Editor’s Note
Notwithstanding the recent positive turn-around of India-China relations, there is a lot of ground yet to be covered. A host of measures need to be pursued for our deterrence to be simultaneously strengthened enough to ensure conflict avoidance. The article enumerates a host of such measures at both the operational and strategic levels.
The disengagement at the LAC between India and China, achieved after over four and half years of protracted, painstaking, and arduous military and diplomatic negotiations, is a positive development for both sides. While earlier disengagements at Galwan, North Bank of Pangong Tso, the Kailash Range and the Gogra-Hot Spring area had happened progressively till September 22, the main sticking disagreements at strategic locations of Depsang and Demchok had persisted due to mutual sensitivities/vulnerabilities of DBO and DSDBO Road on Indian Side and G-219 highway on the Chinese side.
Though the Indian government had confirmed the restoration of patrolling and grazing rights up to areas that existed pre-April 2020 along the entire stretch of the LAC, the Chief of Army Staff preferred caution and trust verification through military confirmation at the tactical level, the buffer zones created on both sides ostensively leading to notional loss of territory by India is an issue still to be resolved.
It may be pertinent to note that the disengagement announcement came on the eve of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Coincidentally, similar disengagement had happened at the Gogra Hot Spring prior to the SCO summit in Samarkand in 2022 and earlier at Doklam before the BRICS summit in September 2017 in China after a 73-day stand-off. It is reprehensible for leaders of the two most populous countries of the world to look the other way in multilateral fora. It is imperative to recall the incidents leading up to the disengagement.
The Economic Survey 2024 suggested that India should welcome Chinese foreign investment to boost manufacturing, increase exports, reduce imports from China and strengthen its role in global value chains. On 12 September, Foreign Minister Jaishankar mentioned that 75% of the disengagement problems with China had been resolved. However, India maintained that restoring peace and tranquillity along the border was a prerequisite for normalising relations.
Chinese are not known to make border concessions, which they consider core interests involving sovereignty. It has passed three laws: the Land Boundary Law effective from 01 January 2022, the Coast Guard Law effective from 01 February 2021, and the Maritime Traffic Safety Law effective from 01 September 2021 to buttress its assertive posture and resolve its land and maritime disputes on its preferred terms.
China violated border-specific agreements with India in 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013 and amassed troops along the LAC. It made selective intrusions into sensitive areas, following its strategy of salami slicing through, claiming, occupying, legitimising and integrating. Over the past several years, it has made extensive dual-use infrastructure developments close to the LAC, including Xiaokang (well-off) villages, permanent habitats, roads, bridges, storage sites, heliports, airfields and even a pier on the Pangong Tso.
Consequent to disengagement and de-escalation at Doklam in 2017, the Chinese have vastly improved military infrastructure on its side of the LAC with the option of attempting another foray towards Jampheri Ridge, concurrent with border negotiations with Bhutan. It has reportedly embarked on a plan to enhance its stockpile of nuclear weapons to 1000 by 2030. What, then, is the current compulsion towards a conciliatory climb down?
- The standoff at the border has become self-defeating and counterproductive in the face of a resolute Indian response. Integration of Taiwan is a far more core compulsion than indulgence in a multi-front quagmire.
- China is possibly at its weakest economic, military and diplomatic stature in over a decade. It has suffered relentless pushback from the US and much of the West on trade and high-end technology, which will likely worsen once Trump assumes power. There is likely to be a tariff of up to 60 per cent on Chinese goods entering the US.
- Its economic relations with the EU (especially electric vehicles), the UK and Australia are facing severe headwinds due to tariffs and counter-tariffs, derisking, and the IMF downgrading its GDP growth to 4.8 per cent.
- The South China Sea is increasingly contested and militarised with a resolute Philippines, Japan, Vietnam and even ASEAN calling for a rules-based international order based on UNCLOS.
- Internally, the situation is increasingly precarious with the economic crisis, violent crimes, youth unemployment and housing issues. The recent incidents of multiple mass knife attacks, vehicles running into crowds and bikers blocking major thoroughfares only indicate the deeper malaise. The Exodus of Foreign Direct Investments and the declining property sector that contributed nearly 30 per cent of GDP has had a debilitating effect, compromising its aspiration to match the US as a global power.
- There is growing discontentment/implosion within the CPC and PLA due to the large-scale purging of senior officials, including ministers, leaving Xi Jinping nearly isolated.
- Prolonged deployment in the inhospitable areas of TAR has resulted in excessive casualties and low morale amongst the weak and timid PLA soldiers.
