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China has marketed its military hardware as a cost-effective alternative to Western and Russian systems, advanced on paper, lethal in theory, and politically convenient for countries seeking to diversify away from U.S. or NATO suppliers. Yet recent conflicts and military operations involving Venezuela, Pakistan, and the Middle East have exposed a recurring pattern: Chinese platforms struggle when confronted by technologically superior, network-centric warfare conducted by the United States and India.
From radar systems that failed to detect stealth aircraft to air-defence networks unable to stop cruise missiles or even drones, the battlefield record of Chinese weapons is increasingly at odds with their promotional claims.
Venezuela: The Collapse of China’s Latin American Showcase
Venezuela was once portrayed as China’s flagship defence partner in Latin America. Over the years, Caracas invested heavily in Chinese-made radars, armoured vehicles, missile systems, and electronic warfare equipment, branding its air-defence network as the strongest in South America.
At the centre of that network was the JY-27 meter-wave radar, produced by China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CETC). Marketed as a “counter-stealth” system capable of detecting U.S. fifth-generation fighters, the JY-27 was deployed alongside other Chinese surveillance radars and integrated into Venezuela’s broader air-defence command structure.
When U.S. forces launched military operations against Venezuelan targets, that confidence evaporated rapidly.
According to military assessments, Chinese-supplied radar systems were neutralized early through electronic warfare, leaving Venezuelan air defences effectively blind. Anti-radiation strikes followed, dismantling command-and-control nodes before they could coordinate a meaningful response. Stealth aircraft reportedly operated without detection, directly contradicting claims that the JY-27 could track platforms such as the F-22 or F-35.
The failure was not confined to radar alone. Chinese VN-series amphibious armoured vehicles, rocket artillery, and coastal defence systems proved vulnerable once air superiority was lost. Without resilient sensor fusion, data links, or electronic protection, ground forces were either destroyed from the air or abandoned equipment under pressure.
While China supplied modern-looking hardware, the operational network lacked survivability in a contested electromagnetic environment dominated by U.S. jamming, cyber disruption, and precision strike doctrine.
Syria and the Stealth Detection Myth
Venezuela was not an isolated case. Earlier, Chinese-made JY-27 radars deployed in Syria failed to detect Israeli aircraft conducting repeated air strikes. Despite operating in an environment dense with Russian, Syrian, and Iranian sensors, Israeli jets penetrated airspace with little warning.
While low-frequency VHF radars can theoretically detect stealth aircraft under certain conditions, detection alone is meaningless without precise tracking, targeting quality data, and survivable command links. In Syria and Venezuela alike, those links proved fragile.
Operation Sindoor & Pakistan
During Operation Sindoor in May 2025, Pakistan relied heavily on Chinese-supplied systems, including HQ-9B long-range air defence batteries, HQ-16 systems, LY-80 radars, and YLC-series surveillance radars.
They failed decisively.
Indian Air Force strikes using BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles and SCALP air-launched missiles dismantled key Pakistani air-defence nodes around Lahore, Sialkot, Chaklala, and other strategic locations. Chinese-made HQ-9 and HQ-16 systems were destroyed, along with multiple fire-control and surveillance radars.
U.S. defence analyst Brandon J. Weichert described the HQ-9B’s battlefield performance as catastrophic, noting that the system struggled not only against supersonic missiles like BrahMos but even against slower drones. Russian military analyst Andrei Martyanov was more blunt, stating that the HQ-9B “cannot intercept anything supersonic, or even reliably subsonic.”
In contrast, India’s layered air-defence network, supported by indigenous command systems and electronic warfare suites, intercepted Pakistani rockets, drones, and Chinese-supplied CM-400 AKG missiles with minimal damage.
Irony of Missed Opportunities: Venezuela and BrahMos
Venezuela had expressed interest in acquiring the BrahMos missile system as early as 2015 along with other countries in the region including Chile and Argentina. The Indo-Russian supersonic cruise missile attracted attention across Latin America due to its relatively low development cost and unmatched speed and precision.
However, Caracas focused on Chinese systems that ultimately failed under combat conditions.
About JY-27
It has a mobile AESA antenna, VHF-band operation, improved algorithms, anti-jamming features, and a claimed detection range of up to 500 kilometers for large targets.
Marketing vs. Modern Warfare
From Venezuela’s paralyzed air defences to Pakistan’s shattered radar network under Indian missile strikes, the message is increasingly clear. Against American and Indian military power, Chinese systems have yet to prove they can survive the first wave, let alone control the battlefield.
