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EditorтАЩs Note
┬аThat a kinetic response along a prudently designed escalation matrix can attain politico-military objectives was demonstrated convincingly by the Indians in their response to another manifestation of PakistanтАЩs terror on Indian soil in Pahalgam. However, notwithstanding the espousal of a new doctrine by our political leadership that equates terrorist groups and their state sponsors on the same scale, Pakistan, under its new Field Marshall, is not expected to abjure terror as an instrument of state policy. As the author elaborates in his article, India must prepare for a grey morrow.
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On 22 April 2025 Pakistan, Pakistan-sponsored terrorists executed carnage, resulting in the barbaric slaying of 26 innocent tourists in Baisaran Valley, which was responded to by India launching Operation Sindoor a fortnight later. The operations vastly exceeded any previous kinetic response against terrorist action in terms of depth, intensity and scale of operations. As the fragile cessation of firing and military action in land, air and sea came into effect on 10 May, Indian armed forces clearly dictated the escalation ladder with Pakistan suing for peace. The scale of devastation, including the strategic assets of Pakistan, is unprecedented.
It would be naive to assume that Operation Sindoor will usher in lasting peace between India and Pakistan or that the latter will refrain from perpetuating transborder terrorism as an instrument of state policy. The fundamental intrigue is why Pakistan has indulged in this heinous misadventure at a time when its internal security, political and economic situation is extremely precarious.
Many security analysts have cited reasons chiefly as Pakistan’s attempt to sabotage the notion of normalcy returning to the valley, restore international attention to the disputed nature of the territory and externalise its own socio-political and economic implosion at home. The Pakistan army, which had assumed the reputation of a unifying force, has progressively lost credibility and legitimacy under the ideologically deranged Asim Munir after the incarceration of its most popular political leader, Imran Khan and uncontrolled unrest in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
┬аBackground
Over a quarter of a century, there have been multiple large-scale terror strikes in India, not including the ignominious moments of the kidnapping of Rubiaya Sayeed in Dec 1989 and the hijacking of IC 814 exactly a decade later, following which India was dubiously levelled as a soft state. The self-imposed restriction of not crossing LoC in 1999, which made immense political logic, only worsened matters. In December 2001, Pakistan launched an attack on the temple of Indian democracy, the Parliament. Days later it led to the Indian army undertaking an unprecedented deployment of forces along the Western border under Operation Parakram. It was the first time the mobilization of offensive formations to the western border was evaluated in terms of efficacy and timing.
Notwithstanding the complexities of large-scale mobilisation, there were at least two occasions, in the beginning of January 2002 and mid-May 2002, following the Kaluchak terror attack, where a distinct window of opportunity was available for kinetic retribution with decisive force superiority. ┬аHowever, the perceived moral high ground of exercising strategic restraint/patience in the face of international pressure prevented us from exercising this option. Nearly a year later, the forces were demobilised under тАЬstrategic relocationтАЭ without achieving the politico-military objectives. It led to the formulation of the Cold Start Doctrine, meaning launching designated forces directly from the cantonments for offensive operations across the International Border in response to a terrorist attack. The doctrine was later modified to тАЬProactive OperationsтАЭ for applying conventional forces against Pakistan in varying operational cycles. The concept of application of offensive content of the Defensive (Pivot) Corps matured against the enemy while the Strike Corps were being mobilised from the hinterland.┬а
The 2008 Mumbai attack was a result of our lack of preparedness, intelligence and surveillance along the over 7500-kilometre coastline. Pakistan’s culpability was glaring and irrefutable regarding planning, launching, coordination and real-time execution. It jolted us into strengthening our coastal security, surveillance and fishing/shipping control measures. ┬аThe retribution for such a brazen and outrageous attack by Pakistan-sponsored terrorists remained absent.
The attack on Uri brigade headquarters in 2016, resulting in the death of 19 soldiers, was responded with surgical strikes across the line of control (LoC) using special forces and helicopters at multiple points targeting militant launch pads. These actions, though raising the costs for Pakistan, were largely symbolic and demonstrative considering the temporary nature of the camps in shallow depths across the heavily guarded LoC. ┬аObviously, such actions always have the potential of conflagration in either the same or a different sector with unintended consequences, as both sides have advantages and vulnerabilities in different sectors of the LoC. What the operation achieved was an overt demonstration of willingness and capability to strike at shallow depths across the LoC.
