The Jaffar Express train hijack in Pakistan and its early resolution have important implications from a strategic and tactical perspective. For Pakistan, the hijack was a reflection of the total lack of participatory governance in Baluchistan. Along with it, Pakistan has tried to propagate that it was a good, clinical counter-terrorism operation, thus demonstrating complete securitization of the State’s approach towards the province.
For a first attempt, the train hijack was quite successful in terms of obtaining international publicity, showing the way for other terrorist groups to plan for such suicide attacks. Pakistan continued to wobble in its approach to the crisis of identity in Baluchistan by merely passing the buck and accused Afghanistan of giving shelter and assistance to the Baloch rebel groups. In reality, the inability of the Pakistani state to address the needs of the Baloch people lies at the heart of the continued efforts by these people to gain independence.
The train hijack, conducted by the Majeed Brigade of Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), along with other groups, was well planned and targeted the military and security personnel travelling by the train. The train route map shows its importance, traversing the major cities as it does, thus making it a prime target. Further, large numbers of military personnel travelling on the train on leave made it a lucrative pursuit.
The BLA squad that attacked came prepared to die. Otherwise, they could have chosen to attack and then withdraw. The hijacking took place in a remote mountainous region of Baluchistan, and the attackers had two parties for the operation. The first was an assault unit, while the second was a stay-back unit to actually conduct the siege.
The fog of war ensured that narratives were first built by the BLA in terms of letting women, children and elders walk away. Of the total of 450 odd passengers on the train, around 150 were security personnel heading back home to Peshawar or other cities from Quetta. Initial casualties occurred when local police and Frontier Corps guards on board engaged the first wave of attackers but were eventually overpowered when they ran out of ammunition.
Once the Pakistan security forces responded, it was obvious that it was a matter of time before the Baluchis were overrun. With the Frontier Corps being the first to respond, initial assessments would have been made of numbers and firepower. Other security forces were airlifted to the scene with Pakistan Air Force support. It made the decision of the Army obvious, and they used snipers to target the BLA fighters. A total of 33 BLA fighters were said to have been killed in the operation by the Army and Zarrar company of the Special Services Group. This company is focused on counter-terrorist operations.
The targeting of the BLA forces within the hijacked train was conducted by the SSG snipers. It must have been a tedious and time-consuming operation, clearly sending out signals to counter-terrorist forces of the difficulty of operating in public spaces. The Majeed Brigade, being a fidayeen squad of the BLA, its operators came prepared with explosive vests to use security personnel who were on board as baits and seek the release of hostages in exchange for jailed BLA fighters. The SSG first targeted the suicide bombers with snipers and then did a physical clearing of the train, compartment by compartment.
The hijacking was essentially a response to the larger malaise afflicting Baluchistan, including enforced disappearances, extra-judicial arrests and a general state of apathy by the government agencies. The assault on the Jaffar Express also indicates the failure of the State’s strategy in the last four decades, as it has employed only military force to subdue Baloch ethnonationalism. Given past experience, this situation is likely to persist. Domestic ramifications thus indicate continued Baloch insurgency and targeting of Pakistani state institutions and Chinese interests in the province. While the train hijacking will be difficult to replicate elsewhere in the province, it will leave a lasting psychological impact.
Given the Punjabi mindset and approach, which focus on securitising the problem, Islamabad will find governance much more difficult in the future.
On the other hand, the Baloch insurgency has grown from strength to strength, both in terms of organization, weapons, and people’s participation. The violent struggle of the Baloch people for freedom still faces challenges, as support from possible external actors is minimal. However, the non-violent movement of the Baloch Yakhjeti Committee needs much greater international support than is currently available.
In the long run, the Baloch insurgency will simmer. The Pakistan State will use tactics of divide and rule to contain the problem. Given the unstable relations with Pakistan currently, more such attacks will likely occur, and Islamabad will choose to blame Kabul for sponsoring trans-border attacks against Pakistan.
India has thus far remained on the sidelines in the Balouch problem. That being said, a more robust understanding of the state of affairs in Baluchistan is required. India’s historical linkages with this area allow easier access for the Baloch people.
Dr. Bhashyam Kasturi
