The IAF Redefining Rules of Engagement

Much has been talked about and written about ‘Operation Sindoor’, which, as per the Indian Government, is still ongoing and has not yet been concluded. However, some important lessons have emerged and must be factored into India’s emergence as a resolute, capable, and responsible regional power. The immediate response in the aftermath of the Pahalgam massacre that happened on 22 April 2025 led to a whole of government approach starting with politico-diplomatic actions that included the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, closing of borders, reducing the strength of the diplomatic missions, including the military attaches’ and revoking of visas of Pakistani nationals. It was followed by suspending all trade and preventing Pakistan-registered ships from entering Indian ports and vice versa for Indian ships entering Pakistan ports. The messaging by the political leadership meanwhile conveyed Indian resolve unequivocally to take action to hunt down the perpetrators and the masterminds of the terror attacks.

While the Indian military establishment set its forces into motion, carrying out a careful and calibrated assessment of the options it had been practising, gaming and training for, the Pakistani establishment, fearing the worst, was deployed and ready to defend. The short and intense conflict that was to follow after the political go-ahead signalled a doctrinal shift in India’s employment of force to achieve political objectives. The nation was prepared to go up the escalation ladder to achieve its political goals. It was ready to call the nuclear bluff that Pakistan had gotten so used to employing at every opportunity. The attack on the terror camps and infrastructure was executed flawlessly by the IAF on the night of 06-07 May 2025, even as the Pakistan air defence systems were on alert. Taken aback by these strikes, deep inside Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, the PAF was bound to retaliate, and it did by attempting to strike at IAF bases and cities simultaneously on the night of 08-09 May 2025. Having crossed the redlines of attacking Indian military installations, the IAF hit back, targeting thirteen airfields simultaneously on 10 May 2025, inflicting much damage to airfield infrastructure and aircraft.

The physical and psychological impact of the IAF’s strike led to capitulation, with Pakistan asking for a ceasefire that was apparently perceived to be at the behest of the United States of America. The truth, however, is now out in the open as the Indian External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, has stated that he had clarified to his counterpart in the United  States that the request for a ceasefire must come through the DGMO channel from Pakistan. The IAF started the air campaign on its own terms, defying the odds of a surprise that wasn’t there considering the circumstances and finishing it on its own terms, having met the political objectives. The air defence set-up consisting of the homegrown IACCS network that had integrated sensors and weapon systems across the services ensured that there was no significant damage to Indian military installations, infrastructure and cities despite the Pakistani offensive of drones and missiles. The IAF was not only able to defend but also simultaneously carry out offensive action, taking the fight to Pakistan’s heartland and leaving them exposed and vulnerable. This doctrinal shift in the employment of air power by the IAF has successfully busted the myth of air power playing a supporting role in surface forces.

The debate on splitting air power assets between theatre commands must also be laid to rest as centralised planning and decentralised execution during Operation Sindoor clearly demonstrated the efficacy of air power with all its might. While indigenously developed drones, weapon systems like the Akash and Brahmos delivered to telling effect, this should also compel the nation to take a hard look at the limitations of the IAF in terms of capacity, force enablers and secure operational data links that are urgently required to make the IAF more potent. It is in the national interest to keep the sharp edge of the sword of military power ready to strike at all times. The IAF has delivered in a sharp and intense conflict, rewriting the rules of engagement, controlling the escalation matrix on its own terms and delivering upon the political objectives. The synergy between the Indian Army and the IAF was evident in integrating the multi-layered air defence architecture to make it impregnable to the enemy. The planning and coordination worked with perfection within the existing framework. It is an opportune moment to reflect, learn important lessons and ensure that national effort towards enhancement of military power is prioritised and focused on providing value for money. Efforts towards the enhancement of aerospace power would be in the national interest. In an uncertain, volatile and turbulent neighbourhood, as India’s adversaries would invariably look at taking measures to effectively counter the threat from the IAF in the future, we would do well to not rest on our laurels but continue to innovate, equip and train for the next round.

AVM Anil Golani (Retd)

Air Vice Marshal Anil Golani

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