Editor’s Note
Myanmar is getting engulfed in more and more violence, with various groups having upped the ante. The situation seems to be slipping out of the control of the military junta. Further, fissures within the military are widening. The expectations of junior officers also remain unfulfilled. Defection and desertions from the armed forces are also on an alarming scale. The article details the situation and explores the feasibility of using our military diplomacy to influence Myanmar’s military leadership.
It will be three years since Myanmar held nationwide elections in November 2020 to the national parliament and state legislatures. The electorate looked forward to further movement in their desire for greater democracy, human rights and better living standards. It changed for the worse when on 1 February 2021, the Myanmar military staged a coup and seized power from the civilian government led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi of the National League for Democracy (NLD)). The military, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, justified its action by claiming that the general elections were fraudulently conducted to ensure a favourable verdict for the NLD and its allies.
The Military knew its chances of winning at the hustings were poor, and returning the NLD to office would signal a heavy loss of its influence and power, besides other complications. That the NLD and the Military were at loggerheads after the 2016 elections is well known and was public knowledge. The threat of the dissolution of the 2008 Constitution, which gave the military 25% of the seats in parliament and, importantly, control over the ministries of defence, home, immigration and border areas, was a factor that posed enormous problems for the Military. The opposition to the military coup was unprecedented and has snowballed into a civil war that, in turn, threatens the Military’s influence and control.
Tatmadaw’s Rocking Citadel
The once powerful Myanmar military is almost a shadow of its former self. It is fighting on multiple fronts against better organized, better armed and cohesive pro-democracy forces and anti-Tatmadaw organizations. As a result, it’s suffering unprecedented causalities besides ceding control over large swathes of territory despite using the Air Force to support the ground campaigns. The army’s fighting formations in the ethnic areas are battle-weary, and there is a morale deficit, especially after being in operations for nearly 30 months without respite.
There are other problems such as desertions, defection of officers and other ranks, mass surrenders, sometimes up to the company-level, insubordination and abandoning of posts in the face of determined attacks by the opposition. The military’s decision to call up reservists and “forced recruitment of children” is another indicator that all is not well in the Tatmadaw military machine.
In the past, anti-government protests had remained confined to frontier areas, home to ethnic minorities such as the Kachins, Karens, Karenni, Kayah, Chins, Shan, Mon, Rakhine and others. The fires, so far at Myanmar’s peripheries, are now blowing inwards and covering traditionally Bamar-inhabited areas comprising divisions such as Bago, Sagaing, Mandalay, Chin Hills and Yangon divisions, respectively. The anti-government movement is now nationwide. Even the all-powerful Buddhist Sangha has retreated away from openly supporting the Tatmadaw. There are doubts whether the Tatmadaw will ever again be the same again.
Tatmadaw’s Image Suffers Regression
For Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the military-led coup has been a massive professional failure. It has achieved results just opposite to what he and his colleagues had envisaged when planning the coup. It has resultantly united its opponents from all walks of life against the Tatmadaw.
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is also on the wrong side of the former senior leadership of Than Shwe and company. There are reports of serious differences within the ruling junta. The recent dismissal of two senior army generals from the governing council a few weeks ago on charges of misuse of powers, embezzlement and corruption is quoted as an example by observers. Observers point out that Senior General Min Aung Hlaing had reshuffled his governing council several months ago amidst reports of dissatisfaction, poor performance and corruption. There are unconfirmed reports of unhappiness among the new generation of military officers of the rank of Major and above who were hoping to enter parliament three years ago!
The phenomenal military success achieved by the rebel alliance called “Operation 1027” in gaining control over large parts of northern Myanmar, bordering China, is seen as a major test for Senior General Min Aung Hlaing.
Brotherhood Alliance: Operation 1027
Operation 1027 is named for its launch date, the 27th of October. It’s also known as the Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the Myanmar National Defence Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and Arakan Army. The operational area of this group is across northern Shan and Kachin states, including upper Sagaing and Mandalay regions.
Many other resistance organizations, including the People Defence Force Groups (PDF) under the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and the Kachin Independence Army, are coordinating with the leadership of Operation 1027. It has resulted in the closure of border trade with China, besides creating serious security problems. Additionally, attacks by the Myanmar Army on rebel forces operating in this area with Airforce in support of ground operations have also contributed to the ongoing tensions between Chin Operation 1027, which is named for its launch date, the 27th of October. It’s also known as the Brotherhood Alliance, comprising the Myanmar National Defence Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and Arakan Army. The operational area of this group is across northern Shan and Kachin states, including upper Sagaing and Mandalay regions.
Many other resistance organizations, including the People Defence Force Groups (PDF) under the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) and the Kachin Independence Army, are coordinating with the leadership of Operation 1027. It has resulted in the closure of border trade with China, besides creating serious security problems. Additionally, attacks by the Myanmar Army on rebel forces operating in this area with the Air Force in support of ground operations have also contributed to the ongoing tensions between China and Myanmar.
The closure of border trade is causing heavy financial losses to Chinese business interests in the area and may have severe consequences for both sides if the situation remains unresolved.
These two incidents and others were discussed at a specially convened National Defence and Security Council meeting on 10 November 2027.
