Editor’s Note
The author has examined the growing and varied roles of drones in warfare and the related need for countermeasures. The author also flags some pointers from the history of war and warfighting itself to illustrate that some of the developments and problems that we may think of as uniquely “modern” may have echoes and analogical examples from the past, including gaps between “measures” and countermeasures.” Most conflicts, according to him, have been “modern” for their own times. More specifically, he explains that unmanned warfare will proliferate and drones, as well as countermeasures, would be vital for state as well as non-state actors. Drones open up opportunities for ISR and deliver ordnance in multifarious ways, which will require atmanirbharta (self-reliance). Likewise, the need to invest in developing countermeasures and ensuring dynamism in this field will become increasingly important. That, too, requires atmanirbharta. The article is presented in two parts. Part II will follow.
Dawn of the “Drone Age”: 1957 and Sputnik?
The Right Stuff is Manned Stuff, Right?
At a time when the world debates two years of the Russo-Ukraine conflict and unhelpful formulations like “drone wars,” it might strike some readers as odd if one began this series of articles on drones in warfare by suggesting that the “modern” drone age was born on 4 October 1957! The Soviets had launched an unmanned orbital drone named Earth-orbital Satellite. Not one to be left behind, the US also had its eyes on space in terms of missiles, rockets and even space exploration. Of course, their first launch failed just two months later. (Ian Kennedy, The Sputnik Crisis and America’s Response, 2005, 5). Nonetheless, they successfully launched Explorer 1 on 31 January 1958, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in July. (Bert Chapman, Space Warfare and Defense: A Historical Encyclopedia & Research Guide, 2008, xix). It could be called the space race, except that it was in different stadiums. It would not be wrong to think of satellites as Extremely High Altitude, Long Endurance, Orbital, or Semi-autonomous Vehicle with a complex abbreviation like EHALE-OSV! While the acronym is not recommended for adoption, this would not be principally different from the HALE and MALE drones (or uncrewed/unmanned vehicles) variants that we have come to recognise in recent decades.
Service Cultures
Apart from the fundamental terminological similarity, there is an interesting angle that we could consider. To begin with, neither the US Air Force nor the Soviet Air Force were keen on satellites when scientists and technologists first discussed how potentially useful satellites would be for ISR, nuclear deterrence and enhanced ICBM guidance. Here is where service cultures often matter, but negatively. Many air forces and naval aviation had deeply participated in WW II on winning and losing sides. They were important in the Korean War, even if it factually ended in a stalemate. They were initially reluctant even to see the potential missiles offered as a new way of delivering ordnance at long ranges and high speed and with nuclear warheads to boot.
Understandably, there was the impact of an authentic, palpable culture of “brave men in their flying machines” (mainly bombers) that hindered looking at “unmanned” missiles and “unmanned” orbital spherical satellites as valuable instruments that increased overall service effectiveness without endangering current service preferences. Satellites merely delivered information (ISR) but could not deliver ordnance. The US Army was the first to want missiles based on an early understanding of German efforts and plans with the V- series of ballistic and cruise missiles. Although unmanned, the V-series missiles did deliver ordnance on target and the problems of relative inaccuracy, high CEP (circular error of probability and technology limitations were factors, but not significantly different from inaccuracies of conventional bombing anyway. However, the USAF, USN and the Soviet armed forces did play catch-up when they realised the potential of missiles and orbital drones in space.
This example helps illustrate why ‘Sputnik’ – in Russian, it means a fellow traveller- did not initially have many fellow travellers within the two major adversarial air forces. Conservatism, zones of comfort, and the prevalence of a ‘service culture’ with its positives as well as some negatives pose hindrances to seeing opportunities in emerging technologies and being at the forefront of not only absorbing them but advancing them as potential and eager users who enhance it with ideas, tactical thinking. In other words, it spurred the synthesis of what Colonel John Boyd of the more famous OODA loop said: ‘It always is about people, ideas, things (hardware), and in that order.’ His emphasis was on people and ideas. (Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War, Back Bay books, 2002, 382.) Dynamic militaries think more about these three and keep working on them. Those that do not may lose out even if they are larger than their adversaries.
In our times, we hear the relatively recent “dawn” of a drone age or a quite illogical formulation called “drone wars.” Most Indians would imagine drones as the equivalent of helicopters with multiple horizontal rotors seen in weddings, stadiums, and recent conflicts coming into living rooms via television and social media. They are not wrong. An overwhelming number of “drones” are mini helicopters with multiple rotors. Most people would also believe that the birth of the drone age may be no more than 10 to 20 years ago. In this, we may be off by about four decades, but of an almost stillborn “helicopter drone age.” There is an excellent example of an unmanned/uncrewed/remotely piloted vehicle – we can pick a term we prefer – from the history of the US Navy that showed the desire for change but burdened by the constraints of conformism and some limitations of the available technology during that period.