The most striking retribution against terrorism was in 2019 when a Jaish-e-Mohammad training camp in Balakote was targeted by the Indian Air Force deep inside Pakistan in response to the Pulwama attack, which resulted in the killing of 40 CRPF personnel. The subsequent action by the Pak Air Force, including the attempted attack on the brigade headquarters in Nowshera and the dogfight, ended in a stalemate.
It is pertinent to note that a purely non-military and isolated training camp was targeted to restrict collateral damage and prevent escalation. However, what it achieved was one willingness to use the Air Force, till then considered escalators, for trans-LoC/international border targeting of militant camps and two, redefined the rules of engagement in a purely sub-conventional response matrix. With Pakistan downplaying the losses without hard evidence, the strategic aim of the operation remained underachieved.
Between the 2019 Balakot and 2025 Pahalgam attacks, there have been multiple terrorist attacks, especially in the Poonch-Rajouri sector, resulting in the killing of a prohibitive number of security personnel and civilians, indicating a disturbing trend of resurgence.
It is evident that Pakistan continued to use terrorism as an instrument of state policy, having suffered serious reverses in conventional warfare. Our counterinsurgency/ counterterrorism strategy was not able to deter her from perpetuating the strategy of bleeding India with 1000 cuts. It is not to suggest that no actions have been taken to enhance the capability of armed forces in terms of philosophy, doctrine, training, intelligence, surveillance, technology and response matrix, but these have been insufficient to deter Pakistan.
A full-fledged conventional operation as a last resort against Pakistan is fundamentally premised on being able to achieve a decisive victory with the politico-military aim of changing its behaviour. It would entail capturing large parts of its territory and substantially destroying its war-waging potential and economic assets. However, though the Indian armed forces enjoy relative asymmetry vis a vis Pakistan, achieving these politico-military objectives without considerable costs seriously impeding our economic growth is difficult. In addition, the threat from China, especially in the changed paradigm of geopolitics while constraining force application, will also require force preservation.
Considerable Chinese economic stake (CPEC) will obligate her to prevent substantial forces from sidestepping from the Northern Front to the Western Front.┬а┬а The comparative number of platforms and manpower between India and Pakistan do not represent true operational asymmetry. Operational availability, maintenance, location of reserves, and defence of critical areas not directly involved in the conflict play their part. The acceptability of losses in a conventional conflict viz a viz successes need to be taken into account.
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Operation Sindoor
Operation Sindoor has redefined and recalibrated the very strategy of military response mechanism against a terror strike in terms of its scope, intensity, ferocity and appetite for escalation.
- Commencing with diplomatic and economic pressure points, military responses will no longer be confined to LoC or POK/Northern areas (geography). It will encompass the entire swath of terror infrastructure and their support bases in Pakistan. The kinetic retribution in future can only be a notch higher than 7 May 25, with the fundamental distinction between subconventional and conventional aggression being blurred. In effect, triggering a terror incident is equal to launching conventional conflict sans differencing between terrorists and their state sponsors.
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- Attribution to Pakistan and its complicity in a terror incident will be the prerogative of Indian intelligence agencies and bereft of validation by world powers in view of PakistanтАЩs track record of exporting terrorism to the world. Strategic restraint/ hesitancy/ambiguity is replaced by strategic assertion, clarity and maturity. The role of world powers in advising restraint and dialogue will be severely restricted, though India will keep the international community informed about its actions.
- Nuclear sabre rattling will not deter or debilitate a conventional response. At the same time, Pakistan’s retaliation, if any, will dictate the varying levels/intensity of conventional response. India understands that sufficient space is available to prosecute a kinetic response of varying intensity buttressed by its robust second-strike capability through the nuclear triad.
- India may continue to calibrate its conventional response on its own terms by focused, responsible, proportional and non-escalatory targeting to maintain control over escalation while demonstrating its potential to escalate if provoked. All three phases of Operation Sindoor on 07, 09 and 10 May 25 demonstrated this tenet by progressively targeting terror infrastructure and military establishments.