However, it would be naive to assume China is abandoning its territorial expansionism along the disputed borders. Concurrently, India’s growing military, economic, and diplomatic stature in the geostrategic and geoeconomic arena allows it to negotiate from a position of assertive equivalence. It is keen to maintain its strategy of multi-alignment (SCO, BRICS, QUAD, G20, I2U2) to contribute to its comprehensive national power while at the same time impairing Beijing’s anti-Western agenda. The thaw along the LAC needs to be sustained by maintaining a credible and demonstrative deterrent posture all along the LAC to prevent a Galwan 2.0. India’s long-term strategy must include:
At Operational Level
- The instant agreement deals with patrolling rights in Depsang and Demchok and does not include buffer zones of 3-10 km (mainly on its own side) created in areas of Galwan, Gogra Hot Spring, Pangong Tso and Kailash Range. Status quo ante would mean rights as existed before April 2020. India must unequivocally insist on this arrangement.
- China has jettisoned the earlier agreements on border issues through its belligerent behaviour in 2020. There should be a new inviolable framework with attendant costs for non-compliance. Hardnosed negotiations are imperative.
- India must maintain a robust all-weather technology driven and multiple means of ground and aerial surveillance 24/7, ISR, to monitor Chinese nefarious intentions.
- Maintain matching mobilization timings and operational resilience for troops and equipment reacting to criticalities at various points on the LAC as also exercise options for Quid pro Quo. It will be dynamic as PLA troops build up for exercises or turnover.
- Relocation of mechanised forces, artillery, aviation and other combat support assets must be based on verifiable actions by the PLA. The terrain being dissimilar on either side makes the time taken for build-up at critical points crucial. Maintaining coercive content in the defensive layout is essential, as demonstrated at Kailash Range. It would mean reappropriating forces from the Western Sector, and less threatened sectors in the valley would persist.
- The rules of engagement, which were violated by the PLA troops using nail and spike-studded clubs at Galwan, need to be unambiguously defined. During patrolling to the designated locations, reserve patrols of adequate strength be echeloned in mutually supporting distances to respond to any unforeseen contingency in a competitive time matrix. It would be predicated on the proportionate capability of the PLA’s mischievous obfuscation at various points along the LAC. Control over an unintended escalatory spiral is of significant consequence.
- There can be no compromise on the dominating ridgeline held in Arunachal Pradesh as is being reported, including Yangtse, Asaphila, and Fishtails I and II, which have already lost out on Thagla Ridge and Longju held by PLA.
- Our vulnerability in the flanks, including Bhutan (Sakteng and Doklam), Nepal (Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura) and the Central Sector, must be skilfully addressed through resource allocation and active engagement with other stakeholders.
- Future negotiations with the Chinese at the WMCC level ought to have a military representative (if not being done already), as was the case for Corps Commander level talks where a joint secretary-level officer from the Ministry of External Affairs attended.
- The return of normalcy/stability along the LOC must catalyse sustained, result-oriented negotiations to settle the boundary dispute. This must include the exchange of maps depicting claim lines and historical linkages. Time is ripe to stop kicking the can down the road for future generations to resolve.
- There can be no pause or laxity in the ongoing development of border infrastructure, including alternative axes, tunnels, bridges, roads, aviation assets, and habitat. The Vibrant Village Programme must be continued with full gusto and vigour. India must not yield to Chinese pressure to slow down border infrastructure.
At Strategic Level
- Development of disruptive technology, including drone swamps, unmanned and autonomous systems, cyber and EW to close the gap between limited skirmishes and grey zone warfare by force substitution.
- Operationalise technological breakthroughs (including hypersonics) through compressed timelines.
- Maritime capability enhancement must include unmanned assets, underwater capability and weaponisation of dual-use platforms.
- While Chinese investment in the Indian manufacturing sector and pharmaceuticals is essential to sustain/enhance economic growth, it cannot be at the cost of national security interests.
- Atmanirbharta, import substitution and diversification efforts must be pursued with urgency to reduce dependence on foreign sources in critical sectors.
- Investments in vulnerable sectors that lend themselves to technical intrusion (IT equipment, communication) must be prevented. Market access must be reciprocal to include medium—and low-end technology.
- Reciprocity must define cooperation in multilateral forums. Jaishankar raised the issue of double standards, especially regarding terrorism, at the BRICS summit in Kazan.
The trust deficit, which has reached unprecedented levels, will need time to redeem based on verifiable actions on the part of the Chinese. The asymmetry in the comprehensive national power has to be progressively attenuated through military modernisation, technological upgradation, diplomacy and selective multi-alignment. It is a given that China will remain our preeminent adversary for the foreseeable future. If we do fail to prepare, we should be ready to fail. While the development of deterrence is costly, wars are invariably more expensive.
Maj Gen SC Mohanty (Retd)
