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Security has long shaped India-Bangladesh relations, but the two countries have often viewed it differently.
India has focused on insurgency in the Northeast, illegal migration, terrorism and cross-border crime. Bangladesh has emphasised border killings, sovereignty, human security and the rights of frontier communities. Both perspectives are valid, but neither captures the full picture.
Today, India and Bangladesh no longer face separate security challenges. Geography ensures that instability on one side of the border rarely stays there.
Organised crime, terrorism, climate disasters, misinformation and strategic competition in the Bay of Bengal affect both countries. Security has become a shared responsibility.
It marks a significant shift. For decades after Bangladesh’s independence, India’s eastern security was shaped by insurgent groups operating from sanctuaries across the border. Illegal migration, arms smuggling and counterfeit currency deepened mistrust and limited cooperation.
That changed after 2009. Bangladesh acted decisively against anti-India insurgent groups, intelligence sharing expanded, counter-terrorism cooperation deepened, and military dialogue became institutionalised.
These steps transformed Bangladesh from a security concern into a security partner, demonstrating that the security of one country reinforces the security of the other.
That trust, however, is no longer assured.
China and the New Strategic Equation
China has emerged as Bangladesh’s largest source of infrastructure finance and a major partner in transport, energy, industrial development and defence modernisation. Bangladesh’s engagement with China is neither unusual nor illegitimate. Like any developing country, it seeks investment, technology and new markets.
The issue is not Bangladesh’s engagement with China, but how that engagement affects the strategic balance in the Bay of Bengal.
India’s concerns are understandable. Chinese involvement in ports, critical infrastructure, telecommunications and defence projects close to India’s eastern seaboard inevitably raises questions about future military access, intelligence gathering and strategic influence.
Bangladesh’s position is equally clear. Dhaka has consistently pursued a foreign policy that avoids dependence on any single power, balancing ties with China, India, Japan, the United States, ASEAN and the Gulf.
Recent developments illustrate the challenge. Bangladesh has awarded a Chinese state-owned company the contract to develop an economic zone near the strategically important Mongla Port on land originally earmarked for India.
Combined with Chinese involvement in the Teesta River project near the Siliguri Corridor, these projects expand Beijing’s footprint in areas of direct strategic interest to India. While commercial in nature, their location ensures they will also be viewed through a security lens in New Delhi.
The political transition in Bangladesh in 2024 added another layer of complexity. The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus sought to broaden Bangladesh’s foreign policy, but its early diplomatic choices created unease in New Delhi.
Differences over Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India, concerns about minority safety, closer engagement with China and renewed contacts with Pakistan weakened mutual confidence. India, meanwhile, was slow to adjust to Bangladesh’s changed political landscape, reinforcing the perception that it remained tied to the previous dispensation. The relationship did not break down, but trust was undeniably eroded.
Neither country should expect the other to ignore its core interests. India should avoid viewing every Chinese-funded project as an immediate strategic threat, while Bangladesh must recognise that transparency in defence cooperation, digital infrastructure and port development is essential if mutual trust is to endure. Strategic autonomy works best when matched by strategic reassurance.
Pakistan presents a different challenge. Dhaka has every right to maintain diplomatic relations with Islamabad, but the legacy of 1971 cannot be ignored. India’s concern is not diplomatic engagement itself, but the possibility that Pakistani intelligence agencies, extremist organisations or anti-India networks could regain influence in Bangladesh.
Preventing that outcome is in Bangladesh’s interest as much as it is in India’s.
The Border as a Shared Responsibility
The border reflects the same reality. India has a legitimate responsibility to prevent illegal migration, trafficking, narcotics smuggling, arms movement and cross-border crime. Bangladesh has an equally legitimate expectation that its citizens are treated fairly and that deportations follow due legal process.
Effective border management depends on verified nationality, intelligence sharing, consular coordination and efficient legal mechanisms. It also requires reducing the economic conditions that sustain organised crime.
Expanding border trade, improving infrastructure and creating employment are therefore security measures as much as development initiatives.
Reducing violence along the border is equally important. Incidents involving civilian damage to public trust far beyond the immediate locality. India should continue investing in non-lethal technologies, surveillance and better operating procedures, while Bangladesh should strengthen cooperation in identifying genuine nationals, dismantling trafficking networks and preventing repeated illegal crossings. A secure border ultimately depends on cooperation rather than confrontation.
Security Beyond the Battlefield
India’s Northeast illustrates how closely security and development are now linked. Access to the Chattogram and Mongla ports, restored railway links, and inland waterways have transformed connectivity for Tripura, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Assam. Better connectivity strengthens economic growth, improves logistics and enhances resilience during emergencies.
The Border Roads Organisation has become an important part of this effort. Although it does not build infrastructure inside Bangladesh, its roads, bridges and logistics networks along India’s eastern frontier improve military mobility, disaster response and trade. As climate change increases the frequency of floods, landslides, and erosion, resilient infrastructure will become even more critical.
Energy security has also emerged as one of the strongest pillars of bilateral cooperation. Bangladesh imports electricity from India through an interconnected grid, while the Maitree Super Thermal Power Plant and the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline have created long-term interdependence.
Regional electricity trade among Nepal, India and Bangladesh could serve as the foundation for a more integrated South Asian energy market.
Maritime security is no different. The Bay of Bengal has become a theatre of strategic competition, energy exploration, submarine activity, and critical infrastructure development. Cooperation on maritime domain awareness, coastal surveillance, fisheries management, disaster response and the blue economy strengthens both countries while limiting opportunities for external powers to exploit regional divisions.
The same applies to emerging technologies. Space cooperation improves disaster forecasting, navigation and maritime monitoring, while digital partnerships strengthen governance but also require safeguards against cyber threats and vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure.
These domains now deserve the same strategic attention traditionally given to land and maritime security.
An equally important challenge is information warfare. Misinformation, manipulated content and nationalist rhetoric can quickly turn local incidents into diplomatic crises. Governments, media and academic institutions in both countries need stronger mechanisms to counter disinformation before it undermines long-term relations.
The Road Ahead
The biggest lesson of the past decade is that security and development are inseparable. A stable Bangladesh strengthens India’s security in the Northeast. A peaceful and prosperous Northeast, in turn, supports Bangladesh’s ambitions to become a regional transport and manufacturing hub.
Prosperous border communities are less vulnerable to organised crime. Reliable energy supplies reduce economic insecurity. Better universities strengthen policymaking. Climate resilience reduces humanitarian crises. These are all security outcomes.
The relationship has evolved from one centred on border management to one shaped by strategic competition, economic interdependence and regional stability. That demands a broader definition of security from both New Delhi and Dhaka.
The partnership will remain strong only if responsibilities remain shared. India must remain sensitive to Bangladesh’s sovereignty, economic aspirations and public opinion. Bangladesh must remain sensitive to India’s concerns over the Northeast, illegal migration, terrorism and the strategic implications of external military influence.
Neither side can expect unconditional trust. Both must continue earning it.
That remains the strongest security guarantee either country can build—not only for themselves, but for the stability of South Asia.
Ramananda Sengupta
In a career spanning three decades and counting, I’ve been the foreign editor of The Telegraph, Outlook Magazine and the New Indian Express. I helped set up rediff.com’s editorial operations in San Jose and New York, helmed sify.com, and was the founder editor of India.com. My work has featured in national and international publications like the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, Global Times and Ashahi Shimbun. My one constant over all these years, however, has been the attempt to understand rising India’s place in the world.
I can rustle up a mean salad, my oil-less pepper chicken is to die for, and it just takes some beer and rhythm and blues to rock my soul.
