Editor’s Note
Undersea cable networks are the highways of global communications, and as information becomes the central pivot in strategic contestations, protecting them becomes critical. The Chinese have rapidly developed their undersea capabilities; however, the Western powers have also initiated measures to protect these cables. It’s time for India to enhance its capabilities and protect its communication frameworks.
In a significant move to bolster global security, NATO has recently taken decisive steps to enhance the protection of subsea energy pipelines and communication cables. These underwater networks form the backbone of global communications, energy supply, and economic stability, making their security paramount in today’s interconnected world.
May 2023 marked a milestone with the inaugural meeting of NATO’s new Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network. This initiative underscores the alliance’s commitment to safeguarding the vast web of submarine cables that crisscross the world’s oceans. With over 600 cables stretching more than 1.4 million kilometers, these underwater lifelines are vulnerable to accidental damage and deliberate espionage and attacks.
Complementing this effort, NATO officially launched the Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) in Northwood, UK. Housed at the NATO Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) headquarters, this centre is poised to address existing and potential threats to subsea infrastructure. The September 2022 attack on the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea further highlighted the vulnerability faced by such cables. The ongoing tensions in the Red Sea have further complicated the security of international communication networks.
The strategic importance of submarine cables is not a new phenomenon. Recognizing their value early on, the British Empire ensured control over the first transoceanic submarine telegraph networks. By securing cable landing points on British territory and staffing stations with British telegraphers, they established a communications advantage that proved crucial in times of conflict and connecting colonies to preserve their empires. This historical precedent resonates strongly today. During World War I, cable cutting was an integral part of both British and German naval strategies. However, Britain’s naval supremacy and preparedness in subsea telegraphic warfare led to Germany’s isolation when all its cables were cut in 1914.
The threat landscape has evolved, with Russia’s special unit ‘Gugi’ developing new cable-cutting techniques using deep-water submarines and naval drones. While Western security experts believe Russia is still far from severely damaging the dense cable communications between North America and Europe, the threat has renewed focus on protecting this critical infrastructure.
China, too, has made significant strides in underwater capabilities. Their range of unmanned underwater robotics, and sensors, poses a potential threat to internet traffic flows in strategic areas like Taiwan, Guam, and Japan, raising concerns about possible information blockades. In addition the The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has become increasingly connected to submarine cable networks owned, built, or upgraded by Chinese firms.
As the internet has gone global, underwater snooping and sabotage opportunities have multiplied. Western navalists are grappling with the strategic importance of leveraging modern fibre-optic cables and data centres in wartime while denying their use to adversaries. This challenge is compounded by emerging technologies that offer new methods of interference.
The strategic importance of submarine cables in modern warfare and geopolitics is increasingly evident, particularly in the ongoing U.S.-China tech war. Drawing lessons from British strategy in World War I, which forced neutral countries to shut down German-owned and operated cable and radio stations, the United States is now actively working to keep critical undersea infrastructure out of Chinese control. This approach reflects a growing recognition that control over subsea cable technologies may determine future economic and military dominance.
Washington has actively thwarted Chinese projects abroad and restricted Big Tech’s cable routes to Hong Kong. A prime example of this strategy is the battle over the SeaMeWe-6 (South East Asia–Middle East–Western Europe 6) project, as reported by Reuters. This cable system, designed to connect ten countries from Singapore to France across three seas and the Indian Ocean, became a focal point of U.S.-China competition.
In 2020, HMN Tech (formerly majority-owned by Chinese telecom giant Huawei Technologies) was initially awarded the contract for laying the cable, having submitted the lowest bid. However, recognizing the strategic significance of this infrastructure, the U.S. government intervened on behalf of SubCom LLC, an American subsea cable company. This intervention aimed to prevent HMN Tech from securing the contract despite its competitive pricing.
This case illustrates the lengths the United States will go to maintain its technological edge and control critical communication infrastructure. It underscores the shift from purely economic considerations to national security priorities in the realm of undersea cable projects, reflecting the broader geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China in the tech sector.
International law further complicates the situation, considering submarine cables, cable repair ships, and landing stations as legitimate military targets. Given that military data often travels through commercial submarine cables, indistinguishable from civilian traffic, the potential for cable cutting as a military action presents a significant concern for global security.
