Largely incommunicado for over a decade prior to his passing last Monday, a whole generation of strategic planners and military officers have missed out on learning about the uncertainties of contemporary conflict from General S. ‘Paddy’ Padmanabhan, the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) during a series of national security crises during 2001-2002. ‘Paddy’s’ writings in the public domain comprise three books that do not do justice to his cerebral understanding of civil-military relations, contemporary warfare and leadership in turbulent times.
Paddy always welcomed serious discussions on war and conflict. During one such discussion many moons ago, the author coaxed him to share some of his perspectives on J&K, punitive policies against Pakistan, ‘Operation Parakram’ and its precursor, ‘Operation Kabaddi’.
Little known also was Paddy’s deep interest in Civil-Military Relations, a journey that began at the National Defence College in 1988, where he wrote an insightful thesis on ‘Anatomy of Military Coups D’e’tat and their Prevention’ – ‘You have done the NDC Course, haven’t you,’ he asked the author. ‘You must read my dissertation when I did the course – you will find it interesting,’ he said.
After a very detailed analysis of several coups across the world, his prescription to prevent such behaviour by militaries is profoundly wise as he writes, “The military coup is an aberrant behaviour on the part of the armed forces. No reason or circumstance can make such an action by the armed forces acceptable. The onus of preventing the advent of praetorianism (excessive or abusive political influence of the armed forces in a country) lies first in the hands of the political leaders who, through wise stewardship of the state, could make the very thought of praetorianism absurd. Next, it lies in the hands of the Armed Forces, who could, by remaining apolitical and supporting the government of the day, play a calming and stabilising role in the country’s affairs. Finally, it lies in the hands of the vast, silent multitudes whose strength of opinion and collective will resist any form of military adventurism”.
Corps commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps during the early 1990s when militancy had morphed into terrorism and Pakistan’s covert war in J&K had been handed over to Foreign Terrorists (FTs), ‘Paddy’ infused a punitive paradigm along the Line of Control (LOC). It gave his subordinate commanders the freedom to resort to aggressive military action, including the use of heavy artillery, and extract a heavy price from the Pakistan Army for supporting infiltration across the LoC.
Among those who recollect this freedom of action is Lt Gen Rostum K. Nanavatty, who was then commanding the Baramulla-based 19 Infantry Division. He recollects Paddy as having a “pleasant disposition, a razor-sharp mind, excellent communication skills, and a great sense of humour. Calm in crises, he asked searching questions and listened carefully but seldom interfered.”
Whenever summoned to the corps headquarters, and fortunately, that was not often, Nanavatty was invariably privileged to have a quiet meal with the Padmanabhans in their home. The two men talking shop (meaning operations) would exasperate the hostess, Mrs Roopa Padmanabhan, who would ask her husband later, ‘Why is Rostum so formal and stiff? He never talks to me about family and other things.’ Paddy would laugh and tell her, “That is how he is.”
The post-Kargil period saw the Indian Army coming down heavily on all the military components of Pakistan’s covert war in J&K, be it the local terrorist organisations such as the Hizbul Mujahedin or the Foreign Terrorist (FT) organisations such as the LeT and JeM, or for that matter, even Pakistan Army units that supported infiltration bids across the LoC. By the end of 2000, the GOI assessed that it was time to respond to peace overtures from Pakistan’s military dictator-turned-president, Parvez Musharraf and work towards serious de-escalation and called it NICO (Non-Initiation of Combat Operations). Around the time, Paddy succeeded General V.P. Malik as the Army Chief, and Nanavatty took over as the Northern Army Commander. The two would once again grapple with the J&K conundrum.
Notwithstanding PM Vajpayee’s good intentions, the duplicitous Musharraf demonstrated no intent to support the peace process other than agreeing to meet at Agra in July 2001 to take the peace process forward. Immediately striking a good relationship with both the PM and the Raksha Mantri, George Fernandes, Paddy recommended the suspension of NICO to them after providing sufficient evidence that little had changed on the ground. Paddy also supported the idea from Northern Command (NC) that it was time for India to promulgate a Declaratory Punitive Policy to deter Pakistan from continuing overt and covert support of terrorism. It was the genesis for ‘Op Kabbadi’, the Indian Army’s first exploratory look at some Limited War options.