The Road Ahead
It is unlikely that Pakistan will jettison its propensity to perpetuate terrorism in India anytime soon in view of its pathological reliance on jihadist proxies and its repeated humiliation, as long as the Army plays an outsized role in its governance. It is imperative for India to employ all elements of national power to impose punitive costs that are prohibitive and self-defeating for Pakistan.
- The response to a terrorist attack will no longer be based on the number of casualties but on its linkages to perpetrators and infrastructure across the LoC/border. The use of military power across the LoC/IB over a broad swath of targets is the new normal, meaning there will be no half-measures. It is a declaratory compulsion and at a magnitude higher than Operation Sindoor. As the PM said in his address on 12 May 25, India will decide the scale, location (including roots) and intensity of its future responses on its own terms.
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- Based on experience gained, targets, weapon systems, and methods of execution will change and be periodically reviewed. It will have to be backed up by robust and foolproof intelligence. The institutionalisation of theatre commands can no longer be delayed, considering the interdependency and interrelated nature of operations in the fields of communication, surveillance and graded responses
- While modernising the armed forces is a continuous process, it will seldom be sufficient to address the dynamically changing threat levels. We must be prepared to apply these forces calibrated, incrementally, and synergistically across the spectrum of conflict to achieve politico-military objectives.
- As Operation Sindoor has shown, layered and integrated air defence and counter UAS grids have functioned brilliantly to protect our critical assets. These will have to be constantly upgraded, reviewed, augmented, and networked in accordance with measures adopted by Pakistan and China. We will not fight the last battle.
- There have obviously been gaps/lapses in intelligence acquisition and sharing leading to Pahalgam attacks. These must be fixed through thorough appraisal/investigation, responsibility fixing, infusion of technology, multilayered deployment, and strengthened human intelligence. ┬аCross-agency integration in acquisition, collation, validation and real-time sharing is imperative. The unfinished job of tracking down the terrorists and their sympathisers must be taken to its logical conclusion.
- China is unlikely to join till its core interests are threatened, after which a larger regional/global dynamic will come into play. However, China-Pakistan collusion is a given, at least in terms of intelligence sharing, weapon systems and the entire ecosystem of technology, navigation and space-based assets. Therefore, It is no-brainer that we must step up to the plate regarding technological innovation and collaboration with like-minded partners for critical combat support architecture until technological sovereignty is achieved.
- Deterrence is inherently linked to capability and demonstration. The induction of technology-driven surveillance, attack drones, missiles, and artillery capable of striking targets in varying depths and intensity is important. Space-based surveillance must be given impetus to enhance strategic situational awareness across critical frontiers. Air power must be upgraded and augmented with precision and stand-off (BVR) capability to outgun the enemy capability. Cross-pollination of expertise cutting across silo-based establishments is inescapable. Focused defence spending is no longer an option but a critical necessity. Diplomacy is no substitute for deterrence. In fact, the latter will strengthen the former.
- Non-kinetic means of deterrence, including spatial, cyber, economic, diplomatic and informational resources, must be vigorously pursued, including exploiting internal disturbances in Baluchistan and KPK to coerce Pakistan to dismantle its terror infrastructure and support terrorism.
- Experience has shown that a one-off attack responding to a terror incident is insufficient to deliver the desired message. Repeated attacks of varying intensity on higher-value targets for seemingly innocuous terror incidents, even with minuscule casualties, are necessary. A graded, calculated, credible and calibrated dynamic response strategy must be formulated. Our continued deployment along the Northern borders must be kept in view.
The nation’s internal and external security is imperative for economic growth and development. Resources will have to be assigned for a capability-driven force structuring to develop deterrence in the entire spectrum of conflict. While building deterrence is costly, wars are invariably costlier and must be chosen as the instrument of last resort. Operation Sindoor has amply validated escalation dominance through the comprehensive subjugation of Pakistan. It is not without risks, but those risks are worth taking.
┬аBy Maj Gen SC Mohanty, AVSM (Retd)
Maj Gen SC Mohanty served in the Indian Army for close to 38 years in various command and staff assignments. He played a key role in planning operations during Kargil Conflict while being posted at Drass. He is currently the Security Advisor to a key NE State.
