstanding culture of protecting sensitive material. Expecting a former service chief’s account of recent operations to be publicly released within a few years, he says, is therefore unrealistic.

He also notes that there are government directives restricting serving and retired officials from writing or speaking about operations they were personally involved in, particularly when such disclosures could touch on classified matters. From this perspective, halting or delaying the memoir’s publication is consistent with established practice rather than an attempt to suppress uncomfortable truths.

Taken together, Gokhale argues, neither the alleged “do what you deem fit” remark nor the blocked memoir points to abdication or institutional failure.

Instead, they illustrate how complex, high-stakes national security decisions are being reduced to simplified political narratives. In his view, the real story of Galwan is not one of leadership vacuum, but of calibrated military and political coordination aimed at preventing escalation while safeguarding Indian positions.

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In a career spanning three decades and counting, I’ve been the foreign editor of The Telegraph, Outlook Magazine and the New Indian Express. I helped set up rediff.com’s editorial operations in San Jose and New York, helmed sify.com, and was the founder editor of India.com. My work has featured in national and international publications like the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Global Times and Ashahi Shimbun. My one constant over all these years, however, has been the attempt to understand rising India’s place in the world.
I can rustle up a mean salad, my oil-less pepper chicken is to die for, and it just takes some beer and rhythm and blues to rock my soul.

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