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As the Narendra Modi-led government completes eleven years in power—and embarks on the second year of its historic third term—India’s strategic posture has unmistakably shifted. In a special national security SWOT analysis conducted by StratNews Global and BharatShakti Editor-in-Chief Nitin A. Gokhale, key aspects of this transformation were examined, revealing both the assertiveness and vulnerabilities of India’s new doctrine in a challenging geostrategic environment.
Strategic Doctrine 3.0: From Retaliation to Pre-emption
At the heart of this transformation lies a more muscular national security doctrine, which has moved beyond reactive diplomacy and military posturing to embrace calibrated preemptive action. According to Gokhale, the Modi government’s “Doctrine 3.0” signals a clear departure from past restraint: terrorist infrastructure will be dismantled at its source, and adversaries will no longer be indulged under the threat of nuclear escalation.
“India has drawn new red lines,” Gokhale asserted. “The message is unambiguous—cross-border attacks will not just be responded to, they will be punished at their origin.” This recalibration has turned traditional deterrence models on their heads. No longer does the threat of nuclear retaliation from Pakistan act as a check on Indian response; instead, India’s calculated strikes, such as Balakot in 2019 and subsequent covert operations, suggest a new threshold for retaliation.
Strategic Clarity Comes at a Cost
However, this assertiveness comes with its own risks. Gokhale cautioned that such clarity while enhancing deterrence, could empower non-state or irrational actors to provoke escalation. “Strategic initiative can sometimes fall into the hands of those not bound by logic,” he warned, adding that India’s hard-line posture must be tempered with readiness for unforeseen escalatory spirals.
Nonetheless, Gokhale pointed out that Modi’s brand of realpolitik is defined by risk acceptance— “a break from the paralysis by analysis that often marked India’s earlier strategic culture.”
Pakistan: Tactical Threat, China: Strategic Challenge
A significant insight from the discussion was the contextualisation of Pakistan as a subset of the larger China challenge. Gokhale noted that over 80% of Pakistan’s military hardware is of Chinese origin and that strategic coordination between the two is now more overt than ever. It cements the much-discussed “two-front threat” as not merely hypothetical but operationally relevant.
“Pakistan’s threats are immediate but limited in scale. China’s challenge is systemic,” he said, noting how the Galwan clash in June 2020 marked a decisive moment in India’s China policy. As the fifth anniversary of that deadly encounter nears, Gokhale observed that India has refused to return to business as usual with Beijing, unlike in the past.
“Decoupling the boundary issue from the larger relationship is no longer acceptable to India. That change has forced China to recalibrate, even if temporarily,” he added.
China: From Economic Partner to Adversarial Competitor
The Modi government’s initial hopes of forging a strategic economic relationship with China—epitomized by Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit to India—have been eclipsed by recurring military confrontations. From Doklam in 2017 to Galwan in 2020 and subsequent standoffs across the LAC, Beijing has pursued a dual-track strategy: economic engagement alongside strategic pressure.
But what has changed, Gokhale pointed out, is public perception and national resolve. “Today, India’s political class, business leaders, and the broader public recognize that the China challenge is structural, not transactional.”
The strategic community no longer views China as just a regional power but as India’s principal adversary—economically dominant, militarily assertive, and diplomatically combative.
Managing a Delicate Peace
While recent developments, such as the October 2024 Kazan talks that facilitated limited troop withdrawals, suggest tactical de-escalation, Gokhale described the current state as “an uneasy peace.” Trade and people-to-people exchanges may have resumed in small measures, but New Delhi remains resolute that full normalization depends on meaningful resolution of border disputes.
“India has learned from the past—delaying difficult issues like the boundary question only enables Beijing’s salami-slicing tactics. That playbook won’t work anymore,” he stated.
Redefined National Security Posture
The culmination of these shifts is a redefined Indian security doctrine that is more proactive, assertive, and aligned with India’s aspirations to emerge as a leading global power. Whether countering Pakistan’s terrorist networks or facing down China’s strategic coercion, India is increasingly willing to act from a position of strength—even if it means walking a diplomatic and military tightrope.
Gokhale concluded with a sobering reminder: “India’s rise is real—but so is the resistance to it. As we grow stronger, expect more challenges. The key difference now is that we’re no longer uncertain. We are far more prepared, far more resolved, and far more strategic in our responses.”
Conclusion: A Doctrine Shaped by Geopolitical Necessity
Eleven years of Modi’s leadership have forged a security doctrine that prioritizes decisive action, strategic autonomy, and sustained vigilance. In a world where great-power competition is resurging, and regional instability persists, India’s dual challenge from Pakistan and China will remain the central test of its strategic maturity.
As India aims to become a ‘Viksit Bharat’ by 2047, its ability to navigate this perilous geopolitical terrain will define not only its security posture but also its place in the international order.
BharatShakti Team
