![](https://bharatshakti.in/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/LT-BSI-Defence.gif")
Editor’s Note
The author examines the US–Iran standoff through the lens of calculated brinkmanship, in which calibrated escalation substitutes for decisive conflict or durable peace. From the fallout of the Islamic Revolution to the rise and rupture of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, both sides have refined risk as a bargaining tool. Operation Epic Fury underscores a familiar pattern, pressure without closure, signalling without settlement, leaving the region suspended between crisis management and unresolved conflict.
The 2015 US-Iran Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear negotiations, accelerated nuclear activities by Iran, US-imposed economic sanctions, proxy-sponsored attacks on Israel-US forces, Israel-led direct strikes on Iranian territory, among others, have laced the contemporary US–Iran relationship, tempered by diplomatic back channels. Both sides have tried to outsmart each other through bargaining strategies. To put it bluntly, it is nothing but pure brinkmanship.
What is Brinkmanship? Academically speaking, brinkmanship is a strategy in which one side deliberately pushes a dangerous situation by threatening or taking limited escalatory steps in order to gain bargaining leverage, counting on the other side to back down before catastrophe. In high‑intensity armed confrontations, this involves calibrated military moves and the manipulation of risk rather than a clear intent to initiate full‑scale war.
Since 1979, brinkmanship has been a tool in the US-Iranian interface. In Op Epic Fury, two key inflexion points have emerged, namely: a time‑bound pause on strikes against Iranian energy infrastructure (initially five days, then extended) and, later, a two‑week nationwide ceasefire agreed just before a self‑imposed U.S. deadline to devastate Iranian infrastructure and “civilisation”. These moves are nothing but brinkmanship. They may not show the light towards a permanent solution.
Historical Perspective: Brinkmanship as a Policy
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and the subsequent hostage crisis set the foundational antagonism. The US for Iran was the “Great Satan.” Washington, on its part, froze Iranian assets, severed relations and imposed initial sanctions – all elements of brinkmanship.
During the Iran–Iraq War, the United States was inclined toward Iraq. Clashing with Iranian naval units (e.g., Operation Praying Mantis in 1988) and ultimately shooting down Iran Air Flight 655 – all to deter Iran without seeking outright war – classic brinkmanship.
In the 1990s, Washington adopted a strategy that relied heavily on economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and limited military signalling. Iran, meanwhile, supported proxies, pursued missile development, and maintained a hostile rhetoric. The US avoided a major escalation and sought to coerce Iran. Iran, on the other hand, avoided direct confrontation, focused on regional power projection, occasionally exploring dialogue –brinkmanship all the way through.
After 9/11, the US and Iran briefly cooperated tacitly over Afghanistan. All this was brought to nought when President George W. Bush labelled Iran as part of the “axis of evil” in 2002. US policy re‑focused on regime behaviour.
From the mid‑2000s onward, Iranian bargaining chips were uranium enrichment, proxies and asymmetric tactics. It brought ever-increasing sanctions and occasional military threats from the US. This phase featured repeated brinkmanship—coercive diplomacy through the UN and unilateral sanctions.
Years of multilateral diplomacy produced a detailed agreement, the JCPOA (2015), which traded nuclear constraints and intrusive inspections for sanctions relief. It was a notable departure from pure brinkmanship.
The departure was short-lived. In 2018, the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA. and followed it with brinkmanship in a new format —old wine in a new bottle—cutting off Iran from international finance and oil markets. Iran accepted the gauntlet with calibrated nuclear violations, attacks on shipping and energy infrastructure via proxies, and missile strikes on US forces and regional targets. Iran deliberately raised risks while staying below the threshold of total war—textbook brinkmanship.
Since then, US military deployments in and around the Gulf have been used to signal that the US can impose severe costs. Iran has countered this with hardening of missile infrastructure, increasing and improving underground facilities and refocusing on the network of proxies. All this to project power asymmetrically and create multiple escalation fronts. Both sides are indulging in an increasingly risky form of brinkmanship.
Operation Epic Fury: Brinkmanship at a New Level
Operation Epic Fury, as a whole, fits the classic sense of brinkmanship between the US and Iran.
From the US side, the operation began with decapitation strikes. The strikes that followed were labelled as the “largest regional concentration of American military firepower in a generation,” explicitly framed as dismantling Iran’s security apparatus and destroying its navy, missile and drone capabilities, and defence industry.
The campaign has been cast as an “overwhelming and unrelenting blow” and a “mission of profound consequence.” President Trump, bordering on maximalist, warned that “a whole civilisation will die” if Iran did not yield, demanded unconditional surrender, and publicly tied a looming escalation deadline to Iranian behaviour.
That is classic brinkmanship: threaten something so outsized that the other side must blink. US officials described it explicitly as an ultimatum over Iran “holding the world’s economy hostage.”
A 90‑minute‑before‑deadline truce in which President Trump agreed to suspend bombing, provided Iran reopened the Strait of Hormuz, begs to be labelled as brinkmanship.
During the two-week pause, Pentagon and CENTCOM have stressed that US forces would remain forward‑deployed and that the halt was reversible, keeping the “threat of the next rung” alive rather than clearly de‑escalating. In other words, the US has used the escalation ladder while offering concessions—brinkmanship layered through and through.
Iran’s conduct has not been simple passive victimhood. It has targeted US and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. The attacks are not random. Attacks have had a direct bearing on regional stability and the global energy system. It has tested the resolve and political tolerance of the US and its GCC partners.
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz weaponised global markets and raised the cost of US operations—a very pure form of brinkmanship: threaten the economy to force political concessions.
In information ops, Iranian officials and media have portrayed the ceasefire as US “pleading” to stop the war and “blinking first,” claiming victory while emphasising Iran’s readiness to keep fighting if pushed. This narrative is part of brinkmanship: show you are willing to absorb punishment and still stand firm, so the adversary doubts its ability to force capitulation through more pressure.
On Iran’s side, the pattern is: absorb the devastating blows, retaliate in ways that endanger global shipping and regional stability, and then use the hostage economy to bargain from a position of perceived resilience—all under the assumption the US will not risk total regional collapse or a protracted war it cannot easily control.
The brinkmanship between the US and Iran since 1979, and especially so in Operation Epic Fury, is unlikely to yield a permanent US-Iran solution on its own. It can bring short-term concessions. Lasting trust or addressing core structural issues like nuclear ambitions, proxies, and sanctions requires a dedicated effort, not when working against the clock.
Iran may reopen the Strait of Hormuz, but will the opening be permanent? It is a question that nobody can answer with certainty. A slip here or there, and the closure can be back. The regional stability has been shaken to its core.
Iran has proven that the soft underbelly of the Middle East, i.e. the energy infrastructure, is actually fragile. More than half a decade of brinkmanship has bred resentment, eroded credibility, and failed to resolve any underlying grievance. Talks today aim just to “keep dialogue alive”.
Air Vice Marshal Prashant Mohan (Retd)
Air Vice Marshal Prashant Mohan, a fighter pilot superannuated from IAF on 31 Mar 25. A Qualified Flying Instructor commanded a frontline fighter squadron and two front line fighter bases. The Air Officer was India’s Defence and Air Attaché to UK from May 19 to Oct 22.
