About the author

Rear Admiral Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande , AVSM, IN (Retd)

RADM Shrikhande graduated from the NDA. His qualifications include Masters from the Soviet Naval War College, St Petersburg (1985-88) in ASW and Weapon Engineering; Msc From Staff College(1995), MPhil from the Indian Naval War College and highest distinction from the US Naval War College( 2003). He has served long years at sea, commanded three ships and been defense attaché in Australia and to other South Pacific nations. Ashore he has been commander War Room at NHQ, headed the IN’s Tactical Evaluation Group and was a founding member as a captain of the IN’s Strategy and Operations Council. In flag rank he has been head of Naval Intelligence; Chief of Staff of SNC; Joint HQ staff duties and in the nuclear forces command and Flag Officer Doctrines and Concepts before requesting early retirement in July 2016. As a veteran he continues teaching at several institutions including the NDC, all War colleges and the CDM as well as the NDA and INA spanning strategy, operational art, RMA, Peloponnesian War, Indo-Pacific geopolitics, leadership and ethics. He has participated in Track 1.5 discussions with China and the US and is associated with the Vivekananda International, Observer Research and the National Maritime Foundations, National Security Council Secretariat as well as other institutions.

Read More About: Rear Admiral Sudarshan Y. Shrikhande , AVSM, IN (Retd)



  1. Abhay Phansalkar

    Jaihind Sir. The whole idea seems to be to secure our side first and hence the probable name ‘peninsula’. The thrust is to combat external aggression through the sea routes as sec during Mumbai attacks, bolster our SLoCs and shore establishments, refineries, nuc pwr installations and island territories along with reaching out in a limited neighbourhood. A naval skin will obviously remain uncomfortable in the jargon……. and i agree with your arguments.

    1. Sudarshan Shrikhande

      Thanks for your observations. I have no way of saying that the factors that went into a tentative formulation of the name as “Peninsula” command were indeed as you say. You may well be right. I do sense and agree with your implication that we need to well look beyond border and coastal security, counter-terrorism orientation and defence of coastlines and VA/VPs or even force-protection to a offensive-defence or like the Chinese say, “active defence”. At the same time, these defensive tasks are adequately addressed anyhow even if there might be the occasional breach like 26/11/2008 or earlier and later terrorist attacks in several places including bases and cantonments. Nonetheless, what has been a major change is the policy of retaliation.
      A simpler formulation like Southern command gives us more flexibility and greater alignment with what may be the nomenclature of some other Joint commands like the Northern or Western command. China’s Southern and Eastern Command have a primarily maritime orientation and could be the commands that could conceivably provide assets and one of them, say, the southern theatre, might be fighting an IOR war while the land conflict may be primarily fought by the Western theatre with the overall orchestration in Beijing being very integrated in input and and very joint in output. Hence the suggestions that the CDS should eventually also be the CDF with the other Service Chiefs by his side. Likewise, the US Southern Command near Miami is not the same as nearby CENTCOM HQ in Tampa, but with responsibility for the Caribbean, ocean areas around Central and South America and the S American continent itself. In all cases, ordinary prefix, Southern suffices but with comprehensive functions. Hope this helps.


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