The idea of a DASH (Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter) germinated in the early 1960s. Space does not permit a deep examination of its successes and limitations and is discarded instead of being further developed for various missions even beyond the US Navy’s needs. It was conceived at a time when manned helicopters were just about proliferating in the fleet, but several destroyers in the US Navy were not capable of hosting helicopters. The DASH more appropriately designated the QH-50, is made by Gyrodyne in the US. For its time, it was merely a small company, bought over and renamed by an imaginative Greek migrant but a man with vision, courage and a stomach for risk. (See CJ Papaas, SLDinfo.com, 12 May 2010.) Today – and we know this type in India – would be owners of start-ups or fairly new SMEs working in such fields with high commitment and clear results.
Teething Troubles Do Yield Strong Bites Later
The QH-50 did have problems, but most were overcome. Curiously, the programme had begun as a single-pilot helicopter concept for the Marine Corps. It never really fructified. However, Adm Burke, a long-serving and visionary Navy Chief, saw the potential to develop an unmanned version that could deliver two torpedoes or even a nuclear depth charge to a range of 30 miles from a ship under positive control. The contra-rotating blades had a diameter of 20 feet (about 6 metres). The DASH performed quite well for such a disruptive design and with the potential to expand quick ordnance-delivery capacity. It had accidents, of course, due to crew errors and technical hitches. There were no crew fatalities. In a sense, the DASH was ‘dashed’ to the deck due to some sins of commission and omission. With good reason, it was designated an aircraft. However, it never had the support of naval aviators who were all about manned flying. It included ASW helicopters in the early years.
That community did not welcome unmanned competition and instead highlighted the DASH’s limitations while emphasizing the capabilities of manned ‘copters. The ASW community saw its value, as did some seniors in the ‘surface ship’ community, but they encountered a lack of support for manning unmanned craft, an incident and accident reporting system as per aviation format but with little help from aviators, lack of spares support because aviation materiel chains stymied the process. As BJ Armstrong, a noted naval strategist and author, wrote, “Afraid they couldn’t get parts for repairs, commanding officers tended to keep aircraft grounded.” (Cdr BJ Armstrong, Naval History Magazine, June 2016.)
Operators needed to be pilots of sorts but were not adequately trained to fly such or any other aircraft. In a sense, aviators wished it to fail, and those who saw the potential couldn’t make it succeed. However, innovative individuals developed variants for combat conditions of Vietnam for gun-spotting, airborne warning, and a jeep-mounted “night panther” version for the US Army for night ISR. As Ensign Sarah Clark wrote in a prize-winning essay, “The DASH program suffered…because it did not fit pilot identity at the time.” (Sarah Clark, USNI Proceedings, Sept 2022.)
However…
There are some caveats, of course. In the 1960s, there was nothing like an accurate, ubiquitous navigation and positioning system like GPS (or some of us naval oldies would recall SatNav) and mapping like Google or its equivalents. Remote command and control (C2) had limitations; communications systems were hardly digitised; control systems within the vehicles and on platforms or locations that “flew” the RPV from land or in ships or other aircraft were more analogous than digital; sophisticated batteries and lighter materials like composites and advanced plastics were rare, if not unknown; simulators for training at reduced cost, reduced risk and reduced time were again not common or non-existent. Yet, the DASH effort is essential for its positive and negative lessons.
It was a disruptive idea with elements of disruptive technologies. However, it could not entirely disrupt conformist and biased minds! The customer (i.e. USN’s aviation) was not happy with the idea; big companies that made conventional manned aircraft of all types did not wish for disruptive competition. After all, ASW was being done by fixed-wing aircraft from shore, aircraft carriers, and ASW helicopters were set to proliferate. Pappas’s comment is instructive: “Disruptive technologies are particularly threatening to the leaders of an existing market because they are competition from an unexpected direction.”
It was not fundamentally different from some services’ intransigence towards satellites and even missiles. They eventually turned around to signing up, but precious time was lost that delayed design and manufacture in sufficient numbers; demand pull for numbers and enhanced effectiveness of platforms and platform-weapon combinations; cost savings due to a fair degree of commonality across services and perhaps foreign customers. Above all, attitudes and delays impacted operational and tactical effectiveness.
Each of these angles could be seen in how the Indian Armed Forces adopted and adapted RPVs. These are well documented in the public domain. There were ‘Boydian’ shortfalls in ‘people, ideas and things,’ but especially in the first two. The good news is that we learnt to see virtues in unmanned vehicles, took a more joint approach to acquisitions of identical/similar imported UAVs, and even addressed HR issues. However, older prejudices of manned flying may still influence this.