The ferocity of attacks and success of the opposition forces will no doubt be a further test of the government’s military capabilities. If the results are lacklustre, it will create more trouble for the beleaguered leadership. Further, Suppose Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is unable to deliver a solution to the national problem by 1 February 2024. In that case, he may face a major challenge to his position and eventually risk being removed from his post.
It needs to be recalled that Senior General Than Shwe had deposed Senior General Saw Maung, the then head of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), in 1992 for incompetence and corruption. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, therefore, will have to go back to the drawing board to consider several options to counter the growing challenge from the opposition forces and other political and diplomatic channels to bail him out of the most serious challenge that he and the military face.
The Looming China Factor
Contrary to public perceptions, China-Myanmar relations have faced severe headwinds in the past. Relations have not always been smooth or easy. China has faced major dilemma in handling its affairs with the Myanmar military rulers in the past. These have not been isolated cases.
That China is unpopular with the Myanmar masses is to state the obvious. The Chinese strategic community does not lose the memories of the 1966 anti-Chinese riots in Burma. The unprecedented outpouring of anti-Chinese sentiments in the post-February 2021 military coup underlined that China is vastly unpopular, and the general population shares this negative perception.
China has kept its long-term strategy of gaining access to the Bay of Bengal through the Irrawaddy transit route as central to its strategic policy. With massive investments in this critical infrastructure, China has a vested interest in maintaining its relations with the Tatmadaw, the political organizations and the ethnic communities.
Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has not visited Beijing since the ill-fated coup of February 2021. It is a departure from the practice witnessed in Myanmar-China relations since the visit of Senior General Shwe Maung to China in late 1988. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s last visit to Beijing was in 2019, but in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw. He was one of the notable absentees at the BRI Summit hosted by China last month. Beijing did not invite him despite the efforts of his colleagues to obtain an invitation.
It will be recalled that in an interview with a Russian Television channel in Moscow in late 2019, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing accused China of interfering in Myanmar’s internal affairs by aiding the Arakan rebels. In contrast, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has visited Russia several times and used the opportunity to broaden relationships with those that have close ties to Moscow, namely Belarus and others. Russia has returned the favour through military cooperation, export of military hardware and other critical areas. Myanmar has reestablished diplomatic ties with North Korea, which had been cut off by the then former President Thein Sein in 2015. It adds a new dimension to the security environment of the region.
The Chinese formulation that Myanmar should return to elections and subsequently transition to a civilian government has not gone well with the military government. The level of discomfort is marked this time, though both sides have maintained high-level contacts at the military and government levels.
Chinese President Xi Jinping made his historic visit to Myanmar in January 2020 and got a real understanding of the ground realities, including the meeting with the pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, then Senior Counsellor and government member. China has high stakes in Myanmar in a comprehensive count. It has invested an estimated twenty billion dollars in Myanmar in critical infrastructure and development projects designed to secure the interests of the Chinese Communist Party in the region and beyond. It has stayed the course in the past and will continue to do so in the future.
Way Forward
Internal options for the military to come out of the current impasse have narrowed considerably in the past several weeks. In the past, the junta has spurned assistance from the ASEAN, the UN, its agencies, and other international agencies. This intransigence has been counterproductive so far. The three rounds of Track 1.2 hosted by Thailand have failed to produce results, though many observers felt this platform had some promise.
The second round hosted by India in April 2023 had representatives from Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and China invited. Karl Jackson, former Professor at Johns Hopkins, USA, was also invited; there was a participant from Singapore representing a think tank. Laos hosted the third round on 22 September 2023, but details of the proceedings have yet to be made available.
Boosting Military Diplomacy
The Indian military has its roles and responsibilities preset by the Constitution of India and acts on the political mandate of the ruling political dispensation. There are other areas where military diplomacy plays a critical role in buttressing efforts of the national security and foreign policy establishments, especially in Military Operations Other Than War. I dealt with this aspect in my article hosted by Bharatshakti on 23 May 2023. There was another well-researched article by Brig. SK Chatterji on 4 June 2023 on MOD’s expanding role in strengthening India’s foreign relations.
The Press Trust of India on 4 November 2023 reported that the USA, Myanmar and India are scheduled to participate in a joint military exercise at Umroi Cantonment, near Shillong, later in November/ December 2023. However, there has yet to be a confirmation from any government sources.
It is an important breakthrough, and its takeaways are many. It will be for the first time in several decades that the US and Myanmar military will participate together, and that too in the company of Indian counterparts. It has the potential to grow and provide more opportunities for the beleaguered junta to look at its various options.
Shillong is an excellent choice for such a significant interaction. It will be recalled that in January 2000, the then Commander-in-Chief of Tatmadaw, Senior General. Maung Aye paid a day-long visit to Shillong to meet his Indian counterparts at the invitation of Gen VP Malik, then Chief of the Army Staff, to discuss security, defence and other issues. The Myanmar Army, a few weeks later, carried out massive anti-insurgency operations against Indian militant groups that had hitherto used sanctuaries in Myanmar for operations in India.
Senior Gen. Maung Aye was to return to India later (Nov 14-21, 2000) at the invitation of the Indian Vice-President Krishna Kant. It was the first high-level contact between both countries since 1988.
PM Heblikar
