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The Philosophy: Balancing Civil Control and Military Professionalism
Higher defence management, in a democracy, emanates from one cardinal principle of objective civil control over the military, as explained by Samuel Huntington in his book “Soldier and the State.” Consequently, the professional military requires protection from public scrutiny, particularly regarding financial and legal decisions, to maintain its apolitical character. The ultimate responsibility and accountability for the defence of the country lies with the Defence Minister (Raksha Mantri-RM), as part of the Cabinet. However, a political executive has only contemporaneous accountability.
Post facto accountability on financial and legal issues lies with the Secretary, who is also the principal accounting officer of the department. The permanent bureaucracy also assists the RM in procurement and personnel issues, enabling sound decisions. The lack of appreciation by Service officers, due to unfamiliarity with the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, lies at the root of civil-military frictions that affect capability enhancement and operational efficiency.
The Divide: Civil-Military Frictions and Institutional Perceptions
Service Chiefs have continued to fulfil their operational role even after being redesignated as Chiefs of Staff in 1955. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC), chaired by K. Subramanyam, had criticised the Service HQs for displaying a command rather than a staff culture. A permanent bureaucracy in a ministry prioritises credibility over efficiency.
In staff scrutiny at the ministry, the matter takes precedence over the rank at which a proposal is made. Delays and denials are frustrating for service officers who rue the lack of authority. A few ministry officials give the impression that there is a superior-inferior status relationship with Service HQs, where only Service HQs are accountable. It has given rise to many auxiliary issues in civil-military relations, like rank equivalence, which are peripheral to higher defence management.
The Reform: Post-Kargil Evolution of Defence Management
Post-Op Vijay, based on the KRC Report, the Group of Ministers (GoM), tasked with reviewing national security and recommending reforms in the “intelligence apparatus,” “border management,” “internal security,” and “defence management,” appointed task forces for each of these areas.
The Task Force on Management of Defence (TFMD), chaired by Arun Singh, was the only one comprising serving officers, with the erstwhile Defence Planning Staff serving as its secretariat. Chairman TFMD held one-on-one meetings with seven former defence secretaries. It emerged that differences arose mainly on two counts – procurement and personnel. There were also references to a weak budgeting process in Service HQ and rank protocols affecting efficiency. All the recommendations in the TFMD Report, which remains classified to date, were incorporated into the GoM Report of 2001 and implemented, except for those of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).
Chief of Defence Staff: The Long Road to Reform
For almost two decades, nearly every discussion on higher defence organisation focused on the CDS, with the civil bureaucracy and the IAF opposing the appointment. In the absence of the CDS, neither the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) nor the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) shaped as envisaged.
In 2012, the Naresh Chandra Committee diluted it, both in form and substance, to the Permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. When CDS was finally appointed in 2019, with a role similar to the one recommended in 2001, the defence services had come a long way from “Op Vijay” to the Balakot air strikes. The terra firma has transformed and is fast evolving. CDS is only the beginning of a far greater transformation required for an integrated, lean and mean military.
The Strategic Environment: From Firepower to Artificial Intelligence
With the evolution of warfare from “attrition” to “manoeuvre” to “information”, signifying the primacy of firepower, mobility, and information, respectively, as the primary resources to gain asymmetry over the enemy, defence management must evolve with the times to keep forces ready for the next war. As artificial intelligence (AI) sweeps across the world, we are at the cusp of the Tofflerian fourth wave – the AI Age.
Technology-driven changes have expanded the scope of warfare beyond traditional military realms. Domains of cyber, space, and now AI require robust and sustained collaboration amongst various national security agencies pursuing key endeavours, particularly for indigenous solutions. Higher defence management, therefore, must enable such collaboration not only for resource but also for force optimisation.
Tackling Legacy Issues: Procurement, Personnel, and Organisation
Procurement: Adapting to the AI Age
AI-driven warfare requires the precise application of ordnance through automated, unmanned platforms to achieve instantaneous, delayed, or synchronised impact. Developments in AI, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) technologies and communication and information systems (CIS), besides robotics and drone technologies, have altered the procurement landscape in favour of innovators, who must be adequately supported to sustain progressive innovations. The Defence Procurement Board (DPB) and Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), having broadly served their purpose, must adapt to the AI Age in procurements, research, and development. Private sector participation, driven by the proliferation of dual-use technologies in the military, has catalysed indigenisation. Discerning value in technologies for price discovery will intensify the decision-making process for financial advisors and other stakeholders.
Integrated planning and budgeting require a top-down approach, where capability, in terms of firepower, mobility, information, AI, survivability, and logistics, precedes domain consideration. It would result in coherence, continuity and evolution in force development, but can only emanate from a joint doctrine.
Personnel: Building Human Capital for Future Wars
Speedy and credible decisions lie at the core of future wars, as impact and initiative will dictate the outcome. Selection, training, and promotions in the military will need to be guided towards the prudent application of information and AI technologies to create an advantage over the adversary. Although basic military traits, such as valour, doggedness, and resilience, as well as knowledge of the application of firepower and mobility resources, will continue to be important, the focus will shift to the strategic use of information and AI technologies.
Personnel management systems in the Services need a thorough overhaul. Similarly, ministry officials need orientation on the military’s unique charter and circumstances to collaborate effectively.
Organisation: Recalibrating Structures and Roles
A common worry at the apex level is the volume of complaints. It reflects poorly on morale. The basic organisation, selection, training, and promotion procedures have remained largely unchanged since independence, despite the nature of warfare having evolved. Defence services, having had to run their own administration, undertook many functions that can now be outsourced or civilianised. Teeth-to-tail ratio is not just about numbers in combat arms or services, but about numbers actually deployed in or training for respective professional roles. Animated discussions on Agni Veer made evident the resistance to change.
Way Forward: Digital Transformation and Trust
The nation deserves an effective defence and value for the money expended towards it. Both ministry and service HQs must collaborate towards this singular objective. Reciprocal blame must give way to mutual appreciation of each other’s concerns. Structures, though important, can work effectively only in an environment of trust and transparency.
Transparency begets trust, and digitalisation fosters transparency. The saying that “in God we trust, all others must bring data” is particularly true of decision-making in higher defence management, owing to the numerous data points that matter. Data alone will show the right way ahead, and it will become progressively clearer.
The smart way to reform an organisation is through digital transformation, which involves identifying data points, data flow, and decision points, and redefining levels and spans of control. Subsequent structural reforms, including those of theatre commands, Service HQs and departments in the MoD, may be undertaken based on data generated by digitalisation.
The data generated and harnessed will also aid in the adoption of credible AI and train leaders on the application of data science in decision-making at higher tactical, operational, and strategic levels. HQs must prepare themselves for AI-driven warfare.
Maj Gen Ravi K Chaudhary (Retd), Ex-ADG Information Systems, Army HQ
The author is a former Additional Director General, Information Systems, at Army Headquarters, and Scientist ‘H’ at the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO). A strategy and technology expert, he was also a full-time member of the Task Force on Defence Management.
