The issue of dual control of Assam Rifles (AR)–currently under operational control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and under administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA)–has once again come to the fore with the Assam Rifles Ex-servicemen Welfare Organisation having filed a case in the Delhi High Court seeking to place the AR under complete control of the Army.
Not willing to sort out the issue at their level, Secretaries of both the ministries have apprised the Court that they will accept the decision of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
This issue, pending for a long time, comes up every now and then because of peculiar circumstances and rules under which the Assam Rifles has been operating. A bit of recap is in order here to understand the background.
Since 2001 when the Kargil Review Committee studied India’s Border management posture, the issue has been in the public domain. In its report the KRC recommended that, “The entire issue needs detailed study in order to evolve force structures and procedures that ensure improved border management and a reduction, if not the elimination, in the inflow of narcotics, illegal migrants, terrorists and arms”.
The Group of Ministers (GoM) formed as a follow up to the KRC report, made specific recommendations for the Assam Rifles. It said, “In order that the Assam Rifles may be able to play its role effectively, it should be placed under the complete control of the MHA. The DG, Assam Rifles should be selected and appointed by the MHA and report to it directly”. The GoM was possibly following an oversimplified model that called for ‘one border, one force’ in order to fix accountability.
It clearly did not take into account peculiar features and terrain that obtains on different border. Obviously the Line of Actual Control to the North, Line of Control in J&K, the IB along our west and the borders of our northeastern states cannot be guarded the same way nor is it being done so, currently. Further, the utility of AR, a para-military-force as opposed to a police force, along our volatile north east borders, and its potential in hot war situations, were possibly not fully appreciated by the GoM.
It would be prudent to take a historical perspective of AR to understand the full potential of its utilization. Assam Rifles, traces its beginning to 1835 when it was raised as Cachar Levy. It’s current strength is 46 battalions. 80 per cent of its officers are from the Army, while the balance 20 per cent are promotes from the ranks.
To their credit, AR battalions have participated in the 1962 Sino-Indian operations and even the Indian Peace Keeping operations in Sri Lanka. In 1966, when the MNF uprising overran the state, it was only the AR battalion at Aizwal that held its ground providing a foothold for launching operations to beat back the insurgents. It also allowed the use of IAF resources from within the state.
During the 1971 Bangladesh War, AR relieved regular army units in the northeast for employment in erstwhile East Pakistan. A few AR battalions were deployed in Sri Lanka during Operation Pawan in 1987. AR units were deployed in J&K during the initial stages of the insurgency. During Operation Vijay in 1999, AR battalions manned the Line of Actual Control with army formations moving out to the western theatre.
Then there is the question of ethos, tradition and practices followed by the Assam Rifles. Since 80 per cent of AR officers are from the army, the organization has developed military ethos in sync with the Indian Army. In the words of Lt Gen Shokin Chauhan, retired Director General AR, ‘Incidentally, it’s these intangibles like ethos of a battalion, morale and ethics that have decisive influence on the operational efficiency of a force. The best of equipment and training cannot bring about the culture of sacrifice for achieving victory in battle”.
So the question is: What would placing Assam Rifles under the MHA achieve? Former DGs and officers who have worked in the AR feel, making the organisation a pure police force will dilute its operational efficiency. It takes years to build a battalion and hardly any time for the force’s combat capability to slide without the strong leadership and environment that is required to sustain the state of morale.
As is also evident from the history of employment of the force, it has been utilised in hot-war scenarios to take on priority tasks in the depth and also hold lesser threatened sectors where the army units and formations had been relieved. Such arrangements require very agile units that have the grit and determination as well as training to undertake such frontline tasks.
The over 1600 km of Indo-Myanmar border that the AR guards is difficult mountainous cum jungle terrain. It has no fence, nor will a fence prove to be of much use in such areas. Across the border are camps of Indian insurgent groups. The insurgents are well trained, armed and experienced. To guard such a difficult border, there is a need to have a para-military-force that is steeped in the military culture. The army officers who lead these battalions provide them the kind of leadership required to be effective in the terrain and environment that the AR operates.
The role of the AR as given on its web site reads: “Conduct counter insurgency operations in the north-east and other areas where deemed necessary, under control of the army. During peace and ‘proxy war’, ensure security of the India-China and India-Myanmar borders. During war, rear area security in the TBA (Tactical Battle Area). Act as penultimate interventionist force of the central government in internal security situation, under the control of army; when the situation goes beyond the control of central paramilitary operations”.
Close to a 900 officers of the Army serve in the AR and gather experience in counter insurgency operations at any one time. The army provides its own resources to the AR whenever required. Such resources include intelligence, aviation effort, medical and engineering support. The AR has an umbilical connect with the Army. Given this long tradition and practice, hopefully the CCS will ensure that at the minimum, the current arrangement is continued with, or better still, both administrative and operational control of AR is given to the Army.
Nitin A. Gokhale and Brig SK Chatterji (Retd)
10 Comments
Rabindra
Assam Rifles is synonymous to the Indian Army (IA) despite being a MHA Force. It complements and supplements the efforts of the India Army and this aspect has been very clearly brought by Brig Chatterji in this article.
That they easily enmesh themselves in the active operational environment of the Army is due to the fact that they train in a system which is copybook of IA with training imparted by Training staff who are exclusively trained only in the Army training institutions across the country.
Add to this is the ethos and spirit of Assam Rifles which is no different from any Infantry Battalion of IA. This makes their presence in any theater of operation of the Armed Forces not a an aberration but as a seamless complement.
The Air Force and the Navy too are very comfortable transiting through or being guarded by AR units as they don’t find them any different from the normal Infantry battalion.
