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Editor’s Note
The Indian riposte to the Pakistan-engineered Pahalgam killings led to India directing its might on the terrorists and, finally, their sponsor state. However, the covert zone of response is also a huge opportunity that needs to be fully utilised. The article analyses India’s previous responses and debates the utilization of covert responses, should it be necessary again. Political cohesion within the country is necessary for such an approach.
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In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack on 22 April 2025, in which Pakistan-backed terrorists killed 26 Indians, the question of adequate response has been raised. All options, including military strikes, are being considered. The issue is that past precedence informs us that it is best to use the covert option route to hit Pakistan, and it should occur where it hurts them the most. India’s experience of covert action is interesting, and certain capabilities have been used from time to time to enhance national security. This article is not about how to respond covertly to Pahalgam but looks at the experience of responding to Pakistan post-2001 and engages in a debate on the value of decisions taken on covert operations instead of debates. Political discretion to decide on the modus operandi can be exercised if options are provided.
The Mumbai attack did not see a direct Indian response, but the rise and fall of the Technical Services Division (TSD) of the Indian Army demonstrated the value of covert and clandestine operations, both in Jammu and Kashmir and across the Line of Control. Covert operations can be useful only if they remain covert; the intended targets, if taken out by themselves, will mark the measure of one’s success. That is the lesson India needs to implement in the case of Pahalgam.
It is worth recalling that when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called a meeting of all the important stakeholders in the aftermath of the attacks on Mumbai to discuss India’s response on 29 November 2008, there was debate, and it was finally decided not to respond to Pakistan’s aggression militarily or use the hard strike option, including the covert route. However, M.K. Narayanan, then National Security Adviser, wanted to understand the ground reality and called for a meeting of all the heads of intelligence. Discussions around India’s capabilities and response showed that none of the agencies were prepared for a quick and immediate riposte. This by itself, should have raised eyebrows because India has had covert action capability for a long time.
A second consequence in the wake of Mumbai was the creation of the Technical Support Division (TSD) under the military intelligence directorate to undertake covert operations and gather intelligence. The fact that the TSD eventually dissolved in 2012 leads one to conclude that its efforts must have borne fruit. But the larger question remains: What are India’s covert capabilities? The bottom line is that such capabilities are effective when an executive decision is taken instead of being debated. That is the key lesson from India’s response to 26/11.
Covert operations are an instrument of national policy and are used to enhance or supplement other goals, usually in the foreign policy domain. Covert operations are generally clandestine and deniable. However, clandestine operations, both passive and active, are those carried out by governments and non-state actors to gather intelligence or target a specific individual or organization. This broad umbrella of definition will help us understand the nature of operations. One other distinction is necessary. Military surgical strikes are also usually covert but are sometimes publicized to have a greater impact. In India, control over such strategic operations is in the hands of the political leaders, i.e., the Prime Minister. However, covert operations are handled and controlled by the intelligence agency Chiefs. After all, R&AW under R.N. Kao trained the Mukti Bahni in Bangladesh!
Those who reported on the formation of TSD claim that NSA Narayanan convened a meeting in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks to discuss if any of the intelligence agencies could come up with a hard strike response on terrorist camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. Notably, the response from the heads of agencies was negative, or they indicated a lack of preparation for the same.
The intelligence chiefs knew of India’s covert capabilities, such as the Special Group within the Special Frontier Force. Similarly, the military has its share of expertise in the form of para-commando battalions that have been used freely for counter-infiltration and counter-terrorism operations in Kashmir and the northeast. Trained to conduct a variety of operations short of war, these forces demonstrated their skills during the surgical strikes in 2016. The only conclusion one draws in the post-Mumbai attack scenario is that the agency heads waited for a clear political directive to operate across the Line of Control.
Subsequently, the Indian Army, under General V.K. Singh, Chief of Army Staff, created a “Technical Support Division” unit to conduct cross-border raids and covert operations in J&K, North-East and gather intelligence. Colonel Hunny Bakshi, tasked with leading the TSD, later claimed it was done with the NSA’s approval. In principle, it was a good idea. Small in size and with the clout to operate anywhere, the organization did pull off some spectacular operations. While tactical in nature, these operations helped to break the back of some major terrorist organizations in Kashmir. The TSD also performed covert operations inside Pakistan.
The story of TSD eventually falling victim to the politics of covert action is not unique. What killed the initiative was rivalry within the armed forces and senior individuals who were, at that time, aspiring for higher things in the Army’s hierarchy. There would also have been quiet resistance from the other intelligence agencies. The argument would have been that TSD is an instrument of state policy to engage in covert action for which there was no mandate.
Subsequently, in 2011 and 2016, India’s government carried out surgical strikes. The difference was that the first one was kept secret, while in 2016, the operation was made public. When transborder military covert operations are made public, like in 2015 (Myanmar) and 2016 (PoJK), the Prime Minister would have taken the final call. That is probably why the 2016 surgical strikes had a greater impact on the adversary than before, even though its impact was short-lived.
The experiment with the 2015 attack inside Myanmar by Indian Army para-commandos demonstrated the value of such operations. In the larger strategic context, quick political decision-making is an important element in engaging in covert strikes. The primary lesson learnt is that when covert action is to be undertaken, a decision has to be taken and not debated. What took place post-26/11 was a debate; what happened post-Pulwama in 2016 was a decision. It made all the difference. Irrespective of whether it is a strategic or a tactical decision, covert action, by its very nature, provides the underpinnings of support to national policy because of deniability. India’s experience of covert operations must be revisited to better understand its influence on national security policy and how it can be effectively used to respond to Pahalgam-like episodes.