In June 2001, Nanavatty urged General Padmanabhan to authorise NC to prepare for a series of limited battalion-size operations to seize and hold key areas across the LoC. This punitive strategy aimed to coerce Pakistan to cease support to the ongoing covert war in J&K. ‘Why not brigade size? Are you well placed to cater for escalation? We will do something, and they will do something,’ asked Padmanabhan. Nanavatty replied, ‘Sir, I am confident that we have the size, the strength, and the resilience to outlast the Pakistan Army and to “go a bit further”.’ ‘Will you hold the ground that you capture?’ asked Padmanabhan. Nanavatty said, ‘Yes, we should, unless ordered otherwise.’ Approved in principle by the Army Chief but subject to final political clearance, NC commenced preparation for ‘Operation Kabaddi’ in July 2001.
Kabaddi envisaged a departure from NC’s operational philosophy as it pushed the envelope of proactive deterrence without upsetting the existing counter-infiltration posture or the CT operations grid in the rear areas. The operation envisaged measured, deliberate, controlled and localized retaliation to hostile actions by the Pakistan Army, infiltrators and terrorists at a time and place of NC’s choosing. Paddy desired NC to be prepared by 1 October 2001.
Then, the 9/11 terror attacks on the Twin Towers by Al-Qaeda happened. With US President George Bush declaring the ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWOT) and with Musharraf falling in line and supporting the US in Afghanistan, things got further complicated for India. If India were to act unilaterally against Pakistan, it would be perceived as an irresponsible state even as Pakistan was aiding the world in the GWOT. The window for coercive action thus closed. Though several formation commanders expressed disappointment at not being able to punish Pakistan, Nanavatty believes that calling off Kabaddi was the right decision in the given circumstances.
9/11 was soon followed by the attack on India’s parliament on 13 December, which resulted in the complete mobilization of India’s Armed Forces and a similar move on the Pakistani side. Operation Parakram was the biggest test for Paddy, who had to balance deploying a one million-strong army under conditions of ‘No War No Peace’ and without the ‘Union War Book’ being promulgated. Clearly understanding the political objective of the mobilization being a move of ‘coercive diplomacy’ and placing the onus of escalation on the adversary, he had to, on the other hand, prepare his formations for war and hold them back when they pushed hard for retaliatory action after incidents such as the Kaluchak massacre by Pakistan-aided terrorists.
It was, he remembers, a ‘lonely time at the top, only made a little easier by the excellent relationship I had with the RM and my fellow service chiefs. Air Chief Marshal Krishnaswamy, the air chief during that period and a fellow Tam-Bram (short for Tamil Brahmin), recollects several key unrecorded interactions between the two of them ‘over the excellent samosas that the army chief served’ that relieved the pressure and helped strengthen the inter-service synergy, and then, walking together at times, to brief the RM on the progress being made across various fronts. Testimony to this synergy was the seamless and stealthy execution of a Mirage-2000 strike to evict an intrusion made by Pakistan in the Neelum-Gurez Sector in July 2002 that was termed by many as Kargil-2’.
Reinforcing his reputation of being more than a war fighter was his understanding of the need for a comprehensive strategy for conflict resolution in J&K. Nanavatty recollects that had it not been for Paddy’s support, his team in NC would not have had the opportunity to produce an all-encompassing and ‘whole-of-government’ strategy for the resolution of conflict in J&K without any recriminations or accusations. The strategy paper was circulated widely within government circles but did not receive the traction it deserved. For this wide landscape, Paddy will surely be remembered as a cerebral Chief in turbulent times!
Arjun Subramaniam
(Air Vice Marshal Arjun Subramaniam, AVSM (Retd) is a contemporary military historian and the author of ‘India’s Wars: 1947-1971’ and its sequel, ‘Full Spectrum: India’s Wars 1972-2020. Views expressed are personal.)