It has been experienced in numerous cases of operational debacles faced by CRPF, BSF and other CPO forces that it boils down to poor training, not adhering to SOPs, ambiguous orders and all these are pointers to poor leadership.
Most of the senior ranks in the CPO are held by IPS cadre offrs whose exposure to Insurgency operations or deployment in the tier two defences or in lightly held areas or in anti infiltration tasks in in Border is very very limited as is their training . This more often than not translate into lapses in operations ,a result of poor training and leadership and the nation pays a heavy price for it.
At unit and sector level too , there is a severe disconnect between the CPO troops , the CPO cadre ofrs and the IPS offrs who come on a two-three year deputation to command them. This disconnect doesn’t augur well for any SF organisation which is operationally deployed.
In case the MHA takes over complete control of the AR and its delinked from its roots, the IA , then soon the AR standards will be comparable to those of the CPO . its high training standards , operational efficiency, excellent man management , ethos and values which gives strength to the Unit and most importantly their ease of interoperability with all wings of Armed Forces , will all be a thing of past.Indian Armed Forces and this nation will be the loser.
Such an AR will not be able to deliver the same results as it is doing today in keeping at bay the North East militant outfits in Myanmar, nor will they be able to keep a check on them in the Seven sister states of North East. This deterioration will lead to security problems and create an additional burden on the IA.For IA to then restore the situation will be herculean and time consuming task as the lack of inter operability between the two organisations will adversely affect the operations of IA.
Big Chatterji has flagged a very important issue which has direct bearing on the operational efficiency of the Indian Army and the the Armed Forces as a whole.
I am of the opinion that the grievances and inconveniences of the AR veterans be addressed by the MHA on a war footing . For this ,MHA and IA should set up a liaison cell which caters to the AR Veterans needs.
Secondly, , in case it is feasible, the operational and administrative control of the AR should be taken over by the IA in all its aspects with the budget provision being done by the MHA and an efficient book transfer system be put into vogue for timely transfer of funds to IA.
Lastly, in case the third option is not feasible than status quo should be maintained with the addition of speedy redressal of grievances of the AR veterans by the MHA.
M r pattar
A well analysed piece. Having served as a bde Cdr with 8 AR BBS and covering both info China and India Myanmar borders as well as CI in Titan changlang any changes will ruin the ethos of this wonderful organisation. Hope good sense prevails
If not then the army must stop depicting officers and let the MHA raise a cadre of offed and handle their muck
Rabindra
In addition to the points mentioned in my earlier comment , the major casualty of an inefficient AR in North East will be the peace that exists in North East India today. This peace has enabled these insurgency ridden NE states to develop and to get integrated with the rest of India. This i success story is that of AR , IA and India.
In case the security situation deteriorates due to in efficiency of AR ,foreign nations inimical to India will capitalise on this situation and India and its Armed Forces will have a major task to try and again bring normalcy and development in these restive states of North East
Brig Yogesh Kapoor
Compliments to the authors for bringing up an issue that is on the throes of critical decision making by the CCS. The arguments meted perhaps clearly delineate in which basket the decision needs to fall.
From the genesis of the Force to its present day organisation, the Force has grown both in numbers and in experience. In its contemporary role, it could be ascribed to stand by its motto of being the ‘Sentinels of the North East’ and for very good reasons. To them must go the credit of quelling the tribal unrest and insurgency and maintenance of law and order. It has countered insurgency along with the Army units co- located in the counter-insurgency grid with effective intelligence. Its cadre drawn from the North East have inherent advantages that accrue operational and Intelligence benefits.
Ideally, the Force needs to come under the control of the MoD, for serving two masters has inherent lacunae’ and when that transcends into Welfare and Administration, the ‘raison d’ etre’ for the instant case, then a decision that benefits the State Operationally must tip the balance!
Sohan Singh Negi
Being a Para Military Force organised on military line and entirely headed and commanded by Army officers from company level to DG level The Assam Rifles shoud be kept under MoD like ICG and SFF.
Sohan Singh Negi
Being a para military force organised on military line, headed and entirely commanded by Army officers from company level to DG level The Assam Rifles must be kept under MoD like ICG and SFF.
Dhananjay Jha
All your concerns have one answer-Our NSA was an IPS.
Arjun Singh Patwal
The draft comment on issue of dual control of AR n tug of war between IA n MHA to get this force into their hand for all purposes written by Nitin A. Gokhale and Brig SK Chatterji (Retd) above is quite understandable but the actual need of hour in missing in this column. There is no problem as such as being discussed in above mentioned column written by both the renowned writers, but to understand the ground reality in terms of hardship of its membership; being less paid and less opportunities for rest and recoup in commensurate to their contribution to nations serving whole life in risked and hard areas. They only need around 30% of their service life be in less hard and risked area along with pay, perks and privileges as similar to Indian Army during service and after retirement. That’s all.. Regards. AS Patwal
Negi
I have served in AR over 39 years. Over the period of time have seen so many hardships while working in from one mountain to another with meager resources. Never complaint, but now time has come if I say over riped; ” that decision must be taken to avoid so many issues which as a solider I can’t bring to public”. People will oppose siding it to one fold bcoz their Deep interest is jeopardizing neglecting the welfare of 184 years old Force. One sided force will produce great results let it be rear area security during hot war scenario or containing CI in any part of India. This force is over due for its rights which is to be given now. My suggestion is to help to take correct decision & not harming any one else.
Aquarius
Great debate, AR must have organic operational and functional control under Army due to nature of deployment and joint training.