This intertwining of civilian and military interests in submarine cable networks creates a complex strategic landscape. It highlights the vulnerability of these critical systems and underscores the potential for their targeting to have far-reaching consequences beyond purely military objectives. The situation calls for a delicate balance between protecting vital communication infrastructure and acknowledging its strategic value in conflict scenarios.
Cable Snooping
The expansion of Chinese companies into underwater infrastructure raises significant concerns beyond mere economic competition. A primary worry is the potential for these companies to engage in espionage by tapping into submarine cables. This concern is not unfounded, as Western nations have a long history of exploiting such capabilities.
Since the 1970s, Western powers have actively monitored data cables. The United States demonstrated advanced capabilities in this domain during the Cold War. Using specially equipped submarines, American forces were able to place and retrieve sophisticated devices on the seabed, allowing them to tap into Soviet military cables undetected.
More recently, in 2012, it was revealed that Britain had engaged in large-scale cable-tapping operations. The UK’s intelligence services managed to access 200 fibre-optic cables carrying phone and internet traffic, many of which conveniently made landfall on Britain’s west coast.
Furthermore, eleven-year-old reports suggest that Britain’s reach extended beyond its shores through strategic collaborations. Notably, the UK allegedly partnered with Oman to tap cables passing through the Persian Gulf, a critical region for global communications and oil trade.
These historical precedents highlight the strategic value and vulnerability of submarine cables. They also underscore why Western nations are particularly wary of Chinese involvement in this sector. If given access to or control over these critical infrastructure elements, the fear is that Chinese companies could potentially replicate or even surpass these surveillance capabilities. It could give China unprecedented access to global data flows, posing significant national security risks to Western nations and their allies.
Cable Repair Challenges
The global shortage of specialized repair vessels exacerbates the vulnerability of submarine cables. Currently, only 60 ships worldwide are equipped to carry out these critical repairs, a number woefully inadequate given the vast network of undersea cables. This scarcity can lead to prolonged outages and significant communication disruptions when cables are damaged.
Recognizing this critical gap, the Pentagon took action in 2021 by establishing the Cable Security Fleet (CSF). This initiative aims to ensure rapid response capabilities in times of crisis. However, the current state of preparedness falls short of the requirements. The United States presently operates only two cable repair ships, a fraction of the six vessels deemed necessary for adequate coverage and timely response. This shortfall highlights the urgent need for increased investment in this specialized fleet to safeguard the nation’s critical underwater infrastructure.
Multilateral and mini-lateral initiatives have also been initiated to meet the challenge. In May 2023, Quad launched a new initiative for undersea cable protection in the Indo-Pacific, called the “Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience.”
What India Needs to do on Subsea Cable front
India currently faces significant challenges in submarine cable protection and repair, lacking both the capacity and capability for effective cable maintenance. To address these critical shortcomings, India must adopt a multi-faceted approach that leverages international partnerships, enhances domestic capabilities, and integrates advanced technologies.
Recognizing that private firms are the primary builders, owners, and operators of submarine cable systems, India needs to optimize the public-private partnership model. This approach should synthesize strategic objectives with national power to create a comprehensive course of action for undersea cable management systems.
India should capitalize on existing partnerships and investments during peacetime to build resilience for potential conflicts. It needs to establish a robust cable repair ecosystem. This includes investing in India-flagged and crewed ships capable of immediate response to cable crises during wartime. The development of these capabilities is a strategic imperative essential for maintaining communication links during conflicts.
Indian maritime strategists need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the current cable infrastructure and landing stations. This assessment should determine the number of cable cuts required to isolate India, focusing on systems connecting India to its likely key allies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. Such analysis is crucial for developing effective contingency plans.
India must implement advanced monitoring systems to detect hostile interference with submarine cables. While dedicating warships to patrol key cable systems may not be feasible or prudent, alternative solutions should be explored. These include using drones, aerostats, and maritime patrol aircraft to complement conventional monitoring methods such as coastal radar and aerial and surface surveillance. The integration of cutting-edge technologies is essential. India should explore using artificial intelligence (AI) for cable repair and monitoring. This could significantly enhance efficiency and reduce cable damage or interference response times.
In conclusion, protecting and maintaining submarine cable infrastructure is a complex challenge that requires a multifaceted approach. By addressing these areas, the world can significantly enhance its capabilities in submarine cable management, ensuring the resilience of its communication networks and strengthening its strategic position in the region. This comprehensive strategy will not only serve India’s national interests but also contribute to the stability and security of global communications infrastructure.
Atul Bhardwaj
