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India is at a pivotal inflection point in its journey as a space power. As the United States and China accelerate their strategic space programs—militarizing or “securitizing” orbit in both visible and deniable ways—New Delhi finds itself navigating a complex terrain: how to bolster space capabilities without sparking escalation or inviting countermeasures from its two principal competitors.
The 2025 Space Threat Assessment from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) devotes relatively little space to India compared to China or Russia. Yet between the lines, it’s clear that India is methodically laying the groundwork for a credible counterspace capability—one that may be less flashy but no less significant in the long term.
India’s most notable milestone in the past year was the Indian Space Research Organisation’s (ISRO) SpaDeX mission, which demonstrated key technologies like autonomous rendezvous and docking. While framed as an experiment in support of future crewed or robotic missions, these capabilities are dual-use by nature. As CSIS notes, RPO (Rendezvous and Proximity Operations) technologies form the core of satellite inspection, grappling, or neutralization—central tenets of counterspace warfare.
In parallel, India is reportedly in talks with Russia to acquire a powerful ballistic missile early warning radar with a range of 6,000 km. Though its primary utility would be terrestrial missile tracking—particularly from Pakistan or China—it would also enhance India’s Space Domain Awareness (SDA), giving it the eyes to monitor and potentially respond to threats in orbit.
India also tested a direct-ascent anti-satellite (DA-ASAT) weapon in 2019, a rare open demonstration of kinetic capability. Since then, it has maintained a policy of restraint, avoiding overt tests or threats, but continuing to build the backend infrastructure that supports counterspace operations—tracking, targeting, cyber, and command-and-control integration.
India’s space posture is inextricably linked to China’s. The PLA’s impressive expansion of space-based assets, highly manoeuvrable satellites, and suspected orbital weapons platforms have not gone unnoticed in New Delhi. CSIS describes China as having developed “a formidable on-orbit counterspace arsenal,” with a combination of kinetic, non-kinetic, electronic, and cyber capabilities. This includes satellites that can shadow, jam, or even physically disable rivals.
While India cannot match China’s pace satellite-for-satellite or dollar-for-dollar, it is pursuing asymmetric capabilities—low-cost, dual-use, modular platforms—that can be rapidly deployed if deterrence fails. India’s expanding network of surveillance satellites (Cartosat, EMISAT) and growing participation in joint tracking efforts (such as with the U.S. and Japan) reflects a hedging strategy: prepare quietly, engage multilaterally, and maintain escalation control.
Strategically, India also benefits from geography. Positioned far from the key theatres of Pacific confrontation, it can shape its own doctrine without being locked into the U.S.-China binary. But as China’s space presence expands over the Indian Ocean region and into Africa, that buffer is rapidly shrinking.
The U.S., for its part, is both an enabling partner and a strategic challenge. India’s participation in initiatives like the Quad, the U.S.-India Space Dialogue, and agreements on SSA (space situational awareness) show a deepening convergence on norms and threat perceptions.
Yet, India is acutely aware that U.S. partnerships come with expectations. Washington’s emerging space doctrine envisions a robust military-commercial nexus—one that includes integrating private players like SpaceX into military operations. CSIS warns that this fusion makes even commercial platforms like Starlink potential targets during conflict, a dynamic India must carefully evaluate as it ramps up private sector participation in its space program.
New Delhi’s calculus is also shaped by the need for strategic autonomy. Unlike U.S. treaty allies like Japan or Australia, India prefers loosely coupled coalitions. It wants access to U.S. intelligence and tech—but not obligations that would drag it into conflicts over Taiwan or the South China Sea. In space, as on Earth, India wants to remain a swing power—aligned when it must be, but unbound.
India’s space doctrine remains officially undeclared, but its behaviour reveals the contours of a strategy: deterrence by development. Rather than loud declarations or sabre-rattling, India is investing steadily in enabling technologies—secure satellite communications, ISR platforms, early warning systems, electronic warfare capabilities, and even quantum tech research.
This restraint plays well with its desire to be seen as a responsible space actor—especially important as India eyes leadership roles in global governance fora. But it also reflects the stark asymmetries it faces: China’s military budget is over four times larger, and its space budget outpaces India’s by an even greater margin.
What India is building, in effect, is a layered counterspace strategy—one that emphasizes resilience (e.g., satellite constellations, rapid launch), denial (e.g., jamming, cyber), and deterrence (ASATs, RPOs), without necessarily putting weapons on orbit.
In a world where China normalizes aggressive orbital behaviour and Russia flirts with nuclear space weapons, India’s cautious pragmatism might seem underwhelming. But it may also be the most sustainable path for a rising power—assertive but not provocative, capable but not reckless.
As CSIS makes clear, space is no longer immune to terrestrial geopolitics. For India, the challenge is not just to catch up—but to shape the rules of the game before others lock them in. Between the dragon’s shadow and the eagle’s reach, India is carving out its own orbit.
In a career spanning three decades and counting, I’ve been the foreign editor of The Telegraph, Outlook Magazine and the New Indian Express. I helped set up rediff.com’s editorial operations in San Jose and New York, helmed sify.com, and was the founder editor of India.com. My work has featured in national and international publications like the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Global Times and Ashahi Shimbun. My one constant over all these years, however, has been the attempt to understand rising India’s place in the world.
I can rustle up a mean salad, my oil-less pepper chicken is to die for, and it just takes some beer and rhythm and blues to rock my soul